

GPJ

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN

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Scope

“Global Perspectives on Japan” focuses on developing a global perspective on the study of Japan and Asia. The journal promotes innovative, interdisciplinary, inter-regional and transnational approaches to Japanese Studies.

The journal aims to be a venue for scholarship in E.M.E.A. region with a special focus on Turkey and neighboring regions. It especially encourages scholars from the Middle East, Balkans, Central Asia and the Mediterranean but also welcomes scholars from other parts of the world.

GPJ invites papers in the fields of history, humanities, and social sciences including topics of the past and the present. In addition to articles, the journal publishes occasional article size translations, book reviews, and surveys of current trends in Japanese and Asian Studies.

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Editor's Note

Erdal Küçükyağın

Dear Readers,

I am happy to present you the fifth issue of GPJ. I am also honored to announce that our journal has finally succeeded to attain stability in terms of publication frequency thanks to the continued support and generous funding of Toshiba International Foundation (TIFO) and the valuable collaboration of the Japanese Studies Association of Turkey (JAD). We are indebted to TIFO for the trust it has shown us which in turn makes our responsibility heavier, and our determination to produce a better issue each year.

Following two years of uncertainty, pandemic seems to be almost over and I am sure we all hope it will recede into history soon. On the other hand, our world is facing new troubles which come in the form of a war in Ukraine or drought and shortages in food or rising price levels in the coming years. On the bright side, new technological innovations like Metaverse, NFT or Machine Learning are advancing rapidly to change the World as we know it for good. We will see how those advancements will impact and shape academia in the future.




Figure 1: FOIP with ASEAN at the center (Wikipedia)

As for this issue; our overall theme was ‘Japanese Foreign Policy and Geo-strategic Vision’. We have prepared an enhanced content featuring five research articles, six abbreviated translations of selected recent scholarship in Japanese language and a short bibliography on *jiyū de hirakareta Indotaihei-yō senryaku* strategy that is “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) of Japan. This new strategy developed jointly by United States and Japan, aims to create an alternative sphere of collaboration through a combination of regional corridors connecting Southeast and South Asia, Indian Ocean and Southeastern Africa with Australasia and the Pacific Ocean. Based on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts in 2016, Japan has been playing an active leading role in this enterprise. The Project has gained momentum with 2019 and bilateral, multilateral contacts meetings and negotiations increased rapidly with Biden administration. ASEAN is designated to be the center of the Project, binding Indian and Pacific oceans, while India is also expected to contribute largely to the synergy created.

In its recent reports; the specifics of the strategy is announced by MOFA as follows:¹

1. Promoting and establishing rule of law, freedom of navigation, market economy, etc. (with a special emphasis on communication and media),
2. Pursuing economic prosperity (with a special emphasis on Improving “connectivity” through infrastructure development such as ports and railways and economic partnership),
3. Securing peace and stability (with a special emphasis on capacity building, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief as well as anti-piracy, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation).

The document sets the aim of the strategy as to “Improve “connectivity” between Asia and Africa through free and open Indo-Pacific, and, with ASEAN as the hinge of two oceans, promote stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.” A list of ‘connectivity’ corridors are given high priority within the framework:

- a. East-West Economic Corridor: Thilawa (Myanmar) – Da Nang (Vietnam)

1 <https://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/files/000352880.pdf> Accessed on 03/03/2022.

- b. Southern Economic Corridor: Dawei (Myanmar) - Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam)
- c. Yangon-Mandalay Railway (Myanmar)
- d. Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor / Mumbai – Ahmedabad Highspeed Railway (India)
- e. Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt / BIG-B (Bangladesh)
- f. Mombasa / Northern Corridor (Kenya)
- g. Nacala Corridor (Mozambique)

Hence, the strategy is planned to increase connectivity between ‘Two Continents’ (Asia and Africa) and “Two Oceans” (Indian and Pacific) via land and maritime routes. Japan has already started investing in large-scale infrastructure projects in these corridors through JICA.

On the other hand, the strategy is not brand new but an updated version of the former “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” championed by Prime Minister Taro Aso in 2006 onwards. Although the Project was left aside within a few years, it had provided the MOFA with an expanded vision. If it could be realized, “the Arc would start from Northern Europe and traverse the Baltic states, Central and South Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the



*Figure 02: An Overall View of the Arc.
(Nippon.com)*

Middle East, and the Indian subcontinent, then cross Southeast Asia finally to reach Northeast Asia.”² Former Soviet Central Asian countries and Mongolia were not excluded from the scheme of the strategy. The term ‘connectivity’

² https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/html/h1/h1_01.html Accessed on 03/03/2022.

had taken stage for the first time and trade routes to boost regional economies and multilateral relations were also prioritized. The main pillars of the Arc were market economy, democracy, rule of law and human rights.

An obvious difference between the two projects is the western part of the 'Arc' which seems to shift towards South towards East Africa instead of the Middle East, Turkey, Balkans and Eastern Europe. Also; while the FOIP has a more concrete approach and entails an actionable roadmap citing specific project names, the Arc was more conceptual than practical.

In fact, all these attempts remind me of yet an earlier Grand Plan designed by Count Ōtani Kōzui (1876-1948), an ex-Shin Buddhist patriarch and Asianist, the subject of my Ph.D. research and his ten volume Kōa Keikaku (A Plan for the Rise of Asia). In his meticulous work published in 1939, Ōtani delves into the resources of each region in East Asia and offers concrete steps to be taken towards economic development and regional prosperity. His proposal for the construction of a railway line binding Tokyo with Berlin via connection to the Berlin-Bagdad Railway is especially noteworthy when the "Belt and Road Initiative" declared by PRC is considered.

As always, our pages are open to all our readers and their contributions to GPJ.

Greetings from a lovely spring night in Istanbul...

Abstracts

Articles

Girls in Sailor Suits: Constructing Soft Power in Japanese Cultural Diplomacy

Kyunghee Pyun

Girls in sailor suits became visual symbols of Japanese modernity and subsequently of post-war Japanese popular culture. In modern Japan, from the 1920s, female students in sailor suits represented the Japanese alliance with European Enlightenment of the nineteenth century, which set itself aside from its competitors in East Asia in the process of modernization. After WWII, however, female characters in sailor suit school uniforms presented inviting access to Japanese popular culture through the genres of anime, manga, J-pop, horror films, and video games. These characters also emerged in a range of cultural categories: contemporary art for the cultural elite, Hollywood films for mass consumption, and the low-brow subculture of pornography. Japanese foreign policy, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focuses on efforts toward peace and disarmament and world economic development. The emphasis on being a 'member of the West' in East-West relations is well established in the context of the cultural influence of Japanese popular culture on broad regions beyond Asia-Pacific geopolitics. Girls in sailor suits became an accessible icon of cultural diplomacy, emulating the image of 'the girl next door' among fans of Japanese popular culture in the West: they wear school uniforms —a symbol of conformity and group identity— while their American counterparts wear casual jeans and shirts. Although Japan did not plan a geo-strategic vision of Japanese school girls representing its popular culture as a foreign policy, it succeeded in creating an image of accessible, disciplined partners of international cooperation.

Keywords: Cultural diplomacy, soft power, bodily autonomy, sailor suit, conformity, popular culture



The Middle East in 1973–2001 Japanese Foreign Policy: Why and How does a Pacifist State Secure Energy?

Mürsel Doğrul

This article deals with the political-economy of Japan's foreign policy toward the Middle East from 1973 to 2001, focusing on the impact of energy supply. As an unusual example, the foreign and security policies of Japan, a pacifist state, continues to be a popular topic of scholarly researches in the field of International Relations. While the demand for energy has become an essential factor for all countries in modern times, the methods that used meet this need vary by country. In the political crises regarding energy, even aggressive foreign policy instruments were engaged, and alternative foreign policy orientations were discussed. Thus, Japan's foreign policy following the 1973 Oil Crisis is a topic worthy of discussion owing to its special character. The success of Japan, a country where the use of force is rigorously limited by its constitution, in securitizing the Middle East region, has not yet been thoroughly examined. Previous research focused only on these accomplishments in terms of a return to militarism or a commitment to pacifism. However, the underlying philosophy of Japanese aid, as well as the grey zones it provides in foreign policy, have not been extensively addressed. This study contributes a new perspective on energy in Japanese foreign policy from 1973 to 2001. While the political-economy of Japanese diplomacy dates back to the time, the fundamental features of Japanese foreign policy are listed. As a result, Japan's use of economic power with ODA throughout the period became a model for other countries looking to play an active role in the region.

Keywords: Oil Crisis, Middle East, Japan Foreign Policy, ODA, Energy Security



D.T. Suzuki on Swedenborg. An Introduction

Federica Sgarbi

The Japanese Buddhist scholar and philosopher Daisetsu Teitarō Suzuki (1870-1966) is known for his contributions and efforts to promote Zen Buddhism in the West.

However, a field of investigation, diligently cultivated by the religious scholar and somewhat neglected in the relevant literature, is his research on the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772). Suzuki, a devoted admirer of the European author, considered his works a valuable point of reference for overcoming the profound spiritual crisis widespread in Japan at the end of the 19th century. Therefore, he did

his utmost to make his books known by translating them into Japanese and through his writings. Suzuki's research offers an original contribution to philosophy and the history of religion and an unprecedented interpretation of the figure of Swedenborg, perhaps known more for Kant's criticism of his work than for his theological views. This article aims to introduce these contributions, retracing the life and works of the Swedish mystic, with specific reference to the analogies that Suzuki identified between Swedenborg's and Buddhist thought.

Keywords: Buddhism, Kant, religion, culture, Suzuki Daisetsu, Swedenborg



A Framework for the Post-Industrial World: Japanese approach to AI and Society

Almira Bağlar, Güneş Sargüney

As one of the first countries to publish a comprehensive national AI strategy, Japan has not only pioneered many of the technological advancements, but also contributed tremendously to the popular understanding of the means to create a post-industrial society. In addition to the official documents that frame the upcoming AI revolution in the eyes of the citizens, Japan has been working towards creating a legislative system that covers the issues arising due to the emerging technologies, especially robotics and AI. The purpose of this study is to analyse different aspects of Japan's national AI strategy, and understand why the country prioritises tackling socio-economic issues such as well-ageing and labour shortages by diving deeper into the published documents that constitute the basics of the current and future laws and legislature. Furthermore, the study offers an outlook about the insights to be gained from the Japanese experience, while the country creates a full-fledged legal framework that works with and for our changing social dynamics in the AI-powered future.

Keywords: ageing population, artificial intelligence, robotics, labour shortages



A Collection about the Russo-Japanese War in the Atatürk Library

Muratcan Zorcu

This paper draws attention to a collection of the Atatürk Library in Istanbul because this collection has significant materials about the Russo-Japanese War from 1904

and 1905. Throughout and after the wartime, many of the Ottoman military staff translated military books about the war from different languages, as well as gathered numerous materials like postcards and maps in their own individual collections. It is impossible to highlight that this military staff were not solely from the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire but also were the founding fathers of the new republic in Anatolia and a military group. The Russo-Japanese War shaped the understanding of these figures, such as the top people from Marshall Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] and General Kazım [Karabekir] to General Fahreddin [Türkkan] Pashas and the ordinary army officers. Pertev Bey [Demirhan], who was sent to this war as an observer by Abdülhamid II, also impacted the Ottoman military staff in the following years because he gave lectures at the Military School in Istanbul. We are able to understand and uncover the dimensions of the impacts of the Russo-Japanese War on the Ottoman military staff with the collection in the Atatürk Library. Accordingly, this collection helps us remember the impacts of the Russo-Japanese War on the mentality of the Ottoman military staff during the late Ottoman period, as well as the early phase of the Turkish Republic.

Keywords: Russo-Japanese War, Ottoman Army, Pertev [Demirhan], Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk], Vladimir Semenov, Atatürk Library

Selected Abbreviated Translations

Japan's Asian Strategy and the Indo-Pacific

Kamiya Matake

(transl. Aynur Erzenoğlu)

The “Indo-Pacific region” is a novel term in the lexicon of the actors on the global stage that has recently risen as the successor of the Asia-Pacific region due to the shift in the balance of geopolitical forces. The region's expanding demographic, economic, and political potential makes it crucial in shaping the international order. Different actors have different understandings of this geopolitical construct; they also have varying economic and strategic approaches toward it. Japan has become a prominent participant in this region due to the efforts of the Abe administration as well as its geographical location. This paper aims to examine the regional concept of the Indo-Pacific from Japan's perspective, discuss the future Indo-Pacific vision that is desirable for Japan, and provide policy recommendations that would serve to realize this vision based on the assumption that Japan will pursue such an Indo-

Pacific vision in the future.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific region, Japan, maritime Asia, Abe administration, international relations, strategy



The Japan-U.S. Alliance and East Asian Security

Sako Susumu

(transl. Ayşe Duygu Dayıoğlu)

Recently, the national security environment surrounding Japan has become more severe than before. North Korea and China are the cause of such difficult conditions. North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and Peoples Republic of China intends to expand its influence in international society. Therefore, Japan is trying to respond these threats, and the United States of America, allied state of Japan, has given up its 'engagement' policy towards China. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has adopted a strong posture towards China. The U.S. presence in East Asia has contributed to keeping this region relatively stable. So, Japan has to maintain cooperation with the U.S. to sustain freedom, prosperity and peace in this region.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, China, US Alliance, engagement policy, security



Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region: Current Status and Prospects of Competition between Major Powers

Yoichi Kato

(transl. Sevgi Zeyneloğlu)

The geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions in the Indo-Pacific region have been undergoing a variety of changes at a rapid pace. In this paper, the changes are examined from the perspectives of the four major powers in the region: China's overreach and revision of the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), United States' hardening stance toward China, India's sense of caution toward China, and Japan's changes in strategy toward China brought about by the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) strategy. Currently, projects of the BRI are being implemented across a wide

geographical range including the Indo-Pacific region, despite criticisms regarding 'debt traps' and 'new colonialism' from many countries. As China's influence grows, small and medium-sized countries of the region are playing a role in the struggle between United States and Japan's FOIP and China's BRI. China's aim to expand its own national power challenges the previously U.S.-dominated order, while Japan is in a position to advocate maintenance of the existing order and while India sees a multipolar order as more desirable. Although China's growing power in Asia is appearing sooner than expected, it is also evident that the US will not concede its leadership position in the Indo-Pacific. The fundamental question is whether the dominance of the United States that has prevailed since the end of Cold War can be sustained, and if it cannot, how the new order will be formed.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, FOIP, BRI, geopolitics, geoeconomics



**China's Soft-Power in Japan and its Limits
- A Comparison with South Korea's -**

Satoko Yasuno, Yasuko Enomoto

(transl. Elif Alkan)

China and South Korea, appearing as the strong competitors of a soft power rivalry in Eastern Asia, have their peculiar policies in an attempt to attain soft power in the region. Although both countries have a strong potential for soft power, in the context of the Japanese community, China and South Korea intend to elicit positive impressions owing to their soft power strategies. Several public opinion polls and the survey conducted by Tomoko Yasuno and Yasuko Enomoto reveal surprising findings. Impressions of China and Korea are indeed critically poor among Japanese society, as most respondents to multiple surveys state that they are unfriendly to the two countries in question. Yasuno and Enomoto investigate the variables that influence such negative attributions, while elaborating on the Japanese conception of Korea and China further. This paper provides an overview of their hypotheses, findings and interpretations.

Keywords: soft power, South Korea, Japan, China, impressions, web survey, smart power



The Stability of the U.K.'s Involvement in the Indo-Pacific from the Perspective of Consensus Politics and Foreign Policy

Ryosuke Tanaka

(transl. Taha Arda Gün)

The U.K. has been prominently involved in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. Despite being located far away geographically, the U.K. has a significant “tilt” towards the region based on its “Global Britain” initiative that aims to preserve the U.K.’s international influence following Brexit.

The tension in the U.S.-China relations and the shift in Europe’s position towards China have also influenced the U.K.’s strategy. European countries, including the U.K., are currently developing their Indo-Pacific policies. However, the U.K.’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific is not secured by a large population, territory, or exclusive economic zone. Unlike other European countries, the U.K. has not formulated strategic policy documents specific to the Indo-Pacific yet. Therefore, the stability of the U.K.’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific remains questionable.

This paper analyses the stability of the U.K.’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific and examines domestic consensus and foreign policy in the U.K..

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, U.K., Global Britain, consensus politics, foreign policy



Recommendations on Japan’s Foreign Policy towards Indo-Pacific Regional Diplomacy

Tsutomu Kikuchi, Mataka Kamiya, Yasuyuki Ishida

(transl. Selin Kütükçü)

Following the overlapping interest on political, economic and security issues in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, an Indo-Pacific strategy started to gain importance in recent years as the region’s strategic importance in terms of maritime security was realized. The power dynamics in the region are expected to affect Japan’s security and prosperity as well. Therefore, the questions of how the regional order will be structured and how to deal with the swing states were included in Japan’s diplomatic agenda.

This research project aims to introduce 16 policy recommendations for Japan’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy as a part of the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s Foreign

Relations and Security Research Project” to strengthen Japan’s foreign relations with the powers in the region, especially with ASEAN, Australia, and India, to promote a liberal, open, free, rules-based order that is in line with Japan’s interest in responding to China’s growing influence.

This project will provide a new diplomatic approach for Japan by describing appropriate measures to be taken in consideration of requirements, concerns and possible reactions of the countries concerned. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. alliance will be tackled and emphasized along the way as recommendations are listed and the questions of why this alliance is beneficial for economic development and why it is necessary for Japan to gain sympathy from other countries in the region in order to build and strengthen the foundation of their Indo-Pacific strategy and to improve Japan’s influence on the region will be explained.

Keywords: Indo-Pacific, China, Swing-States, Japan, liberal, ASEAN, rules-based order, United States



A Short Bibliography

Louis Tanaka

Recent publications on ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ (FOIP)

Girls in Sailor Suits: Constructing Soft Power in Japanese Cultural Diplomacy

Kyunghee Pyun*

State University of New York

Introduction: Popular Culture for Japanese Foreign Policy

Japan, having been a former colonial empire which occupied many regions of the Pacific, has often been accused of indifference to repatriation, justice, and vindication. Japanese popular culture, on the other hand, has ameliorated its wartime stereotype. Manga, anime, graphic novels, music, and related cultural products such as figures and characters from Japan are popular in Asia and Europe, as well as the Americas. Hong Kong, for example, has been quite receptive of Japanese popular culture. Sociologist Annie Huanung Chan connected the construction of cultural identity among Hong Kong residents with their consumption of Japanese pop culture.¹ Japanese department stores and character products like Hello Kitty and Little Twin Star have been widespread in Hong Kong (Figure 1). Cartoon programming such as Doraemon and Pokémon were well-received in television.² Manga booms led many countries to import ladies' comics with sexually explicit content.³

* Department of History of Art, Fashion Institute of Technology, State University of New York.

1 Annie Hau-nung Chan, "Consumption, Popular Culture, and Cultural Identity: Japan in Post-Colonial Hong Kong," *Studies in Popular Culture* 23, no. 1 (2000): 35-55. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23414566>.

2 In the 1980s, Hong Kong imported 1,357 hours of U.S. television shows; 768 hours of Italian shows; and 391 hours from Japan. Chan, "Consumption," 45.

3 Gretchen Jones, "'Ladies' Comics': Japan's Not-So-Underground Market in Pornography for Women," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal. English Supplement*, no. 22 (2002): 3-31. <http://www.jstor>.

Japan has used cultural diplomacy to burnish its political image since the 1930s. Historian John Gripenroeg showed how Japan wanted to reinvent itself after the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of Manchukuo in the 1930s. Japan set up a state-sponsored initiative called the Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunko Shinkōkai, KBS) in 1934 with dignitaries from the Japanese aristocracy and government as advisors and officers.⁴ In 1936, KBS organized a special exhibition with rare works loaned by private collectors, the imperial family, and national museums in Japan at the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston and later at other museums in the United States. It is common for Japan to showcase high-level art and culture to enhance its value and prestige, and this type of cultural diplomacy is familiar to the West. What is notable in the postwar period is that the Japanese government and private sectors alike included popular culture in this concerted push for soft power.

Girl characters wearing school uniforms, such as in the anime series *Sailor Moon* (*Bishōjo Senshi Sērā Mūn* 美少女戦士セーラームーン, Beautiful Girl-Warrior Sailor Moon, shown in Japan from 1991 to 1997), have many fans beyond Japan. Horror film series like *Haunted School* (*Gakkō no Kaidan* 学校の怪談, 1995), made viewers familiar with students dressed in uniforms. Girls in school uniforms are reproduced in images in magazines, manga, anime, and contemporary art. For example, contemporary artist Mariko Mori's *Love Hotel* (1994) shows a woman in her sailor uniform kneeling on a round bed in a love hotel (Figure 3).⁵ Sociologist Susan Napier included girls in sailor uniforms among four major types of girlhood in Japanese popular culture.⁶ Sociologist Anne Allison also pointed out the global impact of these "Sailor Scouts" on global communities.⁷

org/stable/42772180.

- 4 John Gripenroeg, "Power and Culture: Japan's Cultural Diplomacy in the United States, 1934-1940." *Pacific Historical Review* 84, no. 4 (2015): 478-80. <https://doi.org/10.1525/phr.2015.84.4.478>.
- 5 Jonathan Wallis, "The Paradox of Mariko Mori's Women in Post-Bubble Japan: Office Ladies, Schoolgirls, and Video-Vixens," *Woman's Art Journal* 29, no. 1 (2008): 3-12. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20358141>.
- 6 Susan Napier, "Vampires, Psychic Girls, Flying Women, and Sailor Scouts: Four Faces of the Young Female in Japanese Popular Culture," in Yamaguchi Masao, Nagashima Nobuhiro, Isolde Standish, Halldor Stefansson, and Dolores Martinez, eds., *Worlds of Japanese Popular Culture: Gender, Shifting Boundaries and Global Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 91-3.
- 7 Anne Allison, "Can Popular Culture Go Global: How Japanese Scouts and Rangers Fare in the US," Douglas Slaymaker, ed., *A Century of Popular Culture in Japan* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), 138-45;

Soft power in the form of popular culture, however, may not carry much weight in political issues of nuclear disarmament and military authority. Japanese foreign policy, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focuses on efforts toward peace, disarmament and world economic development. The emphasis on being a “member of the West” in East-West relations is well maintained in the context of the influence of popular culture on broad regions beyond Asia-Pacific geopolitics. From the 2000s, the Japanese government has embraced this effort as it has realized the advantages of cultivating Japan as a diplomatic partner that embraces peace and culture, and girls in sailor suits became an accessible icon of cultural diplomacy, emulating the image of ‘the girl next door’ among fans of Japanese popular culture in the West since the 1990s. While their American counterparts wear casual jeans and shirts, these girls wear school uniforms — a symbol of conformity and group identity. Although Japan did not plan a geo-strategic vision of Japanese school girls representing its popular culture as a foreign policy, it succeeded in creating an image of accessible, disciplined partners of international cooperation.

This paper examines the development of girls in sailor suits from the 1920s school uniforms to the 1990s iconic subculture in Harajuku known as *kogal* fashion. It evaluates the dissemination of girls in sailor suits outside Japan, which coincided with other forms of popular culture such as J-pop, films, or literature. How Japan exerted soft power on its diplomatic partners is analyzed as a policy-driven mechanism. In the historiography of previous literature about girls in sailor suits, anthropologist Laura Miller is most important in discussing dissemination of juvenile subculture in the domain of popular culture.⁸ Tomoko Namba is a dress historian specializing school uniforms and wrote extensively on the development of sailor suits to become a most representative design for school girls in Japan.⁹ Fashion historian

See also E. Taylor Atkins, *History of Popular Culture in Japan: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2022).

8 Miller, author of *Beauty Up: Exploring Contemporary Japanese Body Aesthetics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006) wrote extensively on Japanese popular culture and gender. Her cultural depictions of women based on linguistic anthropology are crucial for scholars of Japanese studies in general. More works are cited later in this paper.

9 Namba wrote several monographs (only available in Japanese) on school uniforms of Japanese girls based on the archive of Tokyo Women’s Normal School, Japan’s first institute of higher education for women founded in 1875. It was the predecessor of Ochanomizu University where Namba currently teaches. It was renamed and established in 1949 as a women’s university in Tokyo, Bunyō-ku. Namba’s paper on this topic

Brian McVeigh on the other hand has interpreted Japanese school uniforms as an iconic symbol of conformity and group identity.¹⁰ Educational or behavioral scholars have also connected implementation of discipline and national identity to the school uniform policy in the early twentieth century. These views are briefly introduced when pertinent to the historical changes of sailor suits and contribute much to the shared assumption of utilitarian purpose of the mandatory school uniform policy behind popular images of girls in sailor suits. This paper is not about a chronological survey of different fashion styles themselves with regards to girls in sailor suits.

The paper, instead, presents a geo-strategic vision for Japan to make the image of girls in sailor suits icons of contemporary art as well as representative symbols of popular culture, which would leave lasting impression of Japanese cultural authenticity beyond the realm of popular culture. This may bring a provocative, cutting-edge paradigm of new culture replacing the Cold War binary relationship between Japan and the United States. Political scientist Alexander Bukh argues that Japan's own definition of national identity emphasizes its cultural diplomacy.¹¹ As Bukh stressed, with the post-war national identity of Japan as culturally unique (the phenomenon of *Nihonjinron*, or theories of Japaneseness) and the bridge between East and West, as in Katō Shū'ichi's "hybrid culture," Japanese cultural diplomacy tries to exude cultural autonomy. School girls in sailor suits, represented in literature, manga, anime, or dramas, successfully fulfill their mission to look unique yet universal and accessible.

Girls in Sailor Suits:

From School Uniforms to the Kogal Fashion Subculture

Schoolgirls in sailor suits are an iconic image of Japan in public mind. The sailor suit originated in the early twentieth century. Schoolgirls in the late

(in English) is cited later in this paper.

10 Brian J. McVeigh, *Wearing ideology: State, schooling and self-presentation in Japan* (New York: Berg, 2000).

11 Alexander Bukh, "Revisiting Japan's Cultural Diplomacy: A Critique of the Agent-Level Approach to Japan's Soft Power," *Asian Perspective* 38, no. 3 (2014): 461-85. This is an important essay to replace agency-centered cultural diplomacy with the international ideational structure shaping a country's cultural diplomacy. Bukh argues that Japan's pre-1945 national identity and its post-1945 identity after Cold War hegemony are different in perceiving its status within Asia's racial dynamics.

1880s adopted the *hakama*, or trouser-skirt, worn by samurai and ladies-in-waiting in the Edo period (1603-1868). The garment was suitable for physical education and other active lessons.¹² By the 1920s, *hakama* made of brown *meisen* (inferior silk, not suitable for export) were a popular style of girls' school uniforms. Along with *meisen*, imported wool muslin was also used for uniforms.¹³ From the 1920s, girls at prominent schools wore sailor suits modeled on nineteenth-century Edwardian British boys' clothing.¹⁴ As modern styles become more established among adults in Japan, female students were given sailor suits (セーラー服 *sēra fuku*) comprising a jacket and skirt.¹⁵ This style has remained popular to the present day. The black jacket with white stripes and matching black pleated skirt emphasizes a coherent group identity as proper students respecting school rules. A "royal navy" sailor suit became standard for girls, while young boys and adolescent male students adopted a high-collar military style uniform in black. There are some variations in color, but most sailor suit school uniforms are black or navy. In the 1950s, sailor suits were rather big and loose on the body as families anticipated the children's growth over time in one outfit. Usually, the pleated skirt reached below the knees. White socks were worn to the ankle or calf. Students did not have many accessories as seen in youth magazines in later periods.

In the 1970s, girls in school uniforms became part of the general public's fascination with cuteness or '*kawaii*' culture. The iconic character of cuteness for Japan is Sanrio's Hello Kitty. (Figure 1)

12 Sheila Cliffe, "Mode Becomes Modern: Meiji to Twenty-First Century," *The Social Life of Kimono: Japanese Fashion Past and Present* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 39-68.

13 Cliffe, "Mode Becomes Modern," Fig 3.11: "*meisen* kimono were literally as ubiquitous as jeans became in western fashion."

14 Kyunghee Pyun, "Transformation of Monastic Habits: Student Uniforms for Christian Schools in East Asia," *Journal of Religion and the Arts* 24:4 [Special Issue: Faith/Fashion/Forward: Dress and the Sacred] (2020): 604-640.

15 For development of girls' school uniforms in Japan before the 1920s, see Tomoko Namba, "School Uniform Reforms in Modern Japan," *Fashion, Identity, and Power in Modern Asia*, ed. Kyunghee Pyun and Aida Yuen Wong (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 91-114 and Rebecca Copeland, "Fashioning the Feminine: Images of the Modern Girl Student in Meiji Japan," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal*, no. 30/31 (2006): 13-35.



Figure 1: Hello Kitty in Sailor Suit. Cultural Product of Sanrio. Photo: Public Domain.

Marketing experts explain that cute visuals appeal to consumers because they call to mind the infantility and vulnerability of the young.¹⁶ Hello Kitty, for example, invites feelings of tenderness and protectiveness, in a similar way to pet owners who are rewarded with positive emotions as concerned caregivers when consuming pet products. Hello Kitty earns Sanrio \$5 billion per year. Other kawaii characters developed in Japan include *Doraemon* (1969), *Princess Minky Momo* (1982), *Sailor Moon* (1991), and *Pokemon* (1997). Uniform-dressed girls, as part of kawaii culture, inspire feelings of protection

16 Tingting Wang, Anirban Mukhopadhyay, and Vanessa M. Patrick, "Getting Consumers to Recycle 'NOW'! When and Why Cuteness Appeals Influence Prosocial and Sustainable Behavior," *Journal of Public Policy & Marketing* 36, no. 2 (2017): 269-83. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44878341>.

or kindness among viewers. Psychologists agree that cuteness provides two kinds of emotional impacts: *Kindchenschema* and whimsicality. While whimsicality provides excitement and playfulness, *Kindchenschema* generates a sense of caregiving and protection.¹⁷ School girls in sailor suits generally fall into two types: cute, innocent and naive, or cute warriors and scouts with magical powers. Adolescent femininity in school uniforms evokes a sense of *Kindchenschema* —a similar sensation to looking at the infantile face of Hello Kitty or Doraemon.

In the 1970s, with the rise of *shōjo* fiction for young girls (in the United States, the similar genre is called “chick lit” from the late 1990s written by women authors for women readers, addressing issues of modern womanhood), visualization of school girls became more prominent. In the genre of high-teen romance literature, girls interacted for friendship, validity, academic success, or love. In this genre of *shōjo* fiction, which eventually spread to foreign audiences via graphic novels, girl students still embodied conformity and adolescent femininity. The dramatization of certain characteristics of schoolgirls, however, became apparent in the 1980s in adult magazines and the video industry.¹⁸ Adolescent femininity was aggrandized into overt femininity and hypersexuality as Japanese economic influence was at its apex.

In the 1990s, street fashion in Tokyo’s Harajuku district and other subculture groups in Osaka presented a new type of schoolgirl. Young women called *kogals* (*kogyaru*) expressed their heterogeneous identity which deviated from adolescent femininity and conformity. Women between fourteen and twenty-two embodied a new style of fashion, language, and behavior. Magazines like *Egg* became a venue for *kogals* to express their candid opinions against the conservative views of the mainstream media, which portrayed them as misbehaving youngsters. *Kogals* thus represented Japanese schoolgirls distinguished by distinctive fashion and culture for international audiences through fashion magazines. The term *kogal* derives from “high school student” (*kōkōsei*) and “gal” or “girl” (*gyaru*), and indicated young women who wore cutting-edge fashion and congregated in centers of

¹⁷ Wang et al., “Getting Consumers,” 271.

¹⁸ Hiroko Tabuchi, “In Tokyo, a Crackdown on Sexual Images of Minors,” *The New York Times*, February 9, 2011. <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/business/global/10manga.html> [accessed on February 15, 2022].

youth culture such as Shibuya and Harajuku. The phenomenon peaked in the 1990s and quickly found influential models among popular idols, such as singer Namie Amuro. *Kogals* followed her style, which resembles surf fashion and Los Angeles fashion from the 1970s. Those who admired and tried to look like Namie Amuro called themselves “Amurā” (Amurers).

Linguistic anthropologist Laura Miller emphasizes the diversity of language used by kogals.¹⁹ In the early 1990s, high school girls flocked to music clubs or discos admitting minors. Among these crowds, the fashionable style of loose socks and short school-uniform skirts coined the visual identity of kogals. Their style embraced hybridity, showing affinity with African American hip hop culture and British punk culture of the 1970s, as studied by sociologist Dick Hebdige in *Subculture: The Meaning of Style* (1979). These “cool” Japanese girls in school uniforms, highly stylized with individual accessories like socks or backpacks, drew attention from the global youth who had been exposed to Japanese popular culture via graphic novels, music videos, cartoons, animations, or films. Miller notes that not all subculture groups pursue kawaii aesthetics, which are vehemently criticized by mainstream media in Japan.²⁰ Audacious expressions like tattoos and tanned skin could be seen as rebellious in the Japanese tradition of conformity and disciplined bodies.

Popular manga writer Kazuo Koike (1936-2019) was influential on American fans of Japanese graphic novels. His *Lady Snowblood* (1972-1973) became a movie in 1973. A sequel, *Lady Snowblood: Love Song of Vengeance*, was released in 1974. The manga was translated into English in 2005-2006. It is known that American directors like Sam Mandes and Quentin Tarantino are fans: Tarantino not only revealed his fascination with *Lady Snowblood* as a basis for his *Kill Bill* series, but also made Tokyo the setting of *Kill Bill: Volume 2* (2004), which features a Japanese character named Gogo Yubari, a teenage killer. Yubari’s school uniform style is reminiscent of the kogals of the 1990s, but instead of a sailor suit Yubari wears a three-piece outfit: a navy-blue jacket, a white blouse with a red ribbon tie, and a tartan checkered

19 Laura Miller, “Those Naughty Teenage Girls: Japanese Kogals, Slang, and Media Assessments,” *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 14, no. 2 (2004): 227.

20 Laura Miller, “Media Typifications and Hip Bijin,” *U.S.-Japan Women’s Journal. English Supplement*, no. 19 (2000): 176-205.

skirt; with a shorter skirt and looser socks Yubari would be transformed into a playful kogal in Roppongi or Harajuku, but as a disciplined killer, her uniform exudes an attitude of seriousness rather than of naughtiness.

Japanese fashion magazines *Egg* and *FRUiTS* were both founded in the mid-1990s during the rise of *kogals*, and soon found readership outside Japan. *FRUiTS* in particular led the Western interest in Japanese street fashion, and British publisher Phaidon Press published collections of photographs from the magazine in 2001 and 2005. In 1999, American pop idol Britney Spears appeared in the music video for “Baby One More Time” as a uniform-clad student at a Catholic school.²¹

Girls in school uniforms were well received among foreign audiences, as seen in the success enjoyed by the animation import industry in the United States. Historian Andrea Horbinski notes that Japanese anime had gained some fandom in California and Hawai’i, where Japanese-language television channels were available, before 1994. Fans traded pirated anime on VHS tapes or obtained copies via family members stationed in Japan as soldiers.²² Fans in the 1970s and in the 1980s were mainly interested in science fiction and its anthropomorphic creatures: cute animal characters such as feline and bunny girls.²³ These hybrid girl action heroes were precursors to the genre of *bishōjo* (beautiful girl) anime featuring a female characters in short skirts in adventure fantasies for male viewers.²⁴ When *Sailor Moon* came out in the early 1990s, American fans of Japanese anime greeted it enthusiastically.

From the mid-1990s, Japanese animation in the United States gained a robust market share, which culminated in 2003 with revenues of more than US \$4.84 billion.²⁵ Japanese scholars connected this extraordinary success in the 2000s with the rise of otaku culture in the United States; positive reception of Japanese animation by American fans; shrewd tactics to diminish cultural

21 It is no accident that worldwide audiences were fascinated Britney Spears’ performance. The video was produced in November 1998, and the album was released worldwide in January 1999.

22 Andrea Horbinski, “What You Watch Is What You Are? Early Anime and Manga Fandom in the United States.” *Mechademia: Second Arc* 12, no. 1 (2019): 14.

23 Horbinski, “What You Watch,” 12.

24 *Bishōjo* genre in Japan is quite complicated as female authors write narratives for a male gaze. See Kathryn Hemmann, “Short Skirts and Superpowers: The Evolution of the Beautiful Fighting Girl.” *U.S.-Japan Women’s Journal*, no. 47 (2014): 45-72.

25 Nissim Otmazgin, “Anime in the US: The Entrepreneurial Dimensions of Globalized Culture,” *Pacific Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2014): 53 and 59ff.



Figure 2: Tomoko Sawada, *School Days/A*, 2004, c-print, 13 x 18 cm. Photo credit: Tomoko Sawada.

differences through adaptations by entrepreneurial importers; and Japanese sponsorship of major anime expos.²⁶

School girls in sailor suits were also visible in the high-brow art world. Japanese contemporary artists are critical of group identity and conformity associated with the school uniform culture. Tomoko Sawada's 2004 photograph *School Days* features a class of girls in black sailor suits with red scarves. (Figure 2)

The black jackets with white stripes and matching black pleated skirts emphasize the coherent group identity of the wearers as proper students respecting their school's rules. The girls in the identical sailor suits are a

26 See note 9 in Otmazgin, "Anime in the US," 55. Otaku refers to people passionate for Japanese manga, anime, video games, pop idols. The term carried some negative connotations because young men who consumed these materials and bought electronic devices at Akihabara, a neighborhood in Tokyo famous for pop culture shops, were considered geeky but lazy and lonely at home instead of actively seeking for full-time employment and social connections. The meaning has been changed over time and inclusive of non-Japanese fans of popular culture from Japan.



Figure 3: Mariko Mori, *Love Hotel*, 1994. Fuji super gloss (duraflex) print, wood, aluminum, pewter frame, 48 x 60 x 2 inches (121.9 x 152.4 x 5.1 cm). Edition of 4 with 1 AP. Private collection © Mariko Mori. Courtesy: Sean Kelly, New York.

ruthless image of ideal citizens, human resources trained to perform their best in a replaceable and interchangeable manner, raised and educated to conform to the group identity imposed by society; deviation, albeit legitimate and reasonable, is not be tolerated or condoned. In fact, all the students in the image are avatars of the artist herself.

Previously, contemporary artist Mariko Mori depicted an adult woman in a school sailor suit in her now-famous work entitled *Love Hotel* (1994). (Figure 3)

This work suggests tolerance of young girls being consumed as objects of desire and is simultaneously critical of the illicit use of images of girls in school uniforms. One can imagine that the woman depicted, possibly a so-called “office lady” or OL, is moonlighting as a sex worker.²⁷ Viewers of

27 Allison Holland, “From Gothic Lolita to Radiant Shaman: The Development of Mariko Mori’s

this artwork, usually shown in a gallery or in a museum, are invited to bring memories of Japanese popular culture they have experienced. Many will not be subscribers to the adult magazines which often depict paid models as objects of desire. Their exposure to this woman in Mori's work could be the first time they see a Japanese woman in a school uniform, or may resonate with their memories of characters in Japanese pop culture products.

However, Mori's depiction of a woman follows her a cyborg alter-ego in other works of the same period. At a close look, one can see a helmet-like silver hair and a pair of metallic legs. She replicated the tradition of being "uncanny" or bizarre in sailor-suited girls. Aida Makoto created an endless path among rice fields connected from a girl's parted hairline in his work called *Azemich* (A path between rice fields) made in 1991 and now kept at the Collection of Toyota Municipal Museum of Art, Aichi, Japan. A serene landscape of endless rice fields and distant mountains is reminiscent of westernized Japanese traditional painting at the turn of the twentieth century, painted on Japanese paper with mineral pigments in the manner of an illusionistic perspective. However, focusing on a girl showing her back with sailor suit flaps, one see a grotesque image of a girl's hair part sticking out like a horn or a spire until one recognizes an accidental alignment of her part with the path. In Makoto's other illustration-like works such as *Harakiri Schoolgirls* of 1999-2001, school girls in sailor suits show dismembered body parts.²⁸ Makoto's more gruesome and infamous sadistic depiction of women in *The Giant Member Fuji versus King Gidora* (1993) or *Dog* series (1996) enabled viewers to make inferential imaginations of prohibitive exploitation of under-age girls in school uniforms in fiction and perhaps in heinous crimes.

Contemporary artist Ryoko Suzuki's series *Anikora-Seifuku no. 6* (2007) shows a girl in a black sailor suit. (Figure 4)

In fact, this robot-like figure depicts popular Japanese collector dolls, with the artist's face grafted onto the hypersexual body. Suzuki intentionally creates a life-like, uncanny image with exaggerated physical proportions to

Ethereal Personae," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal*, no. 40 (2011): 3-28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42772304>.

28 Ryan Roth, "School Girls—The Aida Makoto Interview," *Japan Today*, March 13, 2013. <https://japantoday.com/category/features/school-girls-the-aida-makoto-interview?comment-order=popular> [accessed on March 17, 2022]. Roth writes that "he's not a man who wants to do anything sexual with young girls, no matter what you may assume, from his works."



Figure 4: Ryoko Suzuki, *Anikora-Seifuku no. 6*, 2007. Lambda print, 47 x 71 in. Edition 1 of 3. Courtesy of Corkin Gallery, Toronto.

denote the origin of fantasy dolls. These dolls, intended for male collectors, depict traditionally “appropriate” images of women as schoolgirls, nurses, waitresses, guides, and so forth. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that these figures evoke the highly sexualized roles expected or fantasized for these “professional” women —attractive, sexy, but still inviting, docile, and feminine. Suzuki called the series *kawaii*. But these imagined dolls are seductresses and clandestine sex workers.

Within Japan, schoolgirl characters are in the minority among fans of romance comics for teenage girls.²⁹ Japanese studies expert Deborah Shamoon explores *shōjo* manga, romance comics for teenage girls, by reviewing Japanese girls’ print culture from its origins in 1920s and 1930s girls’ literary magazines to the 1970s “revolution,” when young women artists took over the *shōjo* manga genre. These women writers and artists guided narratives

²⁹ Deborah M. Shamoon, *Passionate Friendship: The Aesthetics of Girls’ Culture in Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2016).

and aesthetic features of girls' literature and illustration across the late twentieth century. Scholars agree that these texts addressed and formed a reading community of girls. Sociologist Andrew McKeivitt included a chapter on anime in his influential book *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America*.³⁰ Inclusion of school girls in magazines and popular literature in Japan has had a long history since the emergence of mass culture, as shown by Amy Bliss Marshall.³¹ Throughout the systemic, global exportation of Japanese culture, this type of *shōjo* literature was disseminated to other countries. The reception varied due to the level of translation, adaptation, and cultural heterogeneity. However, contemporary art, manga, and anime presented multilayered meanings of schoolgirls in uniforms and in other contexts.

Soft Power on Diplomatic Partners: Asia and Beyond

Management scholar Takeshi Matsui argued that Japanese political entities adopted new policies of promoting popular culture to expand Japan's soft power.³² Postwar American popular culture had a significant impact on Japan in the 1950s, which diminished in the 1970s as Japanese people became more affluent and traveled to European countries.³³ Gradually Japan gained economic influence in the region. Singapore, for example, was inundated by Japanese anime, manga, popular music, and video games.³⁴ Taiwan has had a long relationship with Japan, since 1894, including fifty years of colonial rule. Japanese pop culture enjoyed large audiences in Taiwan from the 1990s onward.³⁵ French political scientist Le Bail argues that market saturation with Japanese soft power was effective for winning fans of Japanese culture known

30 Andrew C. McKeivitt, *Consuming Japan: Popular Culture and the Globalizing of 1980s America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

31 Amy B. Marshall, *Magazines and the Making of Mass Culture in Japan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019).

32 Takeshi Matsui, "Nation Branding through Stigmatized Popular Culture: The 'Cool Japan' Craze among Central Ministries in Japan," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management* 48, no. 1 (48) (2014): 81-97. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43295053>.

33 Matsui, "Nation Branding," 83.

34 Benjamin Wai-ming Ng, "Japanese Video Games in Singapore: History, Culture and Industry," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 29, no. 1 (2001): 139-62.

35 Hélène Le Bail, "Japanese Culture in Asia: Infatuation, Identification and the Construction of Identity: The Example of Taiwan," *China Perspectives*, no. 43 (2002): 54-62.

as *harizu* (obsession with Japan) in Taiwan. Japanese television programming came to Taiwan as its cable television system became liberalized and open to foreign companies in 1992. Le Bail argues that these television dramas, manga, and anime enabled Taiwanese young people to perceive a form of optimism toward Japan as being a country with a high standard of living and economic success.³⁶

Laura Kanji emphasized that recent initiatives in Japan were successful in using soft diplomacy and nation branding through popular culture.³⁷ Pop culture diplomacy was firmly installed in the Japanese government in 2007 when it organized the International Manga Award. It also inaugurated the Anime Ambassador Program and the Annual World Cosplay Summit.³⁸ Government officials and policy makers saw both economic and diplomatic opportunities in “Cool Japan” campaigns. Cultural exports and the tourism industry both benefitted from international interest in Japanese popular culture.

The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism also accepted this approach and announced Hello Kitty as their ambassador of tourism in the Visit Japan campaigns for China and Hong Kong in 2008. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs chose Doraemon, a cat-based cute hero with superpowers as its ambassador in 2008. Trade models cosplaying schoolgirls dressed in sailor suits and jacket-skirt ensembles featured prominently in the Japan Festa in Bangkok and the Japan Expo in Paris in 2009. Anthropologist Christine Yano interprets Japan’s reliance on cute/cool characters for international cultural exchange as a clandestine or subconscious strategy to get the attention and alliance of unsuspecting fans who consume cultural products like Hello Kitty and koral fashions. She calls this phenomenon “pink globalization.”³⁹ In this wave of consumption-driven popular culture, critiques of Japanese sovereignty dissipate without much impact. To global consumers of Cool Japan, the country’s role as instigator of WWII and its equivocal gestures toward acknowledgement of its war atrocities by some

36 Le Bail, “Japanese Culture,” 59-60.

37 Laura Kanji, “Illustrations and Influence: Soft Diplomacy and Nation Branding through Popular Culture,” *Harvard International Review* 37, no. 2 (2016): 40-45.

38 Kanji, “Illustrations and Influence,” 41.

39 Christine R. Yano, “Wink on Pink: Interpreting Japanese Cute as It Grabs the Global Headlines,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 68, no. 3 (2009): 682.

conservative politicians becomes blurred or unheard. Samurai warriors, the Kamikaze pilots of WWII, and black-suited businessmen were replaced by Sailor Moon, Doraemon, Hello Kitty, or kogals in hypersexualized sailor uniforms as “benign masks,” winking at larger, serious issues.⁴⁰

In a 2008 survey of Thai students on fondness for Japanese popular culture, an overwhelming majority of 90%, especially high among girls, replied that they like Japanese fashion, manga, and anime.⁴¹ Media scholar Toyoshima explains why these young people show enthusiasm for Japanese popular culture: “by receiving all kinds of media images, young Thais form their own ideas about Japan and feel a closeness to Japanese lifestyles, which in turn lead them to consume Japanese cultural products.”⁴² This is a crucial key to assess the process and impact of consumption patterns of Japanese cultural products, including cosplay or imitation of Japanese school girls in sailor suit uniforms. The inundation of media images of “Cool Japan” is working on all fronts.

Political scientist Otmazgin emphasized that Japan became a cultural power in the 1990s after it lost its glamour as an industrial pioneer and economic superpower in the 1980s. Japanese fashion magazines and comic books are translated into local languages in East Asia.⁴³ School girls in sailor suits could be seen as cultural products in the process of cultural commodification. The proliferation of Japanese popular culture including familiar images of Japanese school girls in sailor suits helps Japan generate a new image of Cool Japan, which is antithetical to the salarymen culture of the postwar economic miracle or Japan as a belligerent empire during WWII. Nonetheless, Japanese influence is met with suspicion and concerns in East Asia. Moreover, this type of soft power does not necessarily translate into diplomatic power and influence on public opinion. In contrast to economic and military power, for example, as represented by Russia in Central Eurasia, soft power disguises territorial or ethnic dominance. Cultural industries such as publishers, film production companies, entertainment agencies and magazines, to name

40 “Benign mask” is an expression used by Yano, “Wink on Pink,” 686.

41 Noboru Toyoshima, “Longing for Japan: The Consumption of Japanese Cultural Products in Thailand,” *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 23, no. 2 (2008): 257-65.

42 Toyoshima, “Longing for Japan,” 276.

43 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East and South-east Asia,” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 8, no. 1 (2008): 74.

a few, have led the public opinion of Japan like public relations agencies. These use non-traditional ways of exerting power or clout co-opt instead of coercion. Soft power may be effective but it is difficult to measure or quantify its impact.⁴⁴ As shown in the example of the United States (with Hollywood movies or spectator sports), soft power can have a resonant impact. But it can also backfire due to the values or assumptions embedded in these types of soft culture (for example, American liberalism, excessive consumerism, or ideological glorification) generating animosity or resistance. In the case of Japanese popular culture, however, anti-Japanese sentiment is rarely seen among fans and followers in East Asia, and characters and cultural products such as school girls in sailor suits or Hello Kitty are often perceived without political or economic motives (Figure 1).

Japan is occasionally the subject of controversies over wartime crimes and compensation for war victims in East Asian media. However, contemporary Japan's constitutionally limited role in militaristic intervention has enabled the country to focus more on humanitarian aid and economic development in the Global South —particularly in South and Southeast Asia. As Nissim Otmazgin and Douglas McGray have shown, the Japanese government was not keen on maximizing cultural exports for both economic profit and diplomatic influence until around the year 2000.⁴⁵ It was in the early part of that decade that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made serious efforts to utilize Japanese popular culture to strengthen diplomacy in regions beyond East Asia.⁴⁶

Girls in school uniforms have featured prominently in these efforts. In the world of gaming, for example, Nintendo Switch now offers the visual novel *Tokyo School Life*. A widely available video game called *High School Simulator* has a warning for "Gore, Violent, Sexual Content," while the game *Japanese School Life*, with its cute school girls in sailor suits, is available to all ages. Sony launched *Summer Lesson* in 2014, which created controversy by showing the bedroom of a school girl. *Yandere Simulator* (2005) features girls in sailor suits killing other students; the anime *Mirai Nikki* and *School Days*

44 Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (2008): 94-109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996>.

45 Douglas McGray, "Japan's Gross National Cool," *Foreign Policy*, no. 130 (2002): 44-54.

46 See various journal issues and committees by MOFA in Otmazgin, "Contesting Soft Power," 81-3.

were inspirations for the game developer. Digital character shops like Unity Asset Store have a number of sailor suit girls.

Japanese popular culture industries have been effective in disseminating their products in East Asia. To overcome the image of Japan as an empire during WWII, Japan reestablished itself as an industrial pioneer and model throughout the 1980s. Simultaneously, it stressed its status as a cultural power. Political scientist Nissim Otmazgin argues that Japan became a “popular culture powerhouse” in South and East Asia by efficiently expanding its cultural industries into Asian markets.⁴⁷ He particularly emphasizes that Japan carefully curated its image through these cultural products that were disseminated to different age groups and social classes. Otmazgin explores the connection between popular culture and soft power by analyzing the activities of the Japanese popular culture industries in East Asia, and by examining the images their products disseminate. The study is based on export data, market surveys, and interviews with media industry personnel and consumers in five cities in East Asia, arguing that the impact of Japanese popular culture lies in shaping the region’s cultural markets and in disseminating new images of Japan, but not in exerting local influence or in creating Japanese-dominated “spheres of influence.”⁴⁸ It should be noted that Japan is not the only country using soft power for cultural diplomacy. India and Turkey have shown strides in this effort.⁴⁹

Geo-Strategic Vision: From Popular Culture to Contemporary Art

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese government promoted a new image of Japan as a pioneer of avant-garde aesthetics. Design historian Ory Bartal argued that Japanese economic success in the 1980s coincided with a concerted effort to promote avant-garde design.⁵⁰ Casio’s personal calculator,

47 Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, *Regionalizing Culture: The Political Economy of Japanese Popular Culture in Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2013).

48 Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power,” 80-97.

49 H. H. S. Viswanathan, “India’s Soft Power Diplomacy: Capturing Hearts and Minds,” *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* 14, no. 2 (2019): 129-36. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48636719>. Federico Donelli, “Persuading through Culture, Values, and Ideas: The Case of Turkey’s Cultural Diplomacy,” *Insight Turkey* 21, no. 3 (2019): 113-34. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26776106>.

50 Ory Bartal, “Postmodern Critiques, Japan’s Economic Miracle, and the New Aesthetic Milieu,” *Critical Design in Japan: Material Culture, Luxury, and the Avant-Garde* (Manchester: Manchester Uni-

Sony's portable audio player (the Walkman) and other consumer electronics promoted individualism. Rei Kawakubo, Yohji Yamamoto, Issey Miyaki, and Junya Watanabe, pioneers of high-fashion design in both the domestic and foreign markets, were activists promoting new idealism. According to Bartal, "These styles were thus far from being decorative or embodying inherently Japanese form of design. Rather, they were a tool by the designers to make sociopolitical statements [...]." ⁵¹ Bartal connects the revolutionary spirit of these designers to the 1968 protest movement. Japanese youth in the 1970s were not vocal dissidents of postwar conservative politics in Japan, but expressed anti-establishment sentiments through material culture.

The Japanese government promoted new creators of interior design, consumer electronics, fashion, and architecture throughout the 1980s. After the economic bubble collapsed, the government moved its attention to the emerging popular culture. In the late 1990s, many municipal government mascots were reinvented as cute characters. Some appear in familiar school uniforms as shown in graphic novels, films, or television shows. Just as 1980s Japanese consumers of design products were part of a social and aesthetic elite embracing the cutting-edge design principles of Rei Kawakubo and others, foreign consumers defined themselves as cultural elites patronizing "cool" Japanese popular culture. These consumers do not necessarily support or promote Japanese diplomatic positions on nuclear policy, national security, economic aid in Southeast Asia, or the China-Japan military confrontation. However, they are amicable opinion leaders for Japan in their own domestic interactions related to Japan's culture. As shown in films like Steven Spielberg's 1987 *Empire of the Sun*, Japan was once an empire with many colonies around the Pacific Ocean. Although the movie was a box office disappointment, this historical narrative of Japan during the interwar period was an affirmation of Japanese economic achievement in the 1980s. The murder of Vincent Chin, who was mistaken for a Japanese-American man by two Caucasian men in Detroit in 1982, coincided with the American public's fear of Japanese economic success across many types of consumer and industrial goods. If the People's Republic of China was the world's factory in the 1990s, it was

versity Press, 2020), 14-25.

⁵¹ Bartal, *Critical Design*, 47.

Japan that supplied everything from consumer goods to heavy equipment like ships and cars.

Popular culture in the form of girls in sailor suits was a way of ameliorating a hard-liner image of Japan as an economic superpower. Characters like school girls, Hello Kitty, and Doraemon arouse a sense of vulnerability, caregiving, or infantile dependence in viewers, consumers, and readers. Especially those who have grown up with these characters would embody less hostile, more sentimental reception of Japan in the long term. As a geo-strategic vision, promotion of popular culture as part of cultural diplomacy should be further explored in the age of virtual reality and the metaverse.

The transition from popular culture to institutionalized contemporary art was visible in Yoshitomo Nara and Takashi Murakami. Vulnerable-looking girls with large eyes by Nara and Murakami's Mr. DOB —who are reminiscent of Mickey Mouse and Hello Kitty— underscore the violence and distress beneath their superficial cuteness. Aesthetic philosopher Sianne Ngai analyzed these works as reflections of postwar aesthetics bridging cuteness and kitsch disguised as “avant-garde” in visual commodity culture.⁵² The same type of transition took place in the transformation of school girls in sailor suits from images of complacency to those of suppressed deviation —from Sailor Moon to Gogo Yubari to Tomoko Sawada's photography, for example (Figure 2).

Kawaii as an aesthetic concept has been the subject of significant debate in recent years. Starting with Hello Kitty, it could mean an affordable commodity relying on universal feelings of caring and friendship. However, the concept includes a deeper, subversive critique of Japanese corporate culture in which male prerogatives are prioritized. Art historian Kirstin Ringelberg agrees with cultural studies experts that fascination with kawaii owes much to the rejection of traditional Japanese values: conformity, responsibility, group identity, corporate culture, or even totalitarianism as opposed to individualism.⁵³ Whether one is infatuated with Sailor Moon, under-age school girls in uniforms in Japanese adult magazines, or Hello Kitty products, what one embraces as ‘Cool Japan’ is not just superficial cuteness, but ‘a

52 Sianne Ngai, “The Cuteness of the Avant-Garde,” *Critical Inquiry* 31, no. 4 (2005): 813-4.

53 Kirstin Ringelberg, “Little Sister, Big Girl: Tabaimo and the Gendered Devaluation of Contemporary Japanese Art,” *Woman's Art Journal* 38, no. 2 (2017): 33.



Figure 5: Sailor Moon Cosplayers at the 2014 Amazing Arizona Comic Con at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona. Photo: Gage Skidmore. Creative Common 2.0.

sense of freedom and individuality’ as manifested in a carefree childhood as opposed to duty-bound adulthood (Figure 5).

Taking the example of American adults cosplaying as Sailor Moon at the 2014 Amazing Arizona Comic Con at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Arizona, they are united as fans of Sailor Moon despite their various ethnic, racial, and linguistic backgrounds. However, these women dressing as Sailor Moon is a powerful statement about the cultural influence of Japan on people far from the major centers of Washington DC, Los Angeles, or San Francisco: Arizona is so far removed from the coastal cities in the Pacific, that it was the location of several internment camps for Japanese-American citizens during WWII. Nonetheless, Japanese popular culture in the form of sailor-suited girls is enthusiastically embraced.

Conclusion

In the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, Japan was the victim of two atomic bombings, but also the first ever country to invade U.S. territory, in the

attack on Pearl Harbor. In the postwar period, like Germany, Japan has been cautious not to act like a diplomatic superpower like Russia or China. Both Germany and Japan have been economic superpowers, but mindful of the atrocities committed by the two countries in WWII, both have kept a low profile in militaristic matters since. Girls in sailor suits have become cultural ambassadors, exuding creative zeal and alternative behavior, shattering the conservative, submissive image of Japan during the Cold War reconstruction period. If images of salarymen or samurai warriors are on one end of the spectrum, fun-loving, sometimes brave, sometimes caring school girls in sailor suits are on the other. Girls in sailor suits became a more accessible icon of cultural diplomacy emulating the image of friendly, unsuspecting, innocent people. This could not only valid for girls in sailor suits but also for Hello Kitty, Draemon and other kawaii characters. However, sailor suits from its military origin to conformity-driven homogeneity within some design variations — associated with girls as opposed to kimono-clad women, salarymen, boys, or anthropomorphic, dependent animals— serve the synecdoche for Japanese diplomacy. The values unique to girls in sailor suits are humane, reliable, observant of rules, harmless, collegial, collaborative yet sometimes creative, flexible, resilient, and enchanting. Although Japan did not plan a geo-strategic vision of Japanese school girls representing its popular culture as a foreign policy, it has succeeded in creating an image of accessible, disciplined partners of international cooperation.

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The Middle East in 1973-2001 Japanese Foreign Policy: Why and How does a Pacifist State Secure Energy?

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Introduction

Many works have been published on how and for what objectives Japan utilized its economic wealth between 1973 and 2001.¹ However, these investigations did not consider the country's energy needs to be among the most important factors. The application of economic accumulation and equipment beyond expectations was a recurrent theme in Japanese foreign policy from 1973 to 2001. In fact, political discourses, humanitarian aid with strong economic components, and bilateral trade agreements have all been used to help ensure the security of Japan's energy resource supply.

Japan has a reputation of being a 'free-rider' country following WWII, a financial backer since the 1970s, and a contributor country since the 1990s.² Japan also became the largest global donor nation in the mid-1990s as a result of its strong economic improvement in the preceding decades.³ Since the early 1990s, Japanese economic aid has transformed into peacekeeping

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1 Steven W. Hook, "Japan's Aid Policy since the Cold War: Rhetoric and Reality," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 11 (November 1, 1998): 1051-66, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645685>; Eileen M. Doherty, "Japan's Expanding Foreign Aid Program," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 14, no. 3 (September 1, 1987): 129-49, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1987.10553645>.

2 Ming Wan, "Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade," *International Studies Quarterly*, 39, no. 1 (March 1995): 94.

3 E. Vogel, "Pax Nipponica?," *Foreign Affairs* 64 (1986): 767.

missions, and human security has become a pillar of Japan's foreign policy.⁴ Some analysts viewed Japan's humanitarian aid policy mostly through the 9th article of the constitution,⁵ finding the following conclusions:

*The Constitution's restriction of military capabilities in this way [referring to Article 9's pacifist character] pushed Japan to seek a new foreign strategy. This condition compelled the state to utilize the economy as a foreign policy tool in order to improve its effectiveness in the international arena, as well as to seek a security alliance with the United States in order to reach the most essential security needs.*⁶

However, while this interpretation stresses the constitutional restriction, it makes no mention of the Japanese government's consent to the limitation. Similarly, it is important that the Japanese seek alternative foreign policy goals through humanitarian aid rather than military means and that they occasionally dismiss the U.S. requests on military and operational matters, overcoming these processes through a variety of civilian ways. The 2015 Security Law Amendment,⁷ on the other hand, showed the possibility of an amendment to Article 9 of the constitution request with securitization discourses. Until recently, the Japanese maintained a pragmatic and utilitarian foreign policy, viewing Article 9 of the constitution as an opportunity rather than a constraint. To conceptualize the pragmatic and utilitarian foreign policy, this research explores Japanese energy security policies toward the Middle East from 1973 to 2001. In fact, thanks to economic and humanitarian aids, Japan's foreign policy in the Middle East has been conducted at a lower cost. The philosophical patterns in the background of postwar Japanese

4 Bahadır Pehlivanlı, "From Peace State to Peacekeeping State: Japan's Changing National Role Conception and Foreign Policy Norms," *Perceptions* 21, no. 1 (2016): 66.

5 Article 9; Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

6 Ali Balı and Murat Yeşiltaş, "Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Dış Yardımların Kullanılması: Japonya Örneği (Using Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Japan)," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 2, no. 8 (Kış 2006 2005): 169.

7 Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Strategic Trajectory And Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity or Radical Shift?," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 43, no. 1 (2017): 98.

foreign policy may be plainly discerned in its involvements with the Middle East.⁸

Power is characterized in the post-World War II Japanese grand strategy by material and economic resources.⁹ The extent of this power was increased, and foreign aid became a pivotal factor in handling the country's security concerns during the years 1973-2001. The Organization of Asian Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Oil Crisis in 1973 had one of the heaviest impacts on industrialized countries, mainly Japan.¹⁰ This crisis occurred when the Arab alliance led by Egypt and Syria lost the Yom Kippur War against Israel in October 1973 and the OAPEC member countries laid an oil embargo on pro-Israel foreign nations. The OAPEC cut world oil supplies by 9.8% in two months. The price of crude oil per barrel fluctuated between 12 and 18 dollars between 1973 and 1979. As a result, oil, a sort of energy, has been turned into foreign policy weaponry. The importance of guaranteeing an energy supply to modern society has been demonstrated by the boycott of major energy importing countries such as Europe and the United States by oil-producing countries. During the oil crisis, Saudi Arabia, which was one of the leading members of OAPEC, announced Japan was an "unfriendly" nation and urged Japan to support Muslim Arab countries.¹¹

8 In some ways, the overall concept of the interactions of Japan with the region aligns with that of the Central Asian Muslim countries prior to WWII. The history of Japanese relations with Muslim societies, as well as regional studies, are viewed as the propelling influences behind the Middle East proficiency. I was unable to provide thorough information on this subject because it would go beyond the scope of our article; Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan and Islam Policy during the 1930s," in Bert Edström (Ed.), *Turning Points in Japanese History* (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 2002); Selçuk Esenbel, "Japan's Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945," *The American Historical Review* 109, no. 4 (October 1, 2004): 1140-70, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/109.4.1140>; Selçuk Esenbel, "The Legacy of the War and the World of Islam in Japanese Pan-Asian Discourse: Wakabayashi Han's Kaikyô Sekai to Nihon," in Rotem Kowner (Ed.), *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5*, 1 (Folkestone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2007), 263-80; Cemil Aydın, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, E-book. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

9 Christopher W. Hughes, Alessio Patalano, and Robert Ward, "Japan's Grand Strategy: The Abe Era and Its Aftermath," *Survival* 63, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 125-60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1881258>; Michael A. Glosny, "The Grand Strategies of Rising Powers: Reassurance, Coercion, and Balancing Responses" (Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012); Wan, "Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade," 88.

10 G. John Ikenberry, "Reasons of State: Oil Politics and The Capacities of American Government," Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1988, 5, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt207g7cv>.

11 Roy Licklider, "The Power of Oil: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Netherlands, the United King-

Since then, Japan's primary security concern has been the Middle East's energy supplies, on which it depends 70% of the time. The Comprehensive National Security Concept (Sōgō Anzen Hoshō-総合安全保障) was launched on July 17, 1980, during Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō's term (1980-1982), as a result of the crisis' continuing impact.¹² The primary goal of this initiative was to provide effective economic assistance to countries that may help Japan's international security. The context of security in this case was security of energy supply.

Establishing Multidimensional Relations Network and Japan's Middle East Energy Dependence

The majority of essential energy resources, such as oil, coal, and iron ore, are insufficient in Japan. Apart from farming rice to feed its population, practically every aspect of the country's enormously complex industrial cycle is reliant on foreign resources. This cycle of importing goods from wherever they are, processing them at home, and exporting them necessarily requires strong and diverse trade relations. In order to survive and advance in response to these conditions, Japan has become a master of commerce.¹³ As a result, one of Japan's top foreign policy aims is to strengthen this economic and commercial cycle. In essence, with the Yoshida Doctrine (1948-1954), which shaped its international character after WWII, Japan redefined its international role as a trading state (*shonin kokka*-社士国家) and evolved into an economic superpower by focusing on economic development.¹⁴ Then, in the early 1970s, Japan's burgeoning living standards and exponential economic growth propelled the state to the forefront of world monetary and financial affairs.¹⁵ The network of economic collaborations, which was

dom, Canada, Japan, and the United States," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (1988): 214.

12 The first version the proposal report was presented to Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (1978-1980) in 1980; T. Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 4 (1991): 324-25, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645387>.

13 B. Akgün and Şaban H. Çalış, "Reluctant Giant: The Rise of Japan and Its Role in the Post-Cold War Era," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2003): 1.

14 Pehlivan Türk, "From Peace State to Peacekeeping State: Japan's Changing National Role Conception and Foreign Policy Norms," 69.

15 David N. Balaam and Bradford Dillman, *Introduction to International Political Economy* (Routledge, 2013), 167.

not limited to its own region, was what granted the Japan's the status as an industrial superpower.

Energy trade, which is a sub-category of Japan's foreign trade relations, was added to the country's agenda in the mid-1950s. The efforts of businessman Taro Yamashita (Arabian Taro- 1889-1967), the founder of the Japan Arabian Oil Company, which was looking for oil trade in the Gulf region, are regarded as the commencement of Japanese energy relations with the Gulf.¹⁶ According to Taro Yamashita, who witnessed the United States' oil embargo on Japan prior to WWII, a drop of oil was as valuable as a drop of blood.¹⁷ Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, one of Japan's most powerful leaders at the time, backed Yamashita, believing that "Japan would not be regarded a first-class country until it gained control over its own oil resources".¹⁸

With the expropriation of the Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (1918-1970) in July 1956, England and France began to lose influence in the Middle East as Arab nationalism grew. At the same time, Taro Yamashita continued his long-term attempts in the Persian Gulf's Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Oil Zone. The oil concession agreement that the French company had to terminate, owing to the Suez Canal problem, was offered to Taro by King Saud bin Abdulaziz (1953-1964). Taro responded by visiting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait three times in 1958, after a year of arduous talks, he was able to acquire oilfield concessions from two Arabian Gulf countries.¹⁹ The cabinet structure of the state, a lack of trained manpower, and economic shortcomings all together played a significant role in this first oil concession offered by Saudi Arabia to a non-Western country. Additionally, the Saudis sought to balance their dependence on the United States in terms of energy technologies and markets by giving Japan an oil concession.²⁰

16 Juzo Kimura, "Japan's Middle East Policy: Impact of the Oil Crises," *Kobe University Law Review* 19, no. 17-37 (1985): 23, <http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/repository/00166912.pdf>.

17 Ahmed Kandil, "Political Economy of International Cooperation Between Japan and Saudi Arabia: The Arabian Oil Company as a Case Study," in *AJAMES, Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 22-1 (Tokyo: Dig Printing Co.Ltd, 2006), 32.

18 Kandil, 33.

19 Kunio Katakura, "Taro Yamashita and the Rising Sun Oil; How Resource-Poor Japan Did Deal with the Middle-East and Islamic World, the Major Energy Providers in Modern Age?," Former Ambassador to UAE, Iraq and Egypt, accessed October 15, 2020, <http://www.gipc.akita-u.ac.jp/~tadokoro/lecture/doc/freshman/2015/Akita%20Univ.%20Special%20Lecture%20memo%2020150519.pdf>.

20 Kandil, "Political Economy of International Cooperation Between Japan and Saudi Arabia: The



Image 1. A shot of Taro Yamashita, his team and Saudi executives. Carla Chahrour, "The Evolution of Oil Trade between Japan and the Middle East," Arab News Japan, October 21, 2020, https://www.arabnews.jp/en/business/article_29338/.

With this first attempt in the economic sense following WWII, economic and diplomatic relations with the Middle East region remained limited for a time. After the oil crisis, Taro Yamashita's Middle East-focused perspective was inevitably remembered in Japanese foreign policy and Japan attempted to solve the oil supply problem by altering its energy policies with the following strategies; (1) increasing the range of energy sources, (2) expansion of economic relations with other oil-rich countries, (3) to concentrate on saving energy²¹ and reducing energy density, and (4) increasing exports to meet rising energy prices.²²

These strategies have also gained Japan significance in economic relations with countries in the Middle East. While the Japan's energy dependency on

Arabian Oil Company as a Case Study," 31.

21 "Japan Energy Conservation Handbook," 2013, 26-28, <https://www.asiaeec-col.eccj.or.jp/wpdata/wp-content/uploads/handbook13.pdf>; Türkan Arslan, "Emerging Energy Trends in East Asia: The Relationship between Production Levels and World Oil Prices" (Master's Thesis, Institute of Social Sciences, Boğaziçi University, 2019), 79-84.

22 Valerie Yorke, "Oil, the Middle East and Japan's Search for Security," *International Affairs* 57, no. 3 (1981): 428.

the Middle East has decreased since 1985, the regional dependency ratios in Japan's total energy imports have also considerably changed. As Japan's energy import rate of the Middle East fell from 85 percent to 59 percent, the Asia-Pacific region's proportion of energy imports rose to 40%. Japan's preferences in the Asia-Pacific area have shifted to other mostly Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.²³ The import percentage of Australia surged from zero to 15 percent in Japan's energy import model from 1970 to 1999, as the import percentage of other East Asian countries nearly doubled from 13 to 23%.²⁴

Energy types	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	1999
<i>Oil</i>	98%	95%	86%	73%	70%	66%	61%
<i>LNG</i>	1%	2%	7%	12%	13%	3% ¹	15%
<i>LPG</i>	1%	2%	4%	5%	5%	4%	4%
<i>Coal</i>	0%	0%	3%	10%	12%	16%	20%
Proportion of the Middle East	85%	76%	66%	56%	55%	57%	59%
<i>Oil</i>	85%	78%	71%	70%	72%	79%	86%
<i>LNG</i>	0%	0%	12%	8%	6%	9%	18%
<i>LPG</i>	84%	74%	82%	81%	78%	79%	84%
<i>Coal</i>	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Table 1. Japan's import rates by energy type and share of the Middle East region from 1970 to 1999. Lesbirel, 5


The Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) is the most well-known initiative, which was formed in 1967 to diversify oil acquisition sources.²⁵ Yet, as these data show, Japan became highly dependent on Middle Eastern countries for energy resources during the same period. In the 1980s, Japan started to encourage foreign oil investments by private companies due to the inadequacy of JNOC. JNOC was succeeded by Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals

23 B. Bryan Barber, *Japan's Relations with Muslim Asia* (Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 71-73.

24 S. H. Lesbirel, "Diversification and Energy Security Risks: The Japanese Case," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 1 (2004): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S146810990400129X>.

25 "A Fresh Start," *Petroleum Economist*, June 1, 2004, <https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/asia-pacific/2004/a-fresh-start>.

Total Primary Energy Supply ¹⁾



1) A different statistical method was used for the figures for FY1989 and prior. 2) Photovoltaic, wind power, geothermal energy, etc. 3) In fiscal 2014, the domestic supply of nuclear energy was zero due to the suspended operation of all nuclear power plants in Japan.

Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Figure 1. Total primary energy demand of Japan (1965-2015). *Statistical Handbook of Japan 2017*, Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2017, 76, <https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2017all.pdf>; Joule is a unit of energy. Petajoule is equal to 1 quadrillion (10¹⁵) joules. 210 PJ is equivalent to about 50 megatons.

National Corporation (JOGMEC) in the 1990s.²⁶

When looking at the energy import diversification (table 1), which has altered as a result of the aforementioned initiatives, the shift of Japan's hub from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region is notable. It is necessary to mention the following detail here; after the oil crisis, Japan continued its actions to ensure its oil supply while also promote vehicles with high energy-saving technologies.²⁷ As a result, the oil crisis was partially turned into an opportunity, and many Japanese products, particularly automobiles,²⁸ widely purchased on international markets.

26 "JOGMEC-Japan Oil Gas and Metals National Corporation," February 29, 2004, <http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/index.html>.

27 J. Ogawa, F. Noda, and Y. Yamashita, "Japan's Energy Management Policy Experiences and Their Implications for Developing Countries," *The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan-IEEJ*, September 2010, 2.

28 J. D. Hamilton, "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, no. 1 (2009): 29.

Japan's strategy of diversifying its energy resource acquisition, which dates back to the 1960s, became more essential following the oil crisis and has had some consequences since the mid-1980s.²⁹ Efforts to diversify these energy sources ushered in an economic-based foreign policy. A new multi-layered Japanese resource diplomacy (*shingengaikô* 資源外交) that focused on economics and humanitarian help had launched. In this regard, Japan has begun to approach the Middle East as a potential export destination as well as a source of oil imports. To take advantage of the region's various markets, Japanese companies outside the energy sector have begun exporting Japanese products to the region. For example, Japanese manufacturing businesses such as Toyota, Honda, and Mitsubishi have gradually increased their automobile sales over the years in the region. Furthermore, Japanese construction companies have invested in a variety of infrastructure projects as well as engineering and technology in the region. For instance, the building for the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry was designed by the Japanese architectural firm Nikken Sekkei. Panasonic, Sharp, Toshiba, and more than 300 other Japanese firms took part in the construction of high-tech parts of the United Arab Emirates' telecommunications infrastructure. Toyobo has become the leading fabric manufacturer in exporting the famous Japanese thobe fabric to the Middle East region. On the other hand, other products such as aluminum, iron and steel were also exported to this region.³⁰ Since the 1970s, the Gulf countries have taken a lead role, accounting for around 80% of Japan's commerce with the Middle East.³¹ In the context of energy sources, OAPC member states supply 87.2% of Japan's total oil imports of which Saudi Arabia (37.4%) is first and the United Arab Emirates (23.7%) comes in second.³²

29 Lesbirel, "Diversification and Energy Security Risks: The Japanese Case," 29.

30 "An Oasis for Japanese Investment in the Gulf Region," The Japan Times, April 29, 2011, <https://info.japantimes.co.jp/international-reports/pdf/20110429-wer-uae.pdf>.

31 Kimura, "Japan's Middle East Policy: Impact of the Oil Crises," 17-18.

32 Loftur Thorarinnsson, "A Review of the Evolution of the Japanese Oil Industry, Oil Policy and Its Relationship with the Middle East," *Oxford Institute for Energy Studies*, 2018, 5, <https://doi.org/10.26889/9781784671020>.

Japan in the Middle East with Japan Official Development Assistance (ODA)

While the Pacific War is still fresh in people's minds, Asian countries have long been cautious of Japan's economic strategies. That is why Japan has made generous and effective efforts to win Asians' 'hearts and minds' through Official Development Assistance (ODA) aids. Thus, relations with the region's countries were maintained through major businesses³³ like Mitsubishi and Fujitsu, as well as government institutions, group investors, employer holdings, and large family businesses.³⁴ Unlike in Asian countries, these businesses have had a chance to easily make investments and provide aid to Middle Eastern countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia. There was no historical animosity, and the Japanese were regarded as representatives of a model nation. As a result, it would not be incorrect to infer that the Japanese found a more flexible field of activity in the region. Furthermore, notwithstanding the problematic nature of the military dimension of Western security policies toward the Middle East, the most popular feature of Japanese foreign policy, as a result of the Japanese constitution, has been the choice of economic help to developing countries. Yet, ODA aid, the primary tool of Japanese foreign policy, has been criticized in the past for the lack of a general ODA philosophy or ideology.³⁵ This criticism stems from a simplistic point of view, and these aids are more of an extension of the Japanese political economy than a political and ideological viewpoint. In fact, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Japan's constant reliance on energy in order to justify the aid to the Middle East. Cultural, commercial, and political engagement with other Middle Eastern countries have been achieved to some extent as a result of these economic aids. Furthermore, ODA aids have functioned as a powerful foreign trade vector.

Another criticism leveled against Japan is that it leverages foreign aid to further its own goals. However, the same can be said of every state;³⁶ this is

33 In Japanese, these groups are referred to as keiretsu (系列), zaibatsu (財閥), and zaikai (財界).

34 Thiago Corrêa Malafaia, "Japanese International Relations: An Assessment of the 1971-2011 Period," *Brazilian Political Science Review* 10, no. 1 (April 1, 2016): 11.

35 Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment," 333.

36 W. Steven Hook and Guan Zhang, "Japan's Aid Policy since the Cold War: Rethoric and Reality," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 11 (November 1998): 1053-56; Balçı and Yeşiltaş, "Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Dış Yardımların Kullanılması: Japonya Örneği (Using Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool: The

an undeniable trend. Japan is believed to conduct this more systematically. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI / Tsūshō-sangyō-shō / 通商産業省) and the Ministry of Finance (Zaimu-shō / 財務省) use this mechanism to maximize how much aid is delivered based on the country's budget. Through the Economic Planning Agency (it handed over this task completely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimu-shō / 外務省) determines how and to which countries the aid will be given. This strategy has led to Japan's achievement in acquiring, maintaining, and sustaining the reputation of being one of the countries that provides the most aid in the world.

Following the 1973 oil crisis, which clearly revealed Japan's fragile energy dependence, Japan changed its aid strategy as a global economic actor. Immediately following the crisis, Arab countries were promised \$3 billion in aid. As a result of the crisis, Japan has focused its attention on the Middle East region, which is rich in energy resources.³⁷ The first actor that comes to mind as having an impact on Japanese aid policy is the United States. Because it is well known that Japan's attempts to assist Cambodia (1979) and the Philippines (1992) from the ASEAN countries were delayed by U.S. criticism.³⁸ However, the consideration that Japanese foreign aid in the Middle Eastern region was made in line with U.S. wishes may not reflect the reality because the amount, method, and quality of this aid in the region have progressed at Japan's discretion. Japan operated in compliance with its own national interests by neglecting American concerns regarding aid in the Middle East, particularly regarding the Palestine conflict. As an exceptional example of this, when Japan wanted to send economic aid to Iran in 1993,

Case of Japan)," 174.

37 Wan, "Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade," 93; Akgün and Çalış, "Reluctant Giant: The Rise of Japan and Its Role in the Post-Cold War Era," 10.

38 Dennis T. Yasutomo, "Why Aid? Japan as an Aid Great Power," *Pacific Affairs* 62, no. 4 (Winter 1990 1989): 492-93; Wan, "Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade," 92; Jr. Robert M. Orr, "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, The Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," *Journal of International Affairs* 41, no. 1 (1987): 41; William L. Brooks and Jr. Robert M. Orr, "Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance," *Asian Survey* 25, no. 3 (March 1985): 326; Balcı and Yeşiltaş, "Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Dış Yardımların Kullanılması: Japonya Örneği (Using Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Japan)," 177.

it was subjected to a U.S. warning.³⁹ While attempting to relaunch this aid, they were halted in 1995, when the United States stated that it would impose double tariffs on expensive Japanese automobiles.⁴⁰ After a while, Japan maintained its help to Iran with the aim of maintaining its own oil supply security. In some ways, this circumstance demonstrates the autonomy of Japanese foreign policy in the Middle East.

Another conclusion to be derived from Japan's ODA investment policies from 1973 to 2001 is that ASEAN countries, which have significant commercial ties with Japan, trailed behind as compared to Middle Eastern countries. In the 1970s, Japan provided 98 percent of total aid to Asian countries; by the 1990s, this had reduced to 65 percent.⁴¹

The importance of economic cooperation as an effective instrument for protecting national security was stressed in a White Paper issued by MITI in December, 1980. The Japanese Council of Ministers agreed in January 1981 that the amount of ODA aid for the period 1981-1985 should be at least twice that of 1976-1980. In 1980, Japan provided 160 million dollars to Pakistan, 100 million dollars to Turkey, and pledged to expand technical collaboration with Egypt. Furthermore, Japan's 85 million dollars contribution to U.N. agencies in 1988 was the second largest member contribution (9.9 percent of total), after the U.S.. In 1989, Japan's contributions to peacekeeping operations accounted for 11.4 percent of total member contributions, placing it third of behind United States (30.8 percent), and the Soviet Union (12.3 percent). In 1988, Japan provided a five-million-dollar voluntary contribution to the Afghan Mediation Commission and a ten-million-dollar donation to the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG). Japan provided 14.1 million, followed by 3.1 million dollars to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).⁴²

While the Middle East region ODA ratio was 0.8 percent in 1972, it soared after the oil crisis to 24.5 percent in 1977. When the emergency loans supplied

39 Orr, "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, The Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," 54.

40 Akitoshi Miyashita, "Gaiatsu and Japan's Foreign Aid: Rethinking the Reactive-Proactive Debate," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (1999): 696.

41 Miyashita, 704.

42 Balcı and Yeşiltaş, "Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Dış Yardımların Kullanılması: Japonya Örneği (Using Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Japan)," 180.

to Egypt, Syria, and Jordan during the Gulf Crisis in 1991 were considered, the region's share of ODA aids remained at 20.4 percent. This proportion of the Middle East region has declined to 10% due to the stability and structural changes in the energy markets throughout time. Since 1992, this percentage has fluctuated between 6% and 7%. In comparison to other regions in same time period, the Middle East ranked fourth, behind Asia (54.5%), Africa (12.6%), and Central and South America (10.8 %).⁴³ As a result, the Middle East region's proportion of Japanese aid has increased significantly during times of regional crisis, but has reduced since 2001.

A Different Approach to the Search for Soft and Hard Power in the Middle East

Humanitarian diplomacy and peacebuilding initiatives became key instruments in Japanese foreign policy's search for security in the 1970s.⁴⁴ In characterizing Japanese foreign policy, Holsti used the word 'developer'. He attributed this to Japan's foreign policy practices being based on peacekeeping and humanitarian security policies.⁴⁵ Humanitarian diplomacy and economic instruments have largely superseded military instruments in Japan's approach to the Middle East.⁴⁶

Ali Balcı and Murat Yeşiltaş concluded in their related article that "... *foreign aid has been used to advance the Japanese national interest and guarantee Japanese national security since the 1950s*" and "*Japanese foreign aid policy has been shaped in line with a perception of economic and security-based interests, and humanitarian concerns have remained secondary*".⁴⁷ These findings support my view of Japanese foreign policy as being concentrated on the economy and security. Apart from pure pacifist or militarist Japanese foreign policy analysis, the importance of the 'third-way' approach emerges once more here

43 Akaha, "Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment," 328-29.

44 "Japan's Economic Cooperation in the Middle East," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 27, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/relation/coop.html.

45 Pehlivan Türk, "From Peace State to Peacekeeping State: Japan's Changing National Role Conception and Foreign Policy Norms," 64.

46 K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (1970): 296, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>.

47 Yukiko Miyagi, "Japan's Middle East Security Policy: Rethinking Roles and Norms," *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 3, no. 1 (July 2011): 12.

in terms of understanding the political economy of Japanese foreign policy.

The Middle East crises provided Japan with the opportunity to evolve into a normal state with a partially independent foreign policy and an active participation in global politics using its own methods. During the energy crisis, the Japanese properly considered the implications and long-term repercussions of the process, and economic priorities were secured by humanitarian policies.⁴⁸ Yet, while it is partially true that Japanese foreign policy in the Middle East has progressively shifted from a non-military to a military axis over time,⁴⁹ it is not conceivable to say that this military status has exceeded the more active economic participation. Actually, military engagement in peacekeeping missions has been severely restricted once it comes to the use of armaments. Japan's peaceful identity has not been endangered. Japan became more assertive and clearer about its national interests and priorities during the 1990s. While doing so, it has sought to maintain its close political, economic, cultural, and costless relations with the United States and other nations that have developed over the last half-century.⁵⁰ In this respect, it has limited its policy toward the Middle East region to political discourses and energy securitization. This constraint prohibited many such Japanese foreign policy approaches from expanding beyond the normal reach. As a result, in comparison to other countries, Japan has become a reasonable actor in the Middle East region as a country that avoids the use of force. Japan's position as a welcome nation in the region has set the precedent for other countries seeking soft power in the Middle East.⁵¹ Finally, Japanese diplomacy, crowned with aid to Middle Eastern countries and active UN involvement, has progressed towards Japan's long-held ambition⁵² to be a member of the United Nations Security Council.

48 Balcı and Yeşiltaş, "Bir Dış Politika Aracı Olarak Dış Yardımların Kullanılması: Japonya Örneği (Using Foreign Aid as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Japan)," (167)-(192).

49 Miyagi, "Japan's Middle East Security Policy: Rethinking Roles and Norms," 15.

50 Miyagi, 9.

51 Wan, "Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Has Used Its Economic Power in the Past Decade," 87.

52 Mürsel Doğrul, "Filistin-İsrail Sorununun Muhtemel Arabulucu Aktörü Olarak Japonya'nın Kapasitesi/İmkanları," *FAD- Filistin Araştırmaları Dergisi* 5 (Yaz 2019): s.81-101.

Conclusion

This article examined the political economy of Japan's foreign policy and the strategy of leveraging foreign aid to secure energy supply from 1973 to 2001. Japan's energy dependence on the Middle East region during the period of 1973-2001 has been sought to be managed through technological partnership and the adoption of a policy of orientation to alternative markets and resources. Although Japan's dependence on the region's energy resources has reduced in part, the critical threshold has not been surpassed. The 1973 Oil Crisis expanded the areas for Japan's aid program. Japan's ODA aid has been used more effectively in the Middle East region than in Asian countries with the help of no historical enmity between Japan and the Middle East region countries. Japan was recognized as a developer state in the international arena with the help of the method of using economic power and humanitarian aids. It has achieved this by following a balanced policy between the concerns of oil supplier countries of the Middle East and the demands of the United States, without compromising its national interests.

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D.T. Suzuki on Swedenborg: An Introduction

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Introduction

D.T. Suzuki was a great admirer of Swedenborg's theological thought and worked tirelessly to propagate its values in his own country, at the time suffering from a severe spiritual crisis. Such a dissemination effort was performed both through the translation into Japanese of several of Swedenborg's key mystical works, and through two of his writings aimed at outlining the life of the Swedish author, who was almost unknown in Japan at the beginning of the 20th century: *Swedenborg* (『スエデンボルグ』, 1913) and *Swedenborg (his view of Heaven and the "Other-Power")* (『スエデンボルグ (その天界と他力観)』, 1924).

Suzuki, however, emphasized the importance of Swedenborg's entire work, not only the theological one, defining him as "a scientific and religious genius". The value of the Swedish scholar's scientific writings and discoveries, which characterized the first half of his life, was indeed recognized officially; Swedenborg was a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences, as well as of that of St. Petersburg. His career as a scholar and inventor was dazzling, leading him to work also in the service of the Swedish crown.

Nevertheless, he suddenly abandoned this career following a profound spiritual crisis that led him to conduct a secluded life devoted solely to his mystical writings.

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Although the phases of Swedenborg's life may appear quite different, they were linked by a specific and enduring research topic.

Swedenborg's Education

Born Swedberg -his surname was later changed- in 1688 in Stockholm, he was the third son of the influential bishop of Skara, Jesper Swedberg (1653-1735). In 1699, he joined the University of Uppsala, where he completed his studies in philosophy in 1709.¹

As was customary for the young offspring of the wealthy families of his time, he went abroad to widen his acquired knowledge. He first travelled to England, a recognized center of culture and a great maritime power, where he studied the observation techniques of the royal astronomer John Flamsteed (1646-1719), mingling with the intellectual circles of luminaries such as Isaac Newton (1643-1727) and Edmund Halley (1656-1742). He also devoted himself to geology, botany, zoology and mechanical sciences, cultivating them later in Amsterdam and Paris.

Upon his return to Sweden, more than five years later, he was hired as an assistant to the Swedish inventor Christopher Polhem (1661-1751); such a position earned him an official presentation to the court. Impressed by the young scientist's intellect, the Swedish king Charles XII (1682-1718) had him employed as an assessor at the Bureau of Mines. This assignment was significant and prestigious in consideration of the vital role played by mineral resources in the Swedish economy, and provided the scientist with countless opportunities for scientific research, which he exploited thoroughly. After the death of Charles XII in 1718, his sister Ulrika Eleonora (1688-1741) ascended to the throne. She ennobled the Swedberg family, changing their name to Swedenborg in 1719; consequently, the young scientist obtained the right to vote in The House of Nobility, which he exercised for most of his life. In 1723, Swedenborg obtained further positions in the Bureau of Mines, which he held until 1747, with some prolonged leave for study abroad.

1 Jun Honna, "Japan and the Responsibility to Protect: Coping with Human Security Diplomacy," *The Pacific Review* 25, no. 1 (2012): 109.

A Scientific Approach to Body and Soul

In the years immediately following his return to Sweden, Swedenborg channeled most of his intellectual energy into scientific and technical research. In 1716, he published –unusually in Swedish– the first issue of a scientific journal titled *Daedalus Hyperboreus*. Although the journal was intended to highlight Polhem's achievements, it also included the publication of several of Swedenborg's projects and inventions. Subsequently, he started writing more speculative books on chemistry and physics, and the first work on algebra in the Swedish language.

Swedenborg's first major publication was *Opera Philosophica et Mineralia* (Philosophical and Metallurgical Works), printed in three folio volumes in 1734. The second and third volumes concerned iron, copper and brass processing and stood out for their technical information on metallurgy. The first volume entitled *Principia Rerum Naturalium* (Basic Principles of Nature) laid the philosophical groundwork for Swedenborg's subsequent investigation into the nature of the soul. *Opera Philosophica et Mineralia* was written in Latin and published abroad, with the intention to gain international dissemination. Between 1720 and 1730, Swedenborg distinguished himself among Sweden's most highly regarded scientists, becoming a member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.²

In the late 1730s, his scientific interests turned towards human physiology, focusing on questions about speculative psychology. The two volumes of *Oeconomie Regni Animalis* (The Economy of the Animal Kingdom) were published respectively in 1740 and 1741. The first focused on the heart and blood; the second dealt with the brain, the nervous system, and the soul with the underlying intent of identifying a connection between the spiritual and physical world. The text, based on the works of contemporary scientists and philosophers, maintained the existence of a spiritual fluid, present in all living creatures, fed by a divine source.

Subsequently, Swedenborg began to work on *Regnum Animalis Anatomice, Physice Et Philosophice Perlustratum, Nunc Primum* (The Animal Kingdom Inspected Anatomically, Physically and Philosophically for the First Time) which dealt, in greater depth, with anatomy.

2 Wilkinson 1996, 59-60.

Other writings were barely drafted when interrupted by a sudden and profound change in the scientist's life.

A Mystical Approach to the Body and Soul

In his diaries, Swedenborg claimed to have had mystical experiences in the form of visions as a child. Unfortunately, there is little information about his childhood; his father's voluminous memoirs mention him once only to note his birth and the meaning of his name: Emanuel, "God with us". However, they provide a clear idea of the bishop's strong personality, solid religious choices and the mysticism of his beliefs and mental constructs, which enriched objects and even everyday events with an otherworldly meaning. It was precisely following the death of his father (1743) that Swedenborg's spiritual crisis began.³

During 1743 and throughout 1744, he underwent profound mystical experiences, recorded in his diary. Initially, many of them revolved around a sense of spiritual unworthiness and the need of purifying from sin. The first -a vision- happened in April 1745, near Easter, in a state of full vigil; from that point onward, Swedenborg began to report experiences of contact with the spiritual world regularly.

Following this event, he began to write an exploration of the Bible, reinterpreted in the light of the new understanding gained during his visionary episodes.

The spiritual crisis and repeated mystical experiences led Swedenborg to resign as a public official and devote himself exclusively to theological writing. His interest in the connection between the spiritual and physical world continued, as did his research on the subject; however. The scientific approach of his investigations was replaced by a mystical one.

Swedenborg's first theological work was *Arcana Coelestia Quae in Scriptura Sacra, seu Verbo Domini Sunt, Detecta* (Revelation of the Celestial Mysteries Contained in the Word of the Lord, Starting from the Book of Genesis), a detailed, verse by verse, analysis of the inner meaning of the Bible, beginning with Genesis and then moving through Exodus.

3 White 1878, 46

The premise of Swedenborg's study was the symbolic code of the Old Testament, which could be understood only through an interpretation of the literal text.

*From the mere letter of the Word of the Old Testament no one would ever discern the fact that this part of the Word contains deep secrets of heaven [...]. Yet the truth is that everywhere in that Word there are internal things which never appear at all in the external things except a very few which the Lord revealed and explained to the Apostles [...].*⁴

Interspersed between the commentary chapters were the presentations of principles that would become critical aspects of Swedenborg's theology. The most important were the 'correspondences' between the physical and the spiritual world and between the soul and body.

Swedenborg published *Arcana Coelestia* in 1749, except for the eighth and final volume, published in 1756. He chose to publish the book in London to avoid Sweden's strict anti-heresy laws and because of the English city's open and lively intellectual climate, essential for diffusing an entirely new approach to reading the Scripture.

Although Swedenborg initially intended to apply this exegesis to the entire Bible, that endeavor was never completed. In fact, in 1758, he returned to London with new titles to publish: *De Coelo et Eius Mirabilibus et de inferno, ex Auditibus et Visis* (Heaven and its Wonders and Hell: According to What has been Heard and Seen), describing the afterlife and the life of its inhabitants; *De Equo Albo de quo in Apocalypsi* (The White Horse Mentioned in the Book of Revelation), about the inner meaning of the Bible; *De Telluribus in Mundo Nostro Solari, Quae Vocantur Planetae, et de Telluribus in Coelo Astrifero, deque Illarum Incolis, Tum de Spiritibus et Angelis Ibi; Ex Auditibus et Visis* (The Lands in the Starry Sky, their Inhabitants, their Spirits and Angels, According to What has been Heard and Seen), dedicated to the forms of life on other planets; *De Ultimo Judicio* (The Last Judgment); and *De Nova Hierosolyma et eius doctrina coelesti* (The New Jerusalem and its Celestial Doctrine). The last two books were based on a fundamental aspect of Swedenborg's theology: the symbolic meaning of the Scripture. In *De Ultimo Judicio*, the 'last judgment'

⁴ Wilkinson 1996, 59-60.

was interpreted not as a prophetic event in the history of humanity, but as a spiritual phase in its evolution, while in *De Nova Hierosolyma*, Jerusalem symbolized the new church and its general principles.

Except for *De Ultimo Judicio*, the contents of the five volumes he published in 1758 were taken from the *Arcana Coelestia*, sometimes with very few revisions.⁵

De Coelo et Eius Mirabilibus et de Inferno included, in fact, an entire chapter dedicated to “correspondences”:

People today do not know what “correspondence” is. There are many reasons for this ignorance, the primary one being that we have moved away from heaven because of our love for ourselves and for the world. You see, people who love themselves and the world above all focus on nothing but earthly matters because these provide gratification to their more outward senses and pleasure to their moods. They do not attend to spiritual matters because these offer gratification to their deeper senses and pleasure to their minds. So, they set such matters aside, saying that they are too lofty to think about.

The early people behaved differently. For them, knowledge about correspondences was the pearl of all knowledge. By means of it, they gained intelligence and wisdom, and by means of it those who were of the church had a communication with heaven. Knowledge about correspondences is in fact angelic knowledge.

The earliest ones, who were heavenly people, did their thinking from correspondence like angels, so they could even talk with angels. Further, the Lord was quite often visible to them, and taught them. Nowadays, though, this knowledge has been so completely lost that people do not know what correspondence is.

Now, without some grasp of what correspondence is, nothing can be known in clear light about the spiritual world or about its inflow into the natural world, nothing at all about what the spiritual is relative to the natural, nothing in clear light about the human spirit that is called “the soul” and how it affects the body inward, nothing about our state after death. Because of all this, I need to define it and explain what it is like. This will also pave the way for matters

5 Swedenborg 1749 (2009), 1.

that are to follow.

First, I need to state what correspondence is. The whole natural world is responsive to the spiritual world — the natural world not just in general, but in detail. So, whatever arises in the natural world out of the spiritual one is called “something that corresponds.” It needs to be realized that the natural world arises from and is sustained in being by the spiritual world, exactly the way an effect relates to its efficient cause.

By “the natural world,” I mean all that extended reality that is under our sun and that receives its light and warmth from it. All the things that are sustained in being from that source belong to that world. The spiritual world, in contrast, is heaven, and to that world belong all the things that are in the heavens.

Since a human being is a heaven and a world in least form in the image of the greatest, there is a spiritual world and a natural world within each of us. The deeper elements, which belong to our minds and relate to our intelligence and volition, constitute our spiritual world, while the outer elements, which belong to our bodies and relate to our senses and actions, constitute our natural world. Anything that occurs in our natural world (that is, in our bodies and their senses and actions) because of our spiritual world (that is, because of our minds and their intelligence and volition) is called something that corresponds.⁶

In the last years of his life, Swedenborg published several more important theological works: *De Cultu et Amore Dei* (Divine Love and Wisdom) (1763), *De Divina Providentia* (Divine Providence) (1764), *Apocalypsis Revelata, in Qua Deteguntur Arcana Quae Ibi Praedicta Sunt, et Hactenus Recondita Latuerunt* (The Revealed Apocalypse, Revealing the Secrets that were Foretold there and which have Remained Hidden Until Now) (1766) and *Delitiae Sapientiae de Amore Coniugali; Post Quas Sequuntur Voluptates Insaniae de Amore Scortatorio* (The Pleasure of the Wisdom of Conjugal Love, Followed by the Insane Pleasure of Promiscuous Love) (1768). Although published separately, *De Cultu et Amore Dei* and *De Divina Providentia* focused on investigating the divine essence, developing two distinct aspects. The first dealt with the nature

⁶ It was initially published anonymously and with only a few sales. Separating the elements of the work into smaller volumes may have been an attempt to make the content more accessible.

of God, described as love and wisdom and the source of every form of life, recalling Swedenborg's earlier works. *De Divina Providentia*, instead, focused on the theme of free will and the nature of evil and suffering, describing the spiritual laws that govern the world.

In *Apocalypsis Revelata* Swedenborg resumed his discussion on the symbolical meaning of the Bible, including memorable occurrences (*memorabilia*) or descriptions of encounters with otherworldly creatures, usually illustrating specific theological contents.

De Amore Coniugali, instead, dealt with love in all its aspects, focusing on the principle of complementarity between the sexes.

In 1771, Swedenborg, now in advanced age, published his latest work, *Vera Christiana Religio* (The True Christian Religion), a detailed and systematic discussion of his theological view. In the following year, 1772, he died in a London boarding house, where he conducted a life of seclusion to the end, devoted solely to the writing of his works.

Swedenborg, Buddha of the North

Suzuki discovered the mysticism of Swedenborg during a period of profound spiritual crisis in Japan,⁷ caused by widespread materialism, at the root of which is the significant weakening of religious and spiritual values and its connected belief and faith systems.

In his quest for effective ideas to answer this crisis, Suzuki moved to the United States, the stage of lively philosophical-religious debate also influenced by eastern concepts.⁸ The Open Court Publishing House played a major role in facilitating that debate. Suzuki worked there for a long time under the guidance of the scholar Paul Carus (1852-1919), author of *Religion of Science* of 1893 and *The Gospel of Buddha* of 1894. Suzuki's devotion to Carus' scientific religion, possibly cultivated before he visited America, was followed by an interest in theosophy that Suzuki maintained and developed.⁹

On his return to Japan, he translated four works by Swedenborg into Japanese: in 1910 (天界と地獄) (Heaven and Its Marvels and Hell According

⁷ Swedenborg 1758 (2000), 134-135.

⁸ Yoshinaga 2009, 123.

⁹ Ibid., 129-130.

to What We Have Heard and Seen), in 1914 (新エルサレムとその教説) (The new Jerusalem and its Celestial Doctrine) and (神知と神愛) (Divine Love and Wisdom) and, in 1915, (神慮論) (Divine Providence). Also, in 1910, he participated in the International Congress dedicated to Swedenborg, held in London, as vice president. Suzuki dedicated two further studies to the Swedish mystic: the first, published in 1913, is titled スエデンボルグ (Swedenborg); the second, 「スエデンボルグ(その天界と他力観)」 [Swedenborg (His View of Heaven and “Other-Power”)], was published in 1924.

The first work was written to introduce Swedenborg and his mystical thought, at the time almost unknown in Japan.¹⁰ The second, to promote a more in-depth knowledge of the Swedish author's philosophical and religious theory, focusing on its similarities with Buddhism, a prevalent aspect of Suzuki's research.

These two works convey Suzuki's great admiration for the Swedish author's work and the way he led his life. The Japanese scholar emphasized their value and highlighted the impact of Swedenborg's spiritual crisis, resulting in the transition from a scientific to a mystical approach to his investigations into the theme of the soul. This crisis represented a strong point of contact with the experience of Buddhist practitioners, such as Suzuki himself.

Suedenborugu

The book of 1913 was a detailed reconstruction of Swedenborg's life, career, and works. In the preface, Suzuki enumerated the reasons for his interest in the mystic writer:

Emanuel Swedenborg [...] is a very interesting subject for investigation from a number of angles.

First of all, Swedenborg said that he traveled in heaven and hell and witnessed in detail the actual state of people after death. His statements are quite sincere [...] seem to accord well with the truth [...]

In this world of ours, there seems to be a spiritual realm separate from that

¹⁰ Ibid., 105-06.

*of five senses; and when we enter a certain psychological state, we apparently can communicate with that realm. Even if we think that circumstances of this other realm have no moral connection whatsoever to the mundane world there is plenty that is of interest to science and philosophy. This is a second reason to examine Swedenborg. Swedenborg's theological doctrines greatly resemble those of Buddhism. [...] This is the third reason that we should study Swedenborg.*¹¹

The first reason for Suzuki's interest in Swedenborg laid in his exploration of the post-mortem dimension, presented with sincerity and sober moderation and perceivable as likely. The second was the Swedish scholar's assumption of a spiritual dimension –parallel to the sensory one– perceptible only when in a specific psychological state. The third reason was the similarity of Swedenborg's theological doctrine to Buddhism.

Furthermore, the following elements should be considered:

*The fact that scientific and religious genius marvelously combined to produce a person of such unfathomable depth makes not only good material from the viewpoint of psychological research; but because he was a man of great vitality and distinction who had escaped the taint of worldliness, his life also serves as a model for the individual, teaching numerous lessons. There are no drastic changes in the course of his biography, so there is nothing that especially dazzles us. But his eighty-four years of life were completely devoted to science and religion, his everyday existence filled with infinite wonders. He was a man of spirit; and now, in the twentieth century, we are moved by the force of his personality. If only for this reason, we should know about his life.*¹²

When the foundations of Japanese spirituality were shaken by unrestrained materialism, Suzuki became fascinated with Swedenborg, who had distinguished himself for his way of life and values against the spreading materialism of his time. The Swedish author's vision and personality reinforced Suzuki's confidence in a possible solution to the spiritual crisis significantly affecting the Japanese philosopher and, like him, a generation of

11 With the exception of a translation into Japanese, published in 1910, of *De Coelo et Eius Mirabilibus et de inferno*.

12 Suzuki 1913, (1996), 5-6.

young people with strong social, cultural, and spiritual awareness.

Suzuki also highlighted Swedenborg's "scientific and religious genius", highlighting the Swedish author's life's two different and distinct phases: the first as a talented scientist and devoted court servant, and the second as a mystic, conducting a solitary life dedicated to recording his mystical experiences.

The first part of the text outlined Swedenborg's academic career and commitments up to 1744. Suzuki described his scientific interests and contributions, carefully examining the works and subjects explored in the Swedish scholar's research. Such analysis focused on a topic of great interest to Suzuki, the relationship between body and soul, which was the constant object of investigation in the two stages of Swedenborg's life:

However, from what I have seen, there is not a huge, unbreachable gap between Swedenborg's so called worldly career and his spiritual career, since his earlier thoughts and sentiments show a continuity with his spiritual life. Of course, there occurred a revolution in his writing, ideas, concepts, and arguments. Nevertheless, there were aspects of the past that remained in the background. To investigate the traces of this connection, we can look at what Swedenborg wrote in The Animal Kingdom, and see where his ideas were leading.¹³

Below, Suzuki introduced the following passage from Swedenborg's work:

I intend to examine, physically and philosophically, the whole Anatomy of the Body; of all its Viscera, Abdominal and Thoracic; of the Genital Members of both sexes; and of the Organs of the Five Senses. Likewise, the Anatomy of all parts of the Cerebrum, Cerebellum, Medulla Oblongata, and Medulla Spinalis.

Afterwards, the cortical substance of the two brains; and the fibre; and the causes of the forces and motion of the whole organism: Diseases, moreover; those of the head particularly, or which proceed by defluxion from the Cerebrum.

I purpose afterwards to give an introduction to Rational Psychology, consisting of certain new doctrines, through the assistance of which we may be conducted, from the material organism of the Body to a knowledge of the Soul,

¹³ Ibid., 6-7.

which is immaterial: these are, the Doctrine of Forms; the Doctrine of Orders and Degrees; also, the Doctrine of Series and Society; the Doctrine of Influx; the Doctrine of Correspondence and Representation: lastly, the Doctrine of Modification.

From these doctrines I come to the Rational Psychology itself; which will comprise the subjects of action; of external and internal sense; of imagination and memory; also, of the affections of the animus. Of the intellect, that is, of thought and of the will; and of the affections of the rational mind: also, of instinct.

Lastly, of the Soul; and of its state in the Body, its intercourse, affection, and immorality; and of its state when the body dies. The work to conclude with a Concordance of System.

From this summary or plan, the reader may see, that the end I propose to myself in the work, is a knowledge of the soul; since this knowledge will constitute the crown of my studies [...] In order, therefore, to follow up the investigation, and to solve the difficulty, I have chosen to approach by the analytic way; and I think I am the first who was taken this course professedly [...]

In olden time, before any racer could merit the crown, he was commanded to run seven times round the goal, which also I have determined here to do [...].

Thus, I hope, that by bending my course inwards continually, I shall open all the doors that lead to the soul and enter directly within: by the divine permission.¹⁴

Followed by Suzuki's comment on Swedenborg's words:

Thus, we can see that there was not a complete division between the spiritual life of Swedenborg's later years and the intellectual life of his earlier years. In 1744, when he turned 56, he had an unprecedented spiritual experience and embarked on a new life. It is not that this life had no connection to the past. In one sense, it should be viewed as nothing more than an extension of that previous life. Granted, his so-called "contemplation of Divine" may have differed from what he had anticipated; but that is inconsequential from the

¹⁴ Ibid., 19.

perspective of his entire life's development.

Swedenborg tried looking into the life of the Divine from intellectual and analytical angles. At first, he made a careful study of chemistry, physics, and engineering; continuing from there, he entered into biological and anatomical research. At this point, using all of his theoretical genius, he tried to penetrate the mystery of the Divine, but he was not fully satisfied. As a result of meditation and esoteric practice, his mind's eye gradually grew clearer, and he apparently gained the wondrous ability to enter and leave the realm of the Divine at will.¹⁵

Suzuki's words set great importance on the interest and research on the soul, which Swedenborg relentlessly pursued in both stages of his life, identifying in his "contact" with "the realm of the Divine" the authentic and unique experience that had divided the Swedish mystic's life into a "before and after". This experience had such great importance for Suzuki on account of its similarity with the Buddhist *satori*.

In his observations, the Japanese scholar also emphasized the different criteria applied to the investigation of the soul. Initially, the "intellectual and analytical" one, typical of the scientific phase, produced in-depth studies in chemistry, physics, mechanics and, subsequently, anatomy and biology. Such an approach was replaced by that of the "mind's eye" during Swedenborg's mystical phase, which occurred after the "meditations and esoteric practices".

Years later, these two approaches would become the subject of a comprehensive analysis in *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*: in this book, Suzuki concluded that these criteria, defined respectively as "intellectual" and "intuitive", resulted from the respective cultures of origin, namely the western and the eastern ones. Their different research results precisely were caused by the different tools used: intellect and intuition. The first, typical of investigations into evident and scientifically measurable truths, and the second, specific to the spiritual dimension, Swedenborg had managed to apply them both to a research field dear to Suzuki: the soul. Through his investigation, he achieved extensive philosophical-religious knowledge, as seen in the reference to "esoteric meditations and practices", in many ways

¹⁵ Swedenborg 1744 (2012), 79.

similar to the Buddhist tradition.

In the text, his mention of esotericism (密教 Mikkyō) concerning the mystical phase of Swedenborg's life related to a traditional knowledge the Swedish author applied in his investigations. However, it also referred to theosophy, a field of interest diffused in the United States when Suzuki had worked and lived there, to which he had devoted himself. Such orientation was disconnected from religious worship and aimed to explore the spiritual experience and the connections of the soul to the workings of the Divine: precisely the purpose of the newly formed Theosophical Society, established in New York in 1875. Among the numerous followers of theosophy was Beatrice Erskin Lane (1878-1939), Suzuki's wife. Both continued to cultivate this discipline in Japan through meetings and conferences involving various intellectual and academic personalities, within actual lodges.

The second phase of Swedenborg's life coincided with the second part of Suzuki's text. While describing the core of the Swedish author's mystical thought, Suzuki also outlined with greater precision the analogies to Buddhism he had identified. The first similarity existed in Swedenborg's life path, which the Japanese scholar defines as "similar to a Buddhist", emphasizing its culmination, or rather the transition from the "proprium" to the Divine, from "self-power" to the "Other-power":

Swedenborg's theological doctrines greatly resemble those of Buddhism. He taught that, having discarded the proprium, one must act in accordance with the workings of the Divine, that true salvation is the harmonious unification of belief and action, and that the Divine manifests itself as wisdom and love.

Not depending on his own efforts or intellect, he would become an instrument of God's revelation [...] it is similar to a Buddhist who believes in self-power turning around and becoming a believer in Other-power. Belief in Other-power seems easy, but its austerities are no different from those by relying on self-power.

Those who spend their lives in religious practice know this fact from personal experience.¹⁶

Discarding the "proprium", the "Self-power" and acting in accordance "with

16 Suzuki 1913, 20-21.

the workings of the Divine” were key points of Swedenborg’s vision, similar to the Buddhist school of thought and familiar to Japanese culture. This process was deemed an element of interest by Suzuki, as a philosopher and religious scholar, and a valid point of reference in his quest for answers to the critical spiritual situation of his home country.

Another similarity with Buddhism was the assumption of “providence”, a divine intervention that provided and was never accidental in its concessions:

[Swedenborg] taught that [...] there is not a single thing in the world left to chance, and one can witness the revelation of divine wisdom and divine love even in the stroke of a pen, for it is deeply imbued with divine providence. These sorts of issues attract the interest of religious scholars, and especially Buddhists.

Next, Swedenborg explains the reason there is evil and falsehood in the world. This section resembles the Buddhist teaching of expedient means. That is, it is divine providence that allows evil and falsehood to strut about temporarily in order that they may be overcome by good and truth. This is not to say that providence does not manifest itself in both good and evil people. Divine providence is continually inviting people to enter heaven. People are free to respond to this and do good and are also free not to respond and do evil. Evil use of this freedom results from attachment to the self (proprium). Each person has the predisposition and capacity to be saved; and not being saved, or falling from grace, come from not saving oneself. The road of salvation entails recognizing various evils as sins against divine providence and shunning them. Therefore, doing an evil act again and again after recognizing it as evil is an offence against providence. It is not enough to say that you have committed an evil; you must perceive its greater religious significance and avoid it to the best of your ability while tending only toward good. This is the quickest route to salvation. Salvation comes gradually; it is not immediately actualized through the direct grace of God, for this is contrary to divine providence. By faith alone salvation is impossible; we must acknowledge that not until charity and love are added is the fruit of salvation born. Passing through a lifetime committing sins, even if you say on your deathbed, “I beg you, God, save me” this will not in one stroke wash clean the stain of the previous years. From the start, it is crucial to have a penitent heart and, recognizing one’s sins, to accumulate

*good deeds as befit love and wisdom. In this way, a peaceful death is attained.*¹⁷

No significant comments followed, and no other references to Buddhism were made in the text. On the other hand, as mentioned before, (スエデンボルグ) (Swedenborg) was merely an introduction to the Swedish author's figure and works.

Suzuki would develop these analogies, eleven years later, in his other work dedicated to the Swedish mystic: スエデンボルグ “その天界と他力観” (Swedenborg's View of Heaven and “Other-Power”). As stated in the title, the study aimed to investigate Swedenborg's conception of the divine realm and “Other-Power”, which he had extensively investigated, and which Suzuki had identified as a similarity to Buddhism. Not surprisingly, the text contained references to the “correspondences” present in various works of the Swedish mystic and intentionally cited by Suzuki in the conclusion of his work of 1913:

*In order to understand correctly Swedenborg's vision of the spiritual world, we need to know about his doctrine of representation, correspondences, degrees, and influx [...]. Swedenborg teaches that human life is love and that this love is no different from God. Therefore, God is human life, and people are the recipients of this life. Also, there is a distinction in the Divine between Esse (being) and Existere (form). These are two, yet they are one. Love is being, wisdom is form, and love depends on wisdom as wisdom depends on love. The Divine is a combination of these. The Divine manifests itself in the spiritual world as a sun, whose heat is love and whose light is wisdom. The sun of our world depends on this spiritual sun. Receiving its living heat and living light, the natural sun gives rise to all creation and makes it flourish. The purpose of the creation of the universe is to return all things to their origin in the Lord of creation, or the Divine, and thus establish a correspondence and conjunction between them.*¹⁸

Conclusions

Swedenborg's theological thought embraced numerous elements deemed relevant by Suzuki, as a Buddhist philosopher and scholar in religious studies

¹⁷ Suzuki 1913, (2005), 6, 24-25.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6, 34-35.

searching for a valid reference point for the spiritual crisis of his country: first of all, an awareness of the consequences of the actions of individuals' earthly life in the post-mortem. Secondly, the presupposition of the existence of a spiritual dimension and, therefore, a non-materialistic approach in evident contrast to the materialism of Japan during his time. Thirdly, the Swedish mystic's paradigmatic assumptions embraced a series of spiritual presuppositions similar to those of Buddhism and, consequently, close and dear to the culture of the Japanese people.

Hence, Swedenborg lent himself to becoming a reference point to promote a new spiritual and religious awakening in the country. Furthermore, his theological system was based on consolidated foundations, but renewed by an innovative approach: they appeared modern and captivating because from the West and suitable to the Japanese cultural scene of the time, revived by the opening of borders after centuries of seclusion. In addition, Swedenborg's view had a double value, scientific and religious, and was developed following two different approaches: first, the intellectual and, subsequently, the intuitive one. However, such strong points were crowned by his spiritual awakening experience, as the Swedish mystic had embraced in practice –although not in the definition– the illumination evoked and invoked by Buddhism.

The reasons listed perfectly motivated the name “Buddha of the North” coined by Suzuki for Swedenborg. In this writer's opinion, they also accomplished the purpose of the present article, which, starting from an outline of the Swedish mystic's figure and contributions, aimed to present his most stimulating and inspiring characteristics in the Japanese philosopher's view.

Elsewhere, an in-depth philosophical investigation will be presented to explain the analogies between the two ideological systems identified by Suzuki, with a specific reference to the “Other-Power” quoted in the Preface of *Swedenborg*. A “power” that constituted the core of his second text, in which he recalls the esotericism mentioned in this article.

This work aimed to provide a reasoned review of the elements necessary to understand Suzuki's interest, philosophical and otherwise, in Swedenborg, the subject of his research and investigation for almost twenty years.

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A Framework for the Post-Industrial World: Japanese approach to AI and Society

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Introduction

We are living in an age that has drastically changed with, and been changed by, the way we are dealing with technology and information. Throughout history, we have defined each generation before us in groups, according to their means of fulfilling their basic needs, and we named societies after their most prominent traits. Therefore, just like how we use ‘hunter-gatherer societies’ as an umbrella term for our ancestors, who lived as a part of the era in our history where surviving was linked to performing hunting-gathering activities. The term *Johou Shakai* or *Johouka Shakai*¹ (information society), introduced by the Japanese novelists of 1960s, seem accurate to define our current society, *a post-industrial society*, where information and data have become prominent factors. The developments in information and communication technologies (ICT) have created an opening for information exchanges in incredible volumes,² which has led our species to start using information in ways and volumes that could not have been utilised in previous eras.³ Every passing year, the advancements in the fields of AI and robotics quickly bring life to concepts that were once thought to belong to science-fiction movies and novels. With the advent of AI, both in research and practice, countries with enough technological capabilities have taken the leap to become a part of this ever-growing field. Similarly, the rise and the widespread utilisation of AI around the world pushes governing bodies

1 Ibid., 32-33.

2 *Johou Shakai*. 情報社会 and *Johouka Shakai* 情報化社会 (Information society).

3 Nath, “The Information Society,” 19-29.

to try to regulate or to at least create boundaries to some degree. To this end, much of the developed world has been creating policies on the subject; however, the technology itself seems to develop much more rapidly than any regulating body can react accordingly. Moreover, from many researchers' points of view, the utilisation of the words 'regulating' and 'regulation' when discussing governmental strategies might feel restrictive of the development of technology and might impede or at least slow the advancements in AI. Thus, while an AI policy of a government does not differ from a governmental regulation, the use of the term 'policy' instead of 'regulation' creates the illusion of a more innovation-friendly governmental approach, an important effort to bring together the scientists and policy-makers to proceed discussing state-of-the-art advancements. The government reports and written strategies that have begun to spring up are quite recent, and there will be many more to follow, as these technological advancements become more widespread. While countries attempt to utilise AI applications, and create governmental documents for these purposes, it should be understandable that they tend to prioritise areas of focus depending on their specific societal problems, as well as take measurements considering the circumstance of the country both on the domestic and global level. In addition to the official documents concerning the development of AI and addressing related needs, the countries also issued papers regarding the ethical and social responsibilities that need to be considered while utilising AI technologies.

Japan, as one of the countries paving the way to create a fairer, AI-based society, has published one of the first and most influential AI policy document that covers many aspects of AI research and real-life applications. The document did not only offer a framework to discuss social, economic and ethical issues that may arise due to the rapid integration of these emerging technologies, it also assessed how these systems will align with the benefit of Japanese society as a whole.

The AI Strategy of Japan

Japan published its AI strategy in March 2017. The Strategic Council for AI Technology, was established in 2016 to create a roadmap for research and development in the field of AI. The Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy

「人工知能の研究開発目標と産業化のロードマップ」 includes a roadmap for industrialization of AI technologies. The plan is deeply intertwined with Japan's societal structure, *Society 5.0*. The priorities of the strategy are health, mobility and productivity as a result of the rapidly ageing population of Japan. The Japanese AI strategy, which will be covered in detail as part of this study, also includes plans of investment in research and development, talent development and start-ups.⁴

In 2019 the Japanese government has compiled two reports on AI. in March and also in June. The March report titled “Social Principles of Human-Centric AI” focuses more on societal aspects, while defining three principles of “Dignity”, “Diversity and Inclusion” and “Sustainability”. And in June 2019, the Japanese government released another report on the government's approach to AI developments: AI Strategy 2019 AI for Everyone: People, Industries, Regions and Governments A I 「戦略 2019 人・産業・地域・政府全てにA I」. The 2019 report puts emphasis on a more human-centric approach, respecting the principles that were put forward by the March report and the ethical side of technology, while still maintaining the same discourse as the 2017 report. The report also acknowledges that Japan has been lagging behind and should aim to secure a leadership position in the global AI scene.⁵

Society 5.0

In Japan, the biggest societal change in recent history is their rapidly ageing population, as such the government has been designing a remedy to help lighten the burden on the society. One of the solutions to combat this issue is the newly introduced societal structure, *Society 5.0*. The concept for *Society 5.0* or *Super Smart Society* was proposed by the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation in its *5th Science and Technology Plan*. One definition given for Society 5.0 initiative is “A human-centred society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly

⁴ Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, 8-14.

⁵ NEDO, *Jinkō Chinō no Kenkyū Kaihatsu Mokuhyō to Sagyōka no Rōdō Mappu* 人工知能の研究開発目標と産業化のロードマップ (The Artificial Intelligence Technology Strategy Roadmap). 2017.

integrates cyberspace and physical space.”⁶

The Japanese lay a roadmap starting it with the hunter-gatherer society (1.0), agrarian society (2.0), industrial society (3.0), and the information society (4.0) which we currently reside in and finally *Society 5.0*, creating systems of information and connectivity on both physical and informational level.⁷ This initiative’s main objective is to create a sustainable society, in which the individuals from different age groups and generations are able to live comfortably and in harmony.⁸ The discussion about the best method to integrate new technologies based on AI, IoT and Robotics into our daily lives, is at the moment an important topic in Japanese policy-makers agendas, as advancements in science and technology fields are improving all facets of businesses and society, especially through innovation.⁹ The aim of Society 5.0 is “...creating a society where we can resolve various social challenges by incorporating the innovations of the fourth industrial revolution (e.g. IoT, big data, artificial intelligence (AI), robot, and the sharing economy) into every industry and social life.”¹⁰

To support the government in its endeavour to create Society 5.0, *the Advisory Board on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society* was created in 2016 as a part of *Science and Technology Policy* with the aim of advancing research and development as well as the spreading the use of AI technologies. “AI technology is one of the most significant technologies that facilitates the realisation of Society 5.0. The Advisory Board has worked specially to clarify benefits, issues, challenges, and future directions with special attention to AI technologies that exist or will be realised in the near future and a society in which such technologies prevail.”¹¹

The world around us is changing at an incredibly fast pace, sometimes in places where we cannot perceive it concretely, especially the change that is happening in the digital world. The digital transformation that awaits us will revolutionise not only the industry but also impact social infrastructures

6 Cabinet Office, AI senryaku 2019 A I 戦略 2019 (AI Strategy 2019).

7 Cabinet Office, *Society 5.0*.

8 Cabinet Office, Dai Go Ki Kagaku Gijutsu Kihon Keikaku 第5期科学技術基本計画 (The 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan).

9 Shiroishi et al., “ Society 5.0: For Human Security and Well-Being.” , 91- 95.

10 Harayama., “Society 5.0: Aiming for a New Human-centered Society”, 8-13.

11 Cabinet Office, *Society 5.0*.

around the world as well. The digital transformation in the industrial sector, especially in manufacturing, has accelerated throughout the world, with programmes such as Germany's *Industry 4.0*, China's *Made in China 2025*, and *Advanced Manufacturing Partnership* in the United States.¹²

Similar to the roadmap for societal advancements, there is also one for the progression of industrial revolutions throughout history. Starting in the 18th century with advancements with utilisation of steam, and mechanisation of production in light industry, *the First Industrial Revolution*. Followed by advancements in heavy and chemical history in the 19th century which is classified as *the Second Industrial Revolution*. In the 20th century, this was succeeded by the developments in computers and creation of the internet, with the *the Third Industrial Revolution*. *The Fourth Industrial Revolution* was brought upon by a digital transformation and developments in the fields of AI, IoT, blockchain and their utilisation in industry.¹³

The next step to follow the *4th Industrial Revolution* that we currently reside in, is the creation of *systems* that use the *things* or manufactured goods that were handled separately, to become connected with the digital revolution to come. The systems of various fields that already exist separately in our current society will be able to collaborate more easily and freely as the coordination of such connectivity will be much smoother with further digitalization of industry and social infrastructures. This transformation is expected to create change throughout society by structurally changing industries, and, as a consequence, altering the way people live and work. The societal changes to come are especially important for countries such as Japan, that are impacted by an ageing population, where the quality of life cannot be sustained by the current means and structural transformation is crucial in both industry and society, to keep and improve the current quality of life.¹⁴

The Information Society in which we are assumed to be living in already uses information in volumes never been seen before, and recent developments in the technology field, together with some structural changes in the society due to the advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have

12 Advisory Board on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*.

13 Li, "China's manufacturing locus in 2025," 66-74.

14 Stearns, *The industrial revolution in world history*.

created an environment for information exchange in very large volumes.¹⁵ The concept of *information society* was proposed to define the *post-industrial society* in which the prominent factor becomes information. Since its first use as a term in the 1960s in Japan as *Johou Shakai* or *Johouka Shakai* (information society) in the social sciences field, there has not been a general agreement on one concrete definition. There are five main characterizations used for information society: technological, economic, occupational (sociological), spatial, and cultural. While they cannot agree upon a concrete definition, what they agree upon is the fundamental description of *information society*, that it utilises incredible amounts of information, like never been seen before by previous generations.¹⁶

Society 5.0, which is thought to be the next step in the evolution of society, is planned as a more inclusive and highly connective system that will cater to the needs of all its citizens regardless of age, sex, region, language or any other factors. This is a human-centric concept, the main focus being to create equal opportunities for everyone to indulge in an active life and also to have a high-quality life.¹⁷ The central objective is to provide all the necessary services and products to all its citizens equally. The main factor in realising this next step is to further integrate cyberspace and physical space successfully to create more quality data.¹⁸ This is a central difference between Society 4.0 and 5.0 in how the data is analysed. In Society 4.0, the data is usually stored in cloud databases in cyberspace, where people could access the data and analyse it. In Society 5.0, the information is again stored in cyberspace, but the fundamental distinction is, the data is analysed by AI, which is connected to all systems in cyberspace, and afterwards the analysed data is brought back to humans in the physical world. This new practice is expected to bring new values to both the industry and society in various ways.¹⁹

With *Society 5.0* the Japanese government aims to realise a new societal infrastructure to combat issues that are mainly created by its ageing population. The main subjects they wish to address are; healthcare, mobility,

15 Fukuyama, "Society 5.0: Aiming for a New Human-Centered Society" , 47-50.

16 Nath, "The Information Society," 19-29.

17 Webster, *Theories of the Information Society*, 8-14.

18 Shiroishi et al., " Society 5.0: For Human Security and Well-Being." , 91- 95.

19 Hitachi, "Realizing Society 5.0 through 'Habitat Innovation'," 3-5.

infrastructure²⁰ and fintech.²¹ Being one of the first countries to face these issues, and search for answers to the problems which will in near future affect more countries, Japan is sharing its answers and helping to create global solutions with Society 5.0.²² Its universal appeal seems to have prompted scholars from countries ranging from Lithuania,²³ Russia²⁴ to even China²⁵ to adopt the term. This concept will be using the technological advancements from the ongoing industrial revolution, Industry 4.0, and create an environment that will ensure a sustainable future. Industry 4.0, in essence, is the integration of industrial and technical systems into cyber-physical systems (CPS).²⁶ This connectivity is what the Japanese government aims to create in the everyday world outside of the industrial processes.

The Japanese government also expressed its wish to comply with the sustainable development goals (SDGs)²⁷ set by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2015 in its *5th Science and Technology Basic Plan*, by incorporating them into its Society 5.0 scheme.²⁸ This means that while the *Society 5.0* project is a development system for Japan, it is by no means restricted to Japanese society. The difficulties Japan currently faces as a result of its demographic changes will appear in different nations in the near future around the world as well. By finding solutions to these problems, Japan will be able to help settle these comparative issues worldwide and help accomplish the SDGs.²⁹

AI will play a major role in realising Japan's vision for the future and has been gaining popularity as technological advancements create a superior

20 Harayama, "Society 5.0: Aiming for a New Human-centered Society", 8-13.

21 The reduction in population will lead to less dense areas, where the basic infrastructure services such as water, energy, education and medical services will need to be provided to large and sparsely populated areas, resulting in higher service costs. (Harayama, 2017)

22 Financial Technology. Products and companies that employ newly developed digital and online technologies in the banking and financial services industries.

23 Fukuyama, "Society 5.0: Aiming for a New Human-Centered Society", 47-50.

24 Savanevičienė et al., "Individual innovativeness of different generations in the context of the forthcoming society 5.0 in Lithuania", 211-222. (capital letters for titles on this page)

25 Salimova et al., "From industry 4.0 to society 5.0: Challenges for sustainable competitiveness of Russian industry", 1-7.

26 Wang et al., "Societies 5.0: A new paradigm for computational social systems research", 2-8.

27 A broad concept that collects data from sensors installed in the real world (physical space) in the cloud (cyberspace) via the internet, and feeds the results of analysis back into the real world.

28 United Nations, "Sustainable Development Goals."

29 Cabinet Office, Dai Go Ki Kagaku Gijutsu Kihon Keikaku 第5期科学技術基本計画 (The 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan).

playground for it. The story of AI had already started in the 1950s, more precisely in the summer of 1956, at the *Dartmouth Summer Research Project* (Dartmouth Conference), when John McCarthy, a mathematics professor, coined the phrase *artificial intelligence*. The field of *thinking machines* or AI, as we now call it was launched by a vision shared by the scientists attending the conference. Although they were not in complete agreement on the choice of problems, the general theory, or the methodology, they all believed that computers could be able to do intelligent tasks. Their vision, as it was clearly stated in the proposal of the conference; “The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it.” A lot has happened in the field of AI during the 60 years that have passed since the conference and even though AI has enjoyed success, disagreements remain. One such fundamental disagreement is whether AI has to be probability-based or logic-based. These disagreements and obstacles can, of course, be tackled. But first, the situation as, Marvin Minsky,³⁰ expressed has to be changed. His main concerns being was that projects were being chosen on the basis of popularity and only success stories were being published in the field. He also argued that for AI to be considered as a scientific field, failures would also have to be published and shared.³¹

The transformation of society as a direct consequence of advancements in AI is now coming closer to becoming a reality. Technological advancements have paved the way for research in replacing some purely intellectual activities; perception, recognition, reasoning, learning, decision making, to name just a few. AI will be transforming. It will be supporting humanity, enhancing daily activities, and even improving decision making. AI will be creating new business opportunities, services, and new standards in welfare, but this reality will hugely depend on the way it is implemented in real socioeconomic structures. The main difference AI has from earlier technologies is its ability to do things that were previously accepted only

30 Harayama., “Society 5.0: Aiming for a New Human-centered Society”, 8-13.

31 Marvin Lee Minsky (August 9, 1927 - January 24, 2016) was an American cognitive scientist concerned largely with research of AI, also co-founder of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s AI laboratory.

when done by humans.³²

Another fundamental technology for the enhancement of society is the Internet of Things (IoT). In the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, it is defined as “the networking capability that allows information to be sent to and received from objects and devices using the Internet.” The term first appeared at the beginning of the new millennium. In the beginning, it was used as a term to indicate a device able to connect to the internet; but, in the last 20 years since its inception, the term is becoming difficult to define as it has come to mean several things at once. At its core, it is the technology that enables *things* to be part of the connection was made available by the use of the internet. As such, it is called the *Internet of Things*. The ITU³³ report of 2005 further discusses the possible development of IoT

*... most of the traffic will flow between devices and all kinds of ‘things’, thereby creating a much wider and more complex ‘Internet of Things’ [...] if ‘things’ become active internet users on behalf of humans, then the number of active connections could be measured in terms of tens or hundreds of billions. By connecting the world’s things, the internet would truly achieve ubiquity in every sense of the word.*³⁴

This is precisely what the Japanese plan to do; to connect ‘things’, people, and systems in cyberspace, to obtain optimal results with the use of AI technologies. In this new digital era, some of the ‘things’ in IoT will obviously be robots or robotic machines,³⁵ and as they start being used in medical fields as well, their value for a society such as Japan, where the population ages and shrinks rapidly, is immeasurable.

It is also worth noting that, in addition to their well-designed AI strategy documents, Japan was one of the early birds when it came to issuing a series of principles regarding ethical AI. In 2017 the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) formed an expert committee, AI Network Society, whose members published *Draft AI Utilization Principles*, which was

32 Moor, “The Dartmouth College artificial intelligence conference: The next fifty years,” 87-91.

33 Cabinet Office, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*.

34 ITU is the United Nations specialised agency for information and communication technologies - ICTs.

35 ITU, *The Internet of Things*.

followed by a more detailed document offering advice on a global level called *AI R&D Principles for International Discussion*.

Both these non-binding documents mention 9 essential principles: the “Principle of collaboration”, the “Principle of transparency”, the “Principle of controllability”, the “Principle of safety”, the “Principle of security”, the “Principle of privacy”, the “Principle of ethics”, the “Principle of user assistance”, the “Principle of accountability”, which provide a brief but clear framework for safe AI systems.³⁶

Another governmental document was issued on 2019 named *Social Principles of Human-centric AI*, by the Government of Japan Cabinet Office, which sets the rules for creating a human-centric AI society that can be integrated within Society 5.0.; in this document, Japan not only highlights the necessity of education, human-centric responsibility, privacy, security fairness, accountability, and transparency, the officials also draw attention to the fair competition and innovation to ensure sustainable advancements.³⁷

Another leading group operates within the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Research Center based in The University of Tokyo, who aims to develop projects within the framework of “human AI”,³⁸ RIKEN Center for Advanced Intelligence Project was established in hopes of finding answers to societal questions while discussing the ethical and legal codes that should be taken into account during the process of implementing AI practices to the layers of society.³⁹

In collaboration with Waseda University, Digital Asia Hub held one of the first conferences on the subject named AI in Asia: AI for Social Good in March of 2017, with attendees coming from all over the world including Belgium, the USA, Japan, China and more.⁴⁰

As stated in the report by the Cabinet Office of Japan, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*, “Artificial Intelligence (AI) is expected to transform our society, not only by substituting for routinized tasks but also by supporting and enhancing human activities and decision-making.” How

36 Fleisch, “What is the Internet of Things? An Economic Perspective.”, 125-157.

37 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, AI Network Society, Draft AI R&D GUIDELINES for International Discussions, 7-20.

38 Cabinet Office, Social Principles of Human-centric AI.

39 University of Tokyo, “About us,” *Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Research Center*.

40 RIKEN, “About AIP,” *Center for Advanced Intelligence Project*.

these technologies will be used is a matter of discussion on its own. If we can harness these new technologies for the good of humanity, they will carry us into the future. “AI technologies support and augment human intellect and actions, and they execute parts of intellectual behaviours on behalf of humans. This is supposed to greatly benefit and empower human society and contribute to ensuring its sustainability.” However, the misuse of the same technologies could be detrimental to our lives in deeply disruptive ways.⁴¹

Japan’s “Robotic Revolution”

The swift decline in population, particularly in the working-age population, coupled with the limited number of immigrants, has pushed Japan to look for answers in automation, leading the way for a number of nations around the world, and in a way becoming a social laboratory to research what the future of work might look like.⁴² When we talk about robots and robotics, the first place that comes to mind is Japan. Japan has been named the *Robotics Superpower*, *Robot Nation* and has even been called *The Land of Rising Robots*⁴³ and the Japanese government means to profit from these depictions.⁴⁴

Meanwhile there is also a radical transformation that is taking place in the global arena of robotics, of which the Japanese government wishes to take advantage of. The days when robots were mindless automated machines, doing only routine and simple tasks, are coming to an end. They are becoming “autonomous”, with self-learning capabilities, initiative and the ability to create interconnected networks with the advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies and Internet of Things (IoT).⁴⁵

The global trends are to increasingly use robotic technologies outside of manufacturing. Japan has also begun to follow this trend, and robotic technologies are now being used in various fields, such as aeronautics,⁴⁶

41 Digital Asia Hub, “AI in Asia: AI for Social Good.”

42 Cabinet Office, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*, 4.

43 The University of Tokyo, “Japan: The Land of Rising Robotics. Japan: The World’s Leading “Robot Nation.”

44 The expression “Land of the Rising Sun” is used for Japan in most countries.

45 Schneider et al, “Land of the Rising Robots.”

46 METI, Robotto Shinsenryaku. Bijon, Senryaku, Akushonpuran. ロボット新戦略—ビジョン・戦略・アクションプラン— (New Robot Strategy. Japan’s Robot Strategy - Vision, Strategy, Action Plan)

space exploration, medicine, nursing, welfare, disaster investigation, disaster mitigation and rescue.⁴⁷

The Japanese robotics market is currently still dominated by robots made for industrial use, but projections show that by 2025, service robots will have taken over, and have the largest share in the robotics market.⁴⁸

The Japanese government has set some goals to be achieved by the *Robot Revolution*, mentioned in the *New Robot Strategy*, the three main goals mentioned are: firstly, the transformation of daily items such as household appliances, automobiles and housing itself, into robots with advanced sensors and AI technologies, secondly, better utilisation of robots in manufacturing, as well as daily life, and lastly, creating a societal environment where global competitiveness is reinforced in manufacturing and service fields. The government has also a set of objectives for the realisation of the *robot revolution*: the first objective is to transform Japan into a global base for robot innovation, the second objective is to normalise the use of robots in daily life and become the best “society of robot utilisation”, and the third objective is the “global development and expansion of the robot revolution”, with the aim of acquiring international standards. The government also wishes to reform the machines with robotic capabilities used in daily life in accordance with the second objective, and make them ‘easier-to-use’ for everybody. In order to accomplish this, technological innovations, developments and environmental transformations are necessary to create next-generation robots fused with AI and easily used platforms that connect singular robots within an interconnected system. The creation of a “robot barrier-free society”⁴⁹ will also be crucial for a future where humans can coexist with robots in their daily lives.⁵⁰

47 A science dealing with the operation of aircrafts.

48 The University of Tokyo, “Japan: The Land of Rising Robotics. Japan: The World’s Leading “Robot Nation.”

49 Orange Labs Tokyo, *Robot market overview*.

50 “Despite rapid advancement of robots, some point out that there is a huge limit in what robots can do as compared to what a human can do to recognize and cope with diverse situations and therefore we should not expect a dramatic leap in robotics in mid-term. Having said that, it is crucial to meet the requirements for a society where humans and robots can coexist and cooperate on a daily basis for the maximization of robot capacities. Such kind of society can be called “robot barrier-free society” (New Robot Strategy)

Laws and Legislature

We are on the brink of a new era, one that will be dominated by robotics and AI. The increase in robotisation is not confined to manufacturing or industry anymore. Robots and the accompanying technologies are increasingly becoming part of our daily lives.⁵¹ In order to cope with possible problems that might arise, Robot Law is a rapidly developing field, as a new legal framework is needed to deal with any legal issues that might arise with the advent of this new era. In essence, robot law relates to robots and robotic technologies, algorithms, drones, robots used for surveillance purposes, driverless or intelligent cars, virtual reality⁵² (VR) and augmented reality⁵³ (AR). The main issues robot law deals with are both legal questions and ethical questions concerning robots. Some pressing issues regarding this are: what will be the legal status of robots and will they have rights, who will be liable in the case of defective robots, protecting intellectual property, or privacy protection issues with robots processing personal information.⁵⁴

Robots are already handling a large amount of work, previously done by humans, behind the scenes, they are manufacturing products, managing warehouses, and fighting wars. In the near future they will be doing deliveries, cooking meals and doing what are thought to be human activities.⁵⁵ These changes our societies are facing will have enormous social consequences along with moral and legal implications. The legal issues and potential repercussions of robots being a part of daily life have been contemplated by legal theorists, as well as philosophers for some time now. There have been studies to identify the possible inadequacies the law may face with the rise of the robots. Most frequently, these questions focus on liability and who should be held responsible in the case of a robot harming or injuring a human

51 METI, Robotto Shinsenryaku. Bijon, Senryaku, Akushonpuran. ロボット新戦略—ビジョン・戦略・アクションプラン— (New Robot Strategy. Japan's Robot Strategy - Vision, Strategy, Action Plan)

52 Danaher, "Robots, law and the retribution gap," 299.

53 An artificial environment which is experienced through sensory stimuli (such as sights and sounds) provided by a computer and in which one's actions partially determine what happens in the environment. (definition taken from Merriam-Webster Dictionary)

54 An enhanced version of reality created by the use of technology to overlay digital information on an image of something being viewed through a device (such as a smartphone camera). (definition taken from Merriam-Webster Dictionary)

55 Michalsons, "Robot Law is an emerging field of law."

being,⁵⁶ and, from time to time, more philosophical questions, such as if a robot should be legally and morally responsible, are asked.⁵⁷

The laws regarding robots and AI technologies are newly developing, and as Nicolas Petit puts it, there can be an

*... inconsistency between an innovation-adverse rule of strict liability on AI programmers on the one hand and an innovation-friendly legal framework that encourages computer scientists to work on AI through the allocation of subsidies, intellectual property ("IP") rights and tax benefits on the other hand. Or consider a statute that confers dignity rights to robots. As part of such rights, a prohibition of torture would prevent to test how a robot reacts in stressful circumstances, and in turn undermine experimental research on the design of safer robots.*⁵⁸

Often, the law takes some time to catch up with technological advancements that have taken place, but in the end it does. The law takes some time to get used to new ideas, and how to incorporate them into existing laws. A similar period occurred in the 1990s with the internet becoming more and more mainstream. There were now unanswerable questions about jurisdiction, ownership and control, what 'net neutrality' should mean and of course privacy. To find solutions to these problems, legal academics rose to the challenge and developed *cyberlaw*. Robot technologies are on their way to creating a new transformation, and with a main difference from the internet, the robots are merging the question of information and privacy, with the capability to cause harm physically.⁵⁹

When approaching the regulation of robots and AI, two dominant patterns emerge. *legal* and *technological*.⁶⁰ The first route begins within the legal system and draws a list of issues within the legal system which could be affected by robots and AI: privacy, cyber security, liability, and more.⁶¹ The second route tries to predict legal issues that might arise from the

⁵⁶ Kaplan, *Humans need not apply*.

⁵⁷ Calo et al., *Robot law*.

⁵⁸ Purves, et al., "Autonomous machines, moral judgment, and acting for the right reasons."

⁵⁹ Petit, "Law and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and Robots," "2.

⁶⁰ Calo, "Robotics and the lessons of cyberlaw," 514-515.

⁶¹ Petit, "Law and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and Robots," 2.

application of new technologies; intelligent cars, social robots, exoskeletons, and others.⁶² A third approach to regulating the laws about robots and AI, differentiates between robolaw and robot ethics. Robot ethics mainly focuses on the appropriateness of their utilisation, in some ways like the three laws of robotics⁶³ created by Isaac Asimov. Whereas robolaw mainly focuses on the external implications of robots' actions,⁶⁴ the execution stage focuses on where robots are brought into society.⁶⁵ There is another field of ethics in robotics called machine ethics. It is a more speculative field, as it considers the actual behaviour of advanced robots. This pertains to the future, where the robots might have self-awareness and the capability for moral judgement, and thus can be judged according to their actions.⁶⁶

There is a need to create a legal system that is not too lenient nor too restrictive, so as not to slow down the innovation processes. An additional problem that comes out when creating a legal framework about robots is the issue of retribution. Humans crave retribution when they, or people close to them, are harmed.⁶⁷ The robotization of society will make it likely that robots will be responsible for harming humans, but they will not meet the conditions for retribution. The *retribution gap* might generate social and legal ramifications, which the legal academics should keep in mind when creating the laws on robotics.⁶⁸

The UN has also joined in on the development of a legal framework concerning AI and robotics, as they agree that, along with the beneficial developments these new technologies will bring, they also raise some concerns about safety and security. The technologies themselves, especially robotics, have the innate capability for physical harm, but there are also

62 De Cock Buning et al., "Mapping the Legal Framework for the introduction into Society of Robots as Autonomous Intelligent Systems."

63 Palmerini et al., "RoboLaw: Towards a European framework for robotics regulation."

64 "A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. A robot must obey orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law." (Asimov, "Runaround", Astounding Science Fiction 1942.)

65 There also seems to be some sociological ramifications. Where Robolaw seems primarily a field populated by lawyers, robot ethics also consists of philosophers, ethicist, psychologists, computer scientists and novelists.

66 Petit, "Law and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and Robots."

67 Anderson et al., "Machine Ethics: Creating an Ethical Intelligent Agent."

68 Jensen, "Punishment and spite: The dark side of cooperation."

considerations about the using of force autonomously, algorithm bias,⁶⁹ black boxes in decision making,⁷⁰ privacy issues and certainly the danger of criminals or terrorist misusing the technology. To address these issues, in 2015, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) commenced its programme on robotics and AI, to educate the people in the field, and especially the policy makers. Following this in 2017, with the assistance of *the Municipality of the Hague* and *the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands* UNICRI opened *the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics*. The centre is mainly committed to recognizing, focusing on and educating about the dangers and advantages of AI and robotics, in the context of crime and security. To achieve success UNICRI has created a vast international network.⁷¹

It is universally acknowledged that, for mainstream acceptance of robotic technologies and AI in general, society and to safely include them in daily life, one main problem to consider is the legal issue regarding the clarification of responsibility. One frequently used example is the problem of autonomous cars. While the use of autonomous cars, or intelligent cars, leads to a decrease in traffic accidents, the problem emerges if and when one such car creates an accident. To whom does the responsibility belong when such an accident occurs? For a wider implementation of smart cars, robotic technologies and AI in general into a society, there has to be a clear understanding of the allocation of responsibility for accidents, risks, privacy and rights issues, as well as achievements and benefits. This will also be crucial in helping businesses to not overreact or become intimidated because of risks to their reputation or economic burdens.⁷²

Another heatedly debated topic concerning responsibility is the issue of *autonomous weapon systems* (AWS), which will in the near future, with advancements in AI technologies, have the capability to decide on matters of life and death ‘on their own’. The main argument is that AWS, or robots in general, cannot reproduce ‘human moral judgement’. In the article

69 Danaher, “Robots, law and the retribution gap,” 299.

70 Algorithm bias, also known as machine learning bias or AI bias, is a phenomenon that occurs when an algorithm produces results that are systematically prejudiced due to erroneous assumptions in the machine learning process.

71 When AI makes decisions that humans can not understand, or follow the thought process.

72 UNICRI, “Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.”

‘Autonomous machines, moral judgement, and acting for the right reasons’, moral judgement is defined as “... (it) requires either the ability to engage in a wide, reflective equilibrium, the ability to perceive certain facts as moral considerations, moral imagination, or the ability to have moral experiences with a particular phenomenological character.” As robots do not possess these characteristics, it is not morally acceptable to deploy the AWS’s. Following the responsibility argument, the deployment of AWS would bring about what are called *responsibility gaps*.⁷³ An example of this issue was argued by Robert Sparrow, where in asking to whom the blame would go, if an AWS makes a mistake in the battlefield and kills a civilian, as no one could be legally held responsible; not the robot, the commander, the programmers, or others. This would result in a responsibility gap, making the deployment of AWS morally dubious. Following through with this objection, it is important to distinguish between weaponized and non-weaponized autonomous technologies, such as autonomous cars, so as not to obstruct the advancements in technology and innovation.⁷⁴

Another significant issue in the legal arena is privacy protection. As the advancements made in the AI field and consequently in the robotics field are highly reliant on data, their usefulness relies on their ability to exploit and use big data. To avoid what may feel like an invasion of privacy, it is imperative to create institutional frameworks. Access rights of personal data, portability of data, and security issues related to international corporations are some of the main concerns around privacy. And the use of this technology, boosts the creation of high-value and high-profit products. It is important to recognize the issue of ownership: to whom do the property rights belong of a creation or a model made by AI. Moreover, to utilise and facilitate further development, there have to be clear guidelines to protect developers and users of algorithms, and also data providers as the protection of the creative rights is another issue the legal frameworks on AI and robotics are working on.⁷⁵

The global policies are moving forward with trying to solve the issues created by new technologies of AI and robotics. Japan, named as a *Robotics*

73 Cabinet Office, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*.

74 Purves, et al., “Autonomous machines, moral judgment, and acting for the right reasons.”

75 Sparrow, “Killer robots.”

Superpower, is also transforming its policies to create a more technology-friendly legal system. Examples like the *Radio Act*,⁷⁶ the *Road Traffic Act* and the *Road Transport Vehicle Act*⁷⁷ clearly show that the Japanese are eager to solve possible legal issues that might arise, and to create solutions with new introductions to technology. There are also changes made in order to make it easier for the use of new technologies in the medical field. *The Act on Securing Quality, Efficacy and Safety of Pharmaceuticals, Medical Devices, Regenerative and Cellular Therapy Products, Gene Therapy Products, and Cosmetics* is one example of this new transformation.⁷⁸

The future that the Japanese government wishes to achieve is deeply connected to the new societal scheme, called *Society 5.0*, where technological advancements will relieve humans from routine daily tasks and make way for a higher quality of life. This will be notably significant in nursing and medicine sectors, as the population ages and labour-shortages become even more prevalent, due to decreased fertility. The routine tasks being managed by the robots and robotic technologies will allow for better quality nursing-care and advanced medical-care for every individual.⁷⁹ And this future will only be made possible if the necessary legal adjustments are made, and the system as a whole becomes more innovation-friendly.

Conclusion

Societies around the globe have been changing at speeds never before seen, and at the core of this lies technological advancements. Japan, as an industrialised country, has also felt the effects of this change. At the same time, they are also facing societal changes unrelated to this technological change like population decline, ageing population, and labour shortages, to name a few. But upon reviewing governmental documents, it is easy to see that the Japanese government aims to counter the issues that arise from

76 Cabinet Office, *Report on Artificial Intelligence and Human Society*.

77 The establishment of rules aimed at robot utilization such as frequency allocation and regulate maximum permitted power.

78 The sorting-out of legal position of vehicles equipped with robotic functions.

79 METI, Robotto Shinsenryaku. Bijon, Senryaku, Akushonpuran. ロボット新戦略—ビジョン・戦略・アクションプラン— (New Robot Strategy. Japan's Robot Strategy - Vision, Strategy, Action Plan)

population changes with solutions born from these new technologies. To this end, they have also created a roadmap of sorts titled Society 5.0. A human-centric approach to solving problems. They acknowledge that AI is one of the most important aspects of realising this new societal scheme.

In the midst of these technological changes, the Japanese government also is incorporating robotic technologies to its strategies. And it is also true that the AI technologies in Japan are more entwined with robotics than their counterparts. While it may be because their physical manifestation makes them more visible, it is also true that robots also play a big role in the social consciousness of Japan. The government plans to make use of this by once again becoming a major player in the robotics and also AI fields globally. It is clear to see that these new technologies will dominate almost every facet of our lives in the near future and the Japanese government is right to think that by investing in these technologies, they could solidify their standing in the world of technology.

The Japanese government has put effort into creating ethical guidelines for the use of these new technologies much faster than the rest of the world. While it is up for debate how faithful they are to these ethical roadmaps, it is also obvious that it is a point of concern. Every new technology brings with it some issues that were not thought of before. But with the advent of AI and related technologies, it is more important than ever to create and apply ethical guidelines, and the faster the legal side catches up the better, as the speed at which new technology advances compounds by the day.

We believe it is important for the government to create roadmaps for the future, where these new technologies will be more important than ever. But it is also important to create a society which is ready to accept the changes that will happen to their daily lives as a result of AI and robotics. As AI and robotics become more embedded into our day to day lives, it becomes even more important to educate our societies and also address any issues that may arise in the process.

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A Collection on the Russo-Japanese War at the Atatürk Library

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Introduction

This paper aims to pinpoint a compilation of books at the Atatürk Library in Istanbul as a collection containing considerable material on the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). During and after the wartime, many of the Ottoman military staff translated military books about the war from different languages, as well as gathered numerous materials like postcards and maps in their own individual collections.

The Russo-Japanese War shaped the understanding of the army members in the War of Turkish Independence, such as the top people from Marshall Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] and General Kazım (Karabekir) to General Fahreddin (Türkkan) Pashas and the ordinary army officers. For instance, the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal, in his early military career in the Ottoman times, wrote the book titled *Conversation with Officers and Commanders*, and he mentioned the Russo-Japanese War in the fourth chapter of his book.¹ Also, he noted many events within the Russo-Japanese War in his own notebooks.² In

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1 METI, Robotto Shinsenryaku. Bijon, Senryaku, Akushonpuran. ロボット新戦略—ビジョン・戦略・アクションプラン— (New Robot Strategy. Japan's Robot Strategy - Vision, Strategy, Action Plan)

2 M[ustafa]. Kemal [Atatürk], *Zabit ve Kumandan ile Hasbihal* (Istanbul: Minber Matbaası, 1334[1918], [20]. Titled with *Ruh-i Taaruz* [spirit of attacking].

a similar vein, Pertev Bey (Demirhan), who was sent to this war as an observer by Abdülhamid II, also impacted on the Ottoman military staff in the following years because he gave lectures in the Military School in Istanbul. To understand and uncover the dimensions of the impacts of the Russo-Japanese War on the Ottoman military staff with the collection in the Atatürk Library, it is able to be investigated, considering the details of its. Accordingly, this collection helps us remember the impacts of the Russo-Japanese War on the mentality of the Ottoman military staff during the late Ottoman period, as well as the early phase of the Turkish Republic. Within this context, the Russo-Japanese War between the year 1904 and 1905 created new circumstances in *realpolitik* all around the world. It also shaped different military perception of the army officers in the threshold between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. One of these outstanding impacts was inevitably on the Ottoman Empire. It came face-to-face with the consequences of the Russo-Japanese War. These consequences started to be investigated by the most prominent scholars in and beyond Turkey. Professor Selçuk Esenbel, for instance, hoped with to draw attention with her article "The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Ottoman Turkey".³ In the same manner, Professor Ali Merthan Dünder highlighted the Ottoman interest on not solely the Russo-Japanese War but also the Japanese concerns, from their daily life to political conditions.⁴ This research was significant for this present paper, because Professor Dünder catalogued all Ottoman books on the Japanese realm throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by listing their references. The central aim of this present paper, therefore, is to propose the creation of a collection, specifically on the Russo-Japanese War, in the Atatürk Library, Istanbul; this will help to attain a better understanding of the effects of the Russo-Japanese War on the Ottoman army officers by underlining the translation differences of the books in Ottoman script. Last but not least, there are different works that were produced or translated about the Russo-Japanese War by the Ottoman army officers. These studies are not present at the library, so they should be checked with Professor Dünder's article for further research.

3 *Atatürk'ün Not Defterleri II* (Ankara: Genelkurmay ATASE ve Genelkurmay Denetleme Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2004), passim.

4 Selçuk Esenbel, "The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War on Ottoman Turkey" *Shingetsu Electronic Journal of Japanese-Islamic Relations* 4 (September 2008): 16-24.

A Collection in the Atatürk Library

In beginning, it should be reminded that this collection is not under the specific title and the materials about the Russo-Japanese War like books and postcards are in different locations in the Atatürk library. Different sources, such as translations and materials, will be shown by turn in this section of this present paper.

The central items among this collection are Pertev *Bey*'s reports.⁵ Pertev *Bey*⁶ was one of the most outstanding military officers during the disintegration process of the Ottoman Empire. He was sent to Manchuria when he was in the rank of *miralay* (colonel), in order to observe the Russo-Japanese War, between the year 1904 and 1905, with the reference of Goltz Pasha. He spent two months in Japan and more than a year in Manchuria. In addition to explaining his findings in the field of warfare, he also served as an unofficial ambassador, due to the lack of diplomatic relations with Japan. In other words, he contributed to the development of relations among the two countries. After Pertev *Bey* returned to Istanbul, he had given a detailed report, that will be assessed in the following paragraphs, to the Sultan Abdülhamid II. In addition, he gave lectures about the Russo-Japanese War and the Japanese society in the Military School. At the end of the Russian-Japanese War, in 1905, Pertev *Bey* was promoted to the rank of general. Pertev Pasha was the most influential person on the understand the outcomes of the Russo-Japanese War on Turkey because he directed the attitude of the military staff that grew up in the Committee of Union and Progress, the War of Turkish Independence in Anatolia, as well as the Republican period.

These reports are in one cover. It includes one preface and five notebooks.

5 A. Merthan Dündar, "Japan in the Turkish Press: An Essay on Books Written about Japan in Ottoman Script during the 19th and 20th centuries" *Asian Research Trends New Series* 7 (2012): 55-73. In addition to highlighting the Ottoman interest in the Japanese Empire, the press in Istanbul is still waiting for a comprehensive investigation by the magazines such as *Asker*, *Servet-i Fünun* and *Sırat-ı Müstakim*. For the articles about the Russo-Japanese War in the journal of *Asker*: Colmar von der Goltz "Keşfi İstikbal: Şark'ın Maneviyatı", *Asker* 3, (1324[1908]), 113-122. Ali Fuad [Erden], "Aksay-ı Şark Harb'i'nden Alınan Dersler", *Asker* 4, (1324 [1908]): 167-175. Ali Rıza, "Muharebenin Tesirat-ı Maneviyesi: Rus-Japon Seferinden Mütalaat-ı Umumiye", *Asker* 17, (1325[1909]): 199-204. Raşid Galip, "Mançurya Harb'i'nde Rusların Yenilmelerinin Sebeplerinden Biri Ne İdi?", *Asker* 10, (1324[1909]): 498-502. Ali Rıza (Mütercim), "Rus Askerlerine Dair Mülahazat-ı Hususiye", *Asker* ?, (?): 275-280.

6 From the Atatürk Library. (Bel_Yz_B0043). This war report is solely in the Atatürk Library, so the status of this library becomes an archive rather than the library.

At the initial step, the 16-page-preface written by Pertev *Bey* on February 11, 1906, followed the first report. It is under the title of “The Military action of the Third Japanese Army from the first Days of the Month of June to August 1”.⁷ This 14-page-report narrated the Japanese Army’s military action in the earliest days of the war, with his opinions on the events. It continues with the second report that is included under the title of “The Military Action of the Third Japanese Army from the Nineth Day of the Month of August to Fifteenth Day of October”.⁸ It is also fourteen pages. The following report, namely report 3, involves the following days of October 15 to the second day of October.⁹ This report was 59 pages and, additionally, his opinions followed the addendums of the details. The fourth report was two pages, and shows the order of battle among army troops. It was under the title of “In the Evening of 26/27 October, the Japanese Attack to *Hobihoday* [Pine Tree Port] Battery”.¹⁰ The fifth report was titled “The Third Japanese Army’ Military Action in the Battle of Mukden”¹¹ and included twenty-seven pages. The second and fourth report was also added within the cover following the fifth report. It should be said that these reports were reevaluated and published by Pertev *Bey* in the following years with the name of “Rus-Japon Harbi’nden Alınan Maddi ve Manevi Dersler ve Japonların Esbab-ı Muzafferiyeti”.¹² This book was respectively transliterated to modern Turkish in the 2010s by Ali Merthan Dünder and Doruk Akyüz.¹³ Doruk Akyüz also evaluated this book and Pertev *Bey*’s perception of the Russo-Japanese War.¹⁴ However, these

7 Pertev Said [Demirhan] Pasha (1871-1964). He was born in 1871 of Istanbul. Except his journey to Japan, he participated to the Balkan Wars that was enormously influential to the Turkish nationalist understanding in the second decade of the 20th century. He continued his own career during the World War I and the War of Turkish Independence as an Inspector of Military Schools in Istanbul. He retired in 1931 and in the following years, he served as the deputy of Erzurum for three terms in the Republican Era.

8 “Üçüncü Japon ordusunun haziran ibtidasından ağustosun birinci gününe kadar olan harekât-ı askeriyyesi.”

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 “26/27 teşrinisani gecesi Japonlar tarafından hobihoday [Sho-Ju-San] bataryasına icra edilmiş hücum.” This was a fortification known as Sho-Ju-San in Japanese and Pine Tree Port in English. Pertev *Bey* used the word of *Hobihoday* for that. Rotem Kowner, *Historical Dictionary of Russo-Japanese War* (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 461.

12 “Mukden Meydan Muharebesinde üçüncü Japon ordusunun harekât-ı askeriyyesi”

13 Doruk Akyüz, “Pertev (Demirhan) Paşa’nın Rus-Japon Harbi’nden Alınan Maddi ve Manevi Dersler ve Japonların Esbab-ı Muzafferiyeti Adlı Eseri” (MA Thesis, T.C. Harp Akademileri, 2013).

14 S. Pertev Demirhan, *Rus-Japon Harbi’nden Alınan Maddi ve Manevi Dersler ve Japonların Başarılarının*

reports still await the transliteration process from the Ottoman scripts to the Latin scripts for academic usage without any intervention.

Before different translations about the Russo-Japanese War, the last point about Pertev Bey's comprehensive reports is to include many observations and battle plans. For instance, this following illustration in his fourth report displays the order of the battle in the first, the second, the third, and the fourth companies, as well as the battle of the battalion during the Japanese attack on December, 1904.¹⁵

The subsequent items consist of the three different translations of the same book. The original book including translations like English, French and different Turkish versions was *Расплата* that was written by Commander Vladimir Semenoff with the Russian language in 1912.¹⁶ This book was translated to English by British Captain A. B. Lindsay.¹⁷ He was an expert of the Russian language, according to the British War Records.¹⁸ This English book was converted into Ottoman scripts with different titles four times.

The first book is *Çuşima Muharebesi* (The Battle of Tsushima), which was translated by Ottoman navy officer Lieutenant Mustafa Kemal Bey.¹⁹ This book was a further step from the translations by him in the official Navy Magazine (*Ceride-i Bahriyye*) because he translated this book from the English version in this magazine before publishing his translation as a book.²⁰ At this point, the translations of Lieutenant Mustafa Kemal Bey in the navy magazine based on the English version of the book.²¹ Lieutenant Mustafa Kemal Bey as

Sebepleri (Ankara: Gece Kitaplığı, 2016). Doruk Akyüz, *Bir Osmanlı Kurmayının Gözünden Rus-Japon Harbi: Miralay Pertev Bey'in Gözlemleri* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2017).

15 Doruk Akyüz, "An Ottoman Staff Officer in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905): General Pertev Bey's Impressions and Evaluations" *Global Perspectives on Japan* 4: 38-64.

16 From the fourth report by Pertev Bey, 2. Please see, Appendix I.

17 В.И. Семенов, *Расплата: Трилогия* (Санкт-Петербург: тип. т-ва М.О. Вольф, 1912).

18 Captain Vladimir Semenoff, *The Battle of Tsushima between the Japanese and Russian Fleets, fought on 27th May 1905*, trans. Captain A[lexander]. B[ertram]. Lindsay (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1908), half-title.

19 Imperial War Museums, Bond of Sacrifice First World War Portraits Collection, HU 124159. Cited in <https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205384584>, accessed on January 25, 2022. His biographic entry was also written with the preface of the book.

20 Yüzbaşı Mustafa Kemâl, *Çuşima Muharebesi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Bahriyye, [1]328 [1912]). TÖ_0110.

21 Yüzbaşı Mustafa Kemâl, *Çuşima Muharebesi*, [2-3]. There is also registry error in the Library of Turkish Historical Association (TTK) in Ankara. This translator was not the founder of Turkish Republic but the navy officer. <https://kutuphane.ttk.gov.tr/details?id=533760&material-Type=NE&query=Dil+bilim>, accessed on January 25, 2022.

a translator noted that he was aware of the French version²² of this present book after the serialized period in the magazine, as well as that this book was a further version with his own additional corrections, according to his preface.²³ In addition, he noted that in this 129-page-translation, there were an erratum table and various plans on the final pages of the book. Within this translation, the last point to be emphasized is that one copy of the book is also in the museum of General Kazım (Karabekir), Pasha who was one of the significant commanders during the War of Turkish Independence.²⁴ This can be understood as having shaped impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the founding fathers of Turkey.

Among the collection of the Atatürk Library in Istanbul about the Russo-Japanese War, is the following translation: *Kapudan Vladimir Semenofun Ruznamesi ve Çuşima Muharebe-i Bahriyyesi*.²⁵ It was another translation of the previous one by different army officer in the same year. In other words, this book was translated to the Ottoman Turkish by M. Nahid, who was an engineer in *Turgud Reis Battleship*, via the English version of the book by Russian Semenoff. According to the half-title of the translation, H. Fevzi published this book, translated by M. Nahid.

The third translation is the English translation of the book by Semenoff deciphered by the army officers in the Ottoman military service under a different title: *Çuşima Deniz Meydan Muharebesinde Moskof Donanmasının Perişanlığı*.²⁶ Like the publishing of the translation by Lieutenant Mustafa Kemal in the Naval Magazine, this book was a final version of the translation by Muhyiddin, Thessaloniki Harbor Master, after the serialized process in the Rumelia Newspaper.²⁷ In addition, the sixth chapter of the book was

22 Yüzbaşı Mustafa Kemâl, *Çuşima Muharebesi*, [2-3].

23 W. Sémenoff, *L'expiation: L'agonie d'un Cuirassé. L'escadre de Port-Arthur. Sur le Chemin du Sacrifice*, trans. [Raoul de] Balincourt (Paris: Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1911).

24 Please see, footnote 19.

25 <https://www.kazimkarabekirvakfi.org.tr/kutuphane.htm>, accessed on January 20, 2022.

26 The Diary of Captain Vladimir Semenov and the Naval Warfare of Tsushima. M. Nahid, *Kapudan Vladimir Semenofun Ruznamesi ve Çuşima Muharebe-i Bahriyyesi* (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Hayriyye ve Şürekâsı, 1328[1912]). Bel_Osm_K.00264.

27 The Misery of the Russian Armada in the Tsushima Battle. Kumandan Semenoff, *Çuşima Deniz Meydan Muharebesinde Moskof Donanmasının Perişanlığı* trans. M. Muhyiddin Hasan and Muhyiddin, (Selânik [Thessaloniki]: Rumeli Matbaası, 1327 [1911]). Bel_Osm_K.00669. This translation was also transcribed to Latin scripts in modern Turkish: Komutan Siminof, *Çuşima Deniz Meydan Muharebesinde Moskof Donanmasının Perişanlığı*, edited. Habibullah Habib (Istanbul: Kayıhan

translated into Ottoman scripts by M. Muhyiddin Hasan; however, there was not a separate title 'The Sixth Chapter (*fasıl* in Turkish)'. Finally, the Ottoman version of this book was 185 pages.

In a similar vein, the last record of this translation process of Semenoff's book is Muhyiddin's translation. Under normal circumstances, the printed information could not be completed since the half-title page of this book was missing. However, the book was nothing else but the same book previously published by Muhyiddin. Although there was a deceptive note about this book, as the memoirs of Russian commander Kuropatkin in the records of the Atatürk Library,²⁸ the book was again the translation of Semenoff's book with the same title because the content of these books is exactly the same, except for a few pages missing in the second one. M. Muhyiddin Hasan also wrote the epilogue after the fifth (actually, sixth chapter in the original book) chapter of the book.²⁹

The third example is the book of "*Rus-Japon Muharebesi Tecrübelerinden*" (*From the Experience of the Russo-Japanese Battle*).³⁰ According to the half-title of this present book, it included the note titled "*Zafer Külliyyatı Numero 3*" (*The Corpus of Triumph no. 3*). It can be clarified that the book was third gift of *Zafer Ceride-i Askeriyyesi* (the military newspaper called *Triumph*) because it also mentioned the monthly gift of this newspaper to its own subscribers.³¹ In other words, the book was gifted with the newspaper. This 92-page-book was translated from the Russian language to the Ottoman Turkish by M. Sadık. According to the title page, M. Sadık's rank was *süvari binbaşı* in the Ottoman military service.³²

One more investigation among this collection about the Russo-Japanese War is First Lieutenant Mehmed Hilmi Bey's translation.³³ The original study of this translation was not found in any British records; however, the Özege

Yayınları, 2020).

28 Kumandan Semenoff, *Moskof Donanmasının Perişanlığı*, half-title.

29 AG_0327/02.

30 Semenoff, [*Çuşima Deniz Meydan Muharebesinde Moskof Donanmasının Perişanlığı*], trans. M. Muhyiddin Hasan, [(Selânik [Thessaloniki]: Rumeli Matbaası, 1327 [1911]].

31 M. Sadık, *Rus Japon Muharebesi Tecrübelerinden* (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Artin Asaduryan ve Mahdumları Matbaası, 1330 [1914]. Bel_Osm_K.02448.

32 The book included that subtitle: *Zafer Ceride-i Askeriyyesinin abonelerine hediye-i şehriyesidir*. M. Sadık, *Rus Japon Muharebesi*, half-title.

33 Its equivalent was below lieutenant colonel.

records, which involve a list including the names of books with Ottoman scripts until the Language Reform in Turkey in 1928, demonstrated that this translation was based on the writing of Tottenham.³⁴ He was a British army officer in Istanbul under the Admiral Limpus Pasha, a top leader of the British naval mission.³⁵ According to Mehmed Hilmi *Bey*'s autograph note in the Prolog of this translation, not only Tottenham, but also Mehmed Hilmi *Bey*, were in the retinue of Admiral Limpus,³⁶ so it is possible to say that any reports or studies of Tottenham, could also have been translated by Mehmed Hilmi to the Ottoman Turkish in the following years from the starting date of the British naval mission under Limpus Pasha. This translation was 96 pages, as well as 19 tables and maps.

Last but not the least, Fahreddin *Paşa* (Türkkan), who was a defender of the Muslim Holy Center, Medina and the ambassador in Afghanistan in the early Republican period had his own collection, like the example of General Kazım Pasha in the previous paragraphs. Fahreddin Pasha's collection remarkably included the postcard about the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, according to his collection in the Atatürk Library.³⁷

In Lieu of Conclusion

This study introduced and listed several books that were written with the Ottoman script about the Russo-Japanese War, as well as different postcards and maps in the collections of the Ottoman military staff in the Atatürk Library. With the help of them, the main item is the report of Pertev Bey who was dispatched by Abdülhamid II to observe the wartime. Also, there were different translations of the book by Captain Semenoff by different army members of the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the main target of this present research is to introduce this collection to the world literature, it is possible to say some points in lieu of conclusion. Firstly, the ottoman responses to the

34 Tottenham, *Mühim Bir Ders-i Tarihi*, trans. Mehmed Hilmi Bey (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Yeni Turan Matbaası, [191-]). Bel_Osm_K.00294.

35 Özege Catalogue, 14686.

36 Şehbal [Dergisi], 15 Mayıs 1330 [May 28, 1914] (97): 3. Cited in Rasim Koç, "Osmanlı Donanmasında Modernleşme Hareketlerine Bir Örnek: Amiral Arthur Limpus Raporu" *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, 128 (253): 372.

37 Tottenham, *Mühim Bir Ders-i*, [3].

war ought to be clearly established within the different Ottoman magazines; secondly, the position of Ottoman military staff and its impacts on the founding fathers of the modern Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s should be presented; thirdly, the translation differences will help to reveal the perceptions of the Ottoman army officers for further research.

Appendix




Figure 1: From Pertev Bey's fourth report, p. 2. (Bel_Yz_B0043)




Figure 2: The postcard from the collection of Fahreddin Pasha. (Bel_Mtf_026282)

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SELECTED ABBREVIATED TRANSLATIONS
(Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy)

日本のアジア戦略と「インド太平洋」*

Japan's Asian Strategy and the 'Indo-Pacific'**

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Introduction

To define the concept of “region” in the context of international relations, one must focus on three main aspects: geographical proximity, the *density* of interactions among countries, and peoples’ subjective and intersubjective perception of belonging to a region.

The first aspect is geographical proximity. Naturally, the concept of region is related to distinguishing one geographical area on the globe from another. However, this aspect does not suffice to define the concept in the context of international relations since it is not one of static quality. For example, for about a quarter of a century, from the Cold War to the present, the group of countries that include the United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other Pacific Rim countries that belong to the area that is geographically called East-Asia, was commonly referred to as the Asia-Pacific region. However, the view that these countries form a region has not always existed in the past. In Japan, there have been researchers and politicians advocating Asia-Pacific regional cooperation since the 1960s

* This is an abbreviated translation of the following article: 神谷 万丈. (2015年). 「日本のアジア戦略とインド太平洋」、インド太平洋時代の日本外交—スイング・ステーツへの対応—、(113-130頁). The original can be accessed at the following link: https://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/resarch/H26_Indo-Pacific/H26_Japanese_Diplomacy_in_the_Indo-Pacific_Age.pdf

** Summarized and translated by Aynur Erzenoğlu

(Takamura, 1984), and even before World War II, there were international NGOs such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, which aimed to conduct joint research on the problems that existed in and around the region that later came to be known as the Asia-Pacific. However, this was only a perception among a limited number of pioneering people. It was only in the late 1980s or early 1990s that the recognition of the Asia-Pacific as a single region started to become widely shared in Japan and the rest of the world. This shows that the concept of region in international relations varies depending on factors other than geography.

The second aspect that one needs to focus on is the *density* of interactions among various actors. There are many actors on the global stage that interact with each other, however, such interactions do not occur equally in all parts of the earth. When the political, economic, and social interactions among various actors within a particular area are more intense, that area can be distinguished as a region (Etō, Watanabe, Kumon, & Hirano, 1989).

Thirdly, the concept of region has both subjective and intersubjective aspects. Whether the people of a country perceive themselves as belonging to a region or whether they wish to form a region with other specific countries is subject to change over time. A region emerges as the recognition and aspiration of each country's people come together (Ōba, 2004). However, it is important to note that the perception of belonging and aspiration of people are influenced by geographical factors, the density of interactions, and nature of relations (e.g., friendly or confrontational) between countries.

The aim of this article is to draw up a desirable future Indo-Pacific vision for Japan based on the premise that this geopolitical construct is currently being formed and it includes Japan, and also to consider what is required to realize this vision. The following will examine the regional concept of the Indo-Pacific from Japan's perspective, according to the three aspects previously explained, and provide policy recommendations based on the assumption that Japan will pursue this desirable 'Indo-Pacific' vision for the future.

1. The 'Indo-Pacific' as a Geographical Space

From the perspective of Japan, merging South Asia to the traditional Asia-Pacific region and viewing the area as a single Indo-Pacific region is not

unnatural in the geographical sense. This is because the distinction between the Pacific and Indian Oceans as two separate oceans is artificial. In fact, they constitute a single, connected body of water. Japan is located almost equidistant from both the western edge of the Indian Ocean and the eastern edge of the Pacific Ocean (Agawa & Asari, 2013), and the country has already been operating in the maritime region formed by these "Two Oceans" in a way that links the two.

Currently, Japan relies on foreign sources for 9.6% of its oil, of which around 85% is imported from the Middle East. The transportation from the Persian Gulf to Japan is carried out through the sea lanes in the Indian and the Western Pacific Oceans. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Jakarta speech,¹ that was scheduled shortly after his second inauguration, states that "strengthening ties with maritime Asia" is "a geographical necessity for Japan: a nation surrounded by the ocean, deriving its sustenance from the ocean, and considering maritime safety as its own safety" (2013). By considering Japan's oil import routes, it is clear that the "maritime Asia", with which Japan is associated, includes not only the countries of the Asia-Pacific region but also the countries of the Indian Ocean.

2. The Density of Interactions Between Japan and Indian Ocean Countries

In recent years, advocates of the 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept have emphasized that the interactions between the traditional Asia-Pacific countries and the Indian Ocean countries are rapidly becoming *denser*. The prime example of this is Rory Medcalf's following statement "...the accelerating economic and security connections between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean are creating a single strategic system." (2013)

On the security front, China's rising assertiveness is acting as a catalyst for interaction between Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean countries. The sea lanes from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific Ocean mentioned above are important not only for Japan, but also for the world economy. Since about two-thirds of the world's crude oil is transported by

1 This speech did not take place as planned on the date given because of an inconvenience, however, a draft of it was published on the Prime Minister's Office's website.

sea, their stability is of vital importance to the world economy and to world order.

In recent years, the decline of the U.S. as a maritime power, and the growing assertiveness of China as it builds up and modernizes its military capabilities and expands its maritime reach, have led to concerns about the destabilization of these waters. To some extent, it is natural for a nation to become more assertive as it obtains more power. However, China's strong tendency to assert power through activities and statements that do not fully respect the existing liberal, open, rule-based international order appears as a threat of interest or otherwise a challenge to the status quo in maritime Asia from the view of other countries like the U.S. and Japan. China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean is also arousing the alarm of other countries. The Chinese navy has begun to gradually expand the scope of its activities in the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy reasons. Also, based on a strategy known as the 'String of Pearls', China is reportedly trying to secure a foothold for its own expansion into the Indian Ocean by providing support for the development of ports along the Indian Ocean including the Sittwe Port in Myanmar, the Chittagong Port in Bangladesh, the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan.

Stimulated by China's actions, Japan, the United States, and some other countries are increasingly seeking to build on the Japan-U.S. alliance which has traditionally been the cornerstone of security in the Asia-Pacific region, and to forge alliances with Australia, India, and other South Asian countries that face the Indian Ocean. The consistent enthusiasm Prime Minister Abe showed for cooperation with Australia and India after his return to office in December 2012 was an indication of this. During his visit to South Asia in September 2014, Abe also set out to strengthen ties with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

India also has suspicions that China's 'String of Pearls' strategy is an encirclement strategy. (Medcalf, 2013) This is one of the reasons why Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who came to power in May 2014, is more enthusiastic about security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries than his predecessors. In a December, 2014 article, Cronin and Baruah argue that Prime Minister Modi "breath[ed] new life into the concept of Indo-Pacific security in just his first six months in office" and that a "Modi Doctrine"

is taking shape that seeks to vigorously pursue political influence through increased maritime power by strengthening ties with "other regional maritime powers". In fact, Prime Minister Modi chose Japan as his first destination to visit outside South Asia after taking office (August 31-September 3, 2014).

The positive trend in the economic interactions between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region is considered to be important, along with the increase in the density of security interactions. Rory Medcalf maintains that the 'Indo-Pacific' is becoming a center of gravity for the global economy. He also states: "With the recent opening of Burma, an 'Indo-Pacific economic corridor' (traversing land and sea) is being hailed as the next Silk Road" (2013) Japan's political leaders are also emphasizing this fact. For example, in his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 30, 2014, Prime Minister Abe referred to the economic importance of the 'Indo-Pacific' by using the expression "this great growth center that stretches across Asia, the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean". In 2015, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio acknowledged that "the Indo-Pacific region is becoming the center of the world's prosperity" in a speech he delivered during his visit to India. (2015)

India's "Look East" policy is a policy that aims at strengthening economic and strategic relations, and increasing interactions with the nations of Southeast Asia. The Obama administration in the U.S. was especially pleased with the idea of India's participation in the formation of an "Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor". For example, in a speech he delivered at the Tokyo Institute of Technology on April 15, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that "India, the world's largest democracy and a nation with a booming young population, is building an Indo-Pacific economic corridor that can promote development, trade, and security in a crucial part of the world". (Kerry, 2013)

However, it is important to note that despite the trend toward rapid intensification of economic interaction between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean, Japan's economic relations with the Indian Ocean region have lagged behind the rest of the world. In his 2014 essay, Professor Makoto Kojima states that the cooperation between Japan and India is progressing in the economic sphere as well as the security sphere. He also argues that Japan-India trade, despite the expansionary trend it has shown in the previous decade, "is still far behind India-China

trade and India-ASEAN trade, and it is far from the level corresponding to the complementarity potential of Japan and India. (Kojima, 2014) A report issued by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting in 2013 states that India is “very popular” among Japanese companies as an investment destination, indicating that India’s long-term growth potential is “highly valued” by Japanese companies. On the other hand, the report also points out that actual FDI by Japanese companies in India has been “sluggish” due to inadequate infrastructure, complexity of tax collection system, excessive government regulations, and lack of information on investment destinations, and has “languished at a level far below that of FDI in China and lower than that of FDI in South Korea and Indonesia”.

To summarize, in recent years, the interaction between Asia-Pacific countries and countries of the Indian Ocean region has rapidly become more active and denser in terms of both security and economics. And since the Modi government came to power in India, in May 2014, the density of security interactions has risen particularly. This trend may lead to the formation of a “single strategic system” as Medcalf calls it, combining the Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region. In this context, Japan is playing a key role in increasing the security interactions between the Asia-Pacific and India. However, it should be noted that Japan’s economic interaction with the Indian Ocean region remains less intensive than its security interaction.

3. Japanese People’s Perception of Belonging to the Indo-Pacific Region

As previously stated, it is not unnatural for the Japanese people to recognize the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region as a single region from a geographical perspective, and also by looking at the density of interactions among the countries. In reality, however, there is still little sense among the Japanese people that they belong to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region. A clear indication of this is the frequency with which the term ‘Indo-Pacific region’ appears in major newspapers.

According to @nifty’s *Newspaper and Magazine Article Cross Search*, the number of times the term “Indo-Pacific region” appeared in the four national newspapers (The Asahi Shimbun, The Yomiuri Shimbun, The Mainichi Shimbun, and The Sankei Shimbun) during the three-year period from 2011

to 2012 was only two. During the one-year period from January 1, 2014, to December 31, 2014, the number increased to seven, which is a very low number compared to the 871 results that show when "Asia-Pacific region" is used as the keyword. This indicates that unexpectedly, the term remains unfamiliar to most Japanese people.

4. The Future Indo-Pacific Vision That is Desirable for Japan

The above analysis suggests that there is considerable validity in the assumption that the regional concept of 'Indo-Pacific' is currently being formed with the participation of Japan as well as other countries. So, what kind of regional vision of the 'Indo-Pacific' is considered desirable for Japan in the future?

It is clear that one of the main reasons for the growing interest in the concept of the "Indo-Pacific" in Japan is the expectation that it will be useful for Japan to respond to the rising assertiveness of China. Japan's post-Cold War diplomacy in Asia has mainly revolved around the Asia-Pacific framework. However, under the circumstances of China's growing power, its increasing expansion in the Indian Ocean and other oceans, and its repeated provocations over the Senkaku Islands and the Spratly Islands, Japan has come to the conclusion that in order to maintain a 'peaceful' surrounding environment for the country, it is more advantageous to focus on the diplomatic strategy and security strategy within the framework of the 'Indo-Pacific', adding the Indian Ocean to the traditional Asia-Pacific. What is thought to be decisive for the future 'peacefulness' of Japan in the surrounding international environment is whether the existing liberal, open, and rule-based international order can be maintained in the future in the face of China's rise. This order was built and maintained by advanced democracies such as Japan, Western Europe, and Australia under the leadership of the United States after World War II, and it has greatly contributed to the peace and prosperity of the entire international community. The foundation of this order are the liberal values and ideals such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law that the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Australia, and other countries all espouse. However, China does not share many of these values and ideals at this time. This, combined with the question of whether China intends to pursue a path of international cooperation within the framework of the current rule-based international order, or whether it intends to transform the current

order into something more in line with its own vision, is raising international concern. (Rudd, 2013)

If China were to seek to change the existing international order, Japan could counter it by strengthening international cooperation with the United States, EU countries, and other advanced democracies to protect the liberal, open, and rule-based order. To this end, the Abe administration recognizes the importance of cooperating with India, the world's largest democracy that shares Japan's liberal values and ideals. There is a growing expectation that placing the Indo-Pacific concept at the core of Japan's Asian strategy could provide an important opportunity to achieve the protection of the current order. The second Abe administration's vision of the Indo-Pacific also aligns with that of the first. This vision was emphasized by Prime Minister Abe in his speech to the Australian Parliament:

Let us join together all the more in order to make the vast seas from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian and those skies open and free. In everything we say and do, we must follow the law and never fall back onto force or coercion. When there are disputes, we must always use peaceful means to find solutions. These are natural rules. I believe strongly that when Japan and Australia, sharing the common values, join hands, these natural rules will become the norm for the seas of prosperity that stretch from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian. (2014)

5. Various Conditions for Realization

What conditions must be met in order for such a desirable vision of the 'Indo-Pacific' to become a reality for Japan and a cornerstone of Japan's future Asian strategy? This will be discussed in the following based on the results of research and studies so far.

5.1. India's Support and Active Involvement

Japan's desired vision of the Indo-Pacific cannot be realized without India's support and active involvement. Whether India sides with Japan and the United States or with China will have a profound impact on the global balance of power. In particular, this will have a decisive impact on the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Figure 1: GDP share of major countries in the world economy (market rate basis) (Govt. of Japan Cabinet Office, 2011)		
Country / Year	2009	2030 (expected)
USA	24.9%	17.0%
Japan	8.8%	5.8%
Germany, France, UK and Italy together	17.7%	10.2%
USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK and Italy together	51.4%	33.0%
China	8.3%	23.9%
India	2.2%	4.0%

Figure 1 shows how the share of GDP (on a market-rate basis) in the world economy of major countries is expected to change from 2009 to 2030, using numbers announced by the Cabinet Office in May 2011. According to the Cabinet Office's projections, China's GDP will exceed that of the United States by 2030. However, the combined GDPs of the United States, Japan, and major European countries are expected to exceed that of China's by about 9%, indicating that China's GDP cannot exceed the GDPs of the major industrialized groups of countries that are the makers of the current global international order if there is sufficient policy coordination between the United States, Japan, and Europe. In the Asia-Pacific region, however, the situation may be quite different. This is because the combined GDP of the US and Japan is expected to be slightly less than that of China in 2030. If such a balance of power were to become a reality, it could shake the foundations of the liberal, open, rule-based international order in the Asia-Pacific region. India's GDP share in 2030 is projected to be 4%, and if Japan and the U.S. succeed in strengthening ties with India, the combined GDP of Japan, the U.S., and India will exceed that of China. On the other hand, if China succeeds in strengthening its ties with India, their total GDP will be much higher than that of Japan and the United States. It is obvious that whether India sides with the advanced democracies or with China will have a significant impact on the regional balance of power.

Turning from the economic to the political and security spheres, many of the recent regional cooperation frameworks in the Asia-Pacific that have been

formed in part due to the stimulus provided by the rise of China have included India, such as the East Asia Summit and the annual meetings of ADMM Plus. This is despite the fact that in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, when India was eager to join a series of regional cooperation frameworks in the Asia-Pacific, many countries in the region took a cold attitude.

Despite the fact that the term 'Indo-Pacific' is still not widely used internationally, its existence indicates that the regional concept of 'Asia-Pacific' is already changing into 'Indo-Pacific', which includes India. In the face of this change, it is urgent for Japan to make India share the vision of the Indo-Pacific region that is desirable for Japan, and to make efforts to attract India to the side of advanced democracies such as Japan and the United States, rather than the side of China. But this can be quite difficult. Many Indians are wary that the Indo-Pacific concept advocated by Japan, the United States, and Australia would be detrimental to India's national interests if adopted carelessly. (Chacko, 2013) There are still objections and differences of opinion in India when it comes to the recognition of the regional concept of the 'Indo-Pacific' which originated in Japan and the United States. One of the main reasons for this seems to be that it is not clear what benefits India would derive from adopting this concept and having closer security interaction with Japan, the United States, and other Asia-Pacific countries. The rise of China and its growing assertiveness has India on edge, as well. But at the same time, India wants to approach the idea of adopting the Indo-Pacific concept in responding to China's rise cautiously, as it may overstimulate China. So far, the Modi government's cooperative behaviour, that they have displayed in many occasions, is favourable to Japan.

The intensification of security interactions between the Asia-Pacific countries and India cannot be sustained in the long term if the relationship is unilateral, with the former benefiting from the latter. It is necessary to seek a form of mutual benefit for both parties. If Japan wants India to accept to cooperate in the 'Indo-Pacific' region in a favourable way to its future vision, Japan needs to work with the United States and other countries, to demonstrate more clearly that this concept is beneficial to India, as well.

Hitherto, the theory of the 'Indo-Pacific' in Japan has tended to focus on the Indo-Pacific Ocean (the Pacific and Indian Oceans), and little attention has been paid to the problems in South Asia. If the 'Indo-Pacific' concept is to be the pillar of Japan's foreign and security policies, Japan must take a more

proactive stance than in the past in envisioning how it can get involved and play a role in various issues in South Asia (such as the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir issue, and the Sino-Indian border dispute).

5.2 Strengthening Ties with the other Indian Ocean Countries

Up until now, discussions of the Indo-Pacific region in Japan have focused on strengthening Japan-India ties and cooperation. However, no matter how much the relationship with India is strengthened, this alone will not lead to the formation of an Indo-Pacific region. Japan needs to pay more attention to other countries in the Indian Ocean such as Indonesia and Australia. These two countries are not likely to have the same level of power as the major powers now or in the future. However, in considering the future order of the Indo-Pacific, it is important to pay attention to the movements of these 'swing states' that are not major powers like the United States, China, and Japan, but have a certain degree of influence on international relations in the region. It is a challenge for Japanese diplomacy to guide these states in a direction that is desirable for Japan. (Kikuchi)

Australia re-introduced the 'Indo-Pacific' as a regional concept in its 2013 Defense White Paper, for the first time in four years, since 2009. The content of the report has much in common with the vision of the 'Indo-Pacific' region that is considered desirable for Japan. The 2013 White Paper argues that "China's continued rise as a global power, the increasing economic and strategic weight of East Asia and the emergence over time of India as a global power are key trends influencing the Indian Ocean's development as an area of increasing strategic significance. In aggregate, these trends are shaping the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic arc." (Australian Govt. Dept. of Defence, 2013) Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who came to power in September 2013, not only pledged to focus on the 'Indo-Pacific', but also made good on this pledge after coming to power, considering many positive developments ever since.

On the other hand, guiding Indonesia in a direction that is desirable for Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomatic view proves to be a more difficult task. There is no doubt that Indonesia has been paying more attention to the 'Indo-Pacific' concept in recent years. For example, in a series of speeches,

Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marti Natalegawa, advocated the signing of an Indo-Pacific-wide treaty of friendship and cooperation. (2013) According to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (APSI), the Foreign Minister has advocated for an “Indo-Pacific treaty” at least three times in different conferences. (Sambhi, 2013) In December 2013, President Susilo Yudhoyono proposed a binding framework for Indo-Pacific cooperation in his speech in Tokyo during his visit to Japan (Kyodo News, 2013). The Joint Communiqué issued by the 47th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in August 2014, welcomed Yudhoyono’s proposal. (asean.org, 2014)

However, the “Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation”, being advocated by Indonesian political and diplomatic leaders, is quite distant from Japan’s Indo-Pacific view. In a speech in Washington on May 16, 2013, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, argued that there are many challenges in the region and that, in order to meet these challenges and achieve a “peaceful Indo-Pacific”, a “new paradigm” that is “not unlike the one that has developed in Southeast Asia through ASEAN” is needed. What he and President Yudhoyono advocated in response to China’s rise was the implementation of an “ASEAN-style” confidence-building framework in a vast region that included China and incorporated India into the traditional Asia-Pacific region.

As the previous examples show, despite that the reference to the concept of Indo-Pacific is increasing in ASEAN countries, at least so far, the understanding of the concept by these countries can differ significantly from Japan’s, and this could pose a challenge to the realization of Japan’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. More policy initiatives are needed to assess how this can be overcome.

Furthermore, for Japan to establish the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region as a single entity, it will be necessary to make efforts to include South Asian countries other than India, such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Indo-Pacific theory in Japan to date has tended to perceive the ‘Indo-Pacific’ as exclusively maritime-centered, and little attention has been paid to the problems of East Asia. Along with other positive developments, Prime Minister Abe visited Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in early September 2014, following the visits of Indian Prime Minister Modi to Japan at the end of the previous month and beginning of the same month, and it is important to continue these diplomatic efforts.

5.3 Promoting Economic Relations

In order for Japan to realize its desired vision of the 'Indo-Pacific' region, it is necessary to further deepen the interaction between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and those of the Indian Ocean region not only in terms of politics and security but also in economic terms. Japan needs to cooperate with India in the future to expand economic relations to a scale appropriate for the national strengths and strategic interests of both sides. In this sense, one positive development is that on the occasions of Indian Prime Minister Modi's visits to Japan in late August and early September 2014, the leaders of the two countries agreed to set a common goal of doubling the amount of Japanese direct investment and the number of Japanese companies entering the Indian market. Prime Minister Modi also announced that the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry would launch a special team called Japan Plus to strengthen Japan-India economic ties, which was inaugurated on October 8. This has led to other positive developments, as well. Convinced that "joint efforts by Asia's two leading democracies will contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region", in the Japan-India Business Leaders Forum, the business leaders of Japan and India called for greater bilateral cooperation in areas such as combating piracy in the Indian Ocean, securing sea lanes, strengthening the cyber security network and combating terrorism. (Japan-India Business Leaders Forum 2014 Report, 2014)

In the future, Japan needs to think about developing a strategic economic partnership between Japan and India, as well as between Japan and other Indian Ocean countries, that goes beyond the mere economic interests advocated in this report.

5.4 Raising Awareness among the Japanese People

In order to achieve Japan's 'Indo-Pacific' vision, it is also essential to create a sense among the Japanese people that they belong to the 'Indo-Pacific' region. To this end, the prime minister and other political leaders must step up their efforts to talk to the public about the necessity and relevance of this concept for Japan. After his return to power in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe often promoted regional cooperation, linking the traditional Asia-Pacific region with the Indian Ocean region. However, the usage and

explanation of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ were neglected in his policy speeches. This is one of the reasons why the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is not familiar to the Japanese people. If this point is not improved, it may be difficult for the Japanese government to gain public support for its ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy in the future.

5.5 Fostering a Common Understanding with the United States

It goes without saying that it is necessary to foster a common understanding with the United States and to coordinate policies in order to make the desired ‘Indo-Pacific’ vision a reality for Japan. However, since fostering a common understanding with the United States and promoting policy coordination are issues that apply to Japanese diplomacy in general, they will not be analysed in this paper.

6. Policy Recommendations

To conclude, some policy recommendations will be provided based on the analysis and discussion so far on the assumption that Japan will pursue an ‘Indo-Pacific’ diplomacy that aims at realizing its desired ‘Indo-Pacific’ vision in the future.

6.1 Promoting Track II Dialogue with Ally Countries Including the US and Other Countries Concerned to Develop a Common Understanding of the Concept of ‘Security Order in the Indo-Pacific’

Under the second Abe administration, the regional concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ has become increasingly important to Japan’s foreign policy and security policy, especially in its Asian strategy. However, a common international understanding of the desired regional security order has not been fostered sufficiently. In the future, it would be desirable to have active Track II dialogues between Japanese international politicians, security experts and experts from the US, other allies and Indian Ocean countries in order to promote the development of such common understanding. Governments should strengthen their support for activities at the non-governmental level by financial means, as well as other means.

6.2 Taking a Leadership Role with the Ally, the US, to Promote International Cooperation Among the Countries Concerned

What is essential to achieve the goal of maintaining the existing liberal, open, rule-based maritime order is the strengthening of cooperation among relevant countries in the region, especially democratic countries. Together with its ally the United States, Japan should lead the way in cooperating with countries that value the maintenance of such international order. Particular emphasis should be on cooperation with India, the world's largest democracy that shares liberal values and principles with Japan and the United States, and with countries in the Indian Ocean such as Australia and Indonesia.

6.3 Developing the Necessary Foreign and Security Policy Tools to be Utilized in Building and Maintaining a Security Order in the Indo-Pacific

Japan will not be able to take upon a leadership role unless it is willing to take the actions necessary to build and maintain the security order that it considers desirable in the 'Indo-Pacific', under the banner of positive pacifism based on international cooperation, and in accordance with its own national strength. As a prerequisite for this, Japan must hasten the preparation of the necessary policy tools, including the development of military capabilities, particularly the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

6.4 Promoting Economic Relations with Countries in the Indian Ocean Region.

Japan should interact more closely with the countries of the Indian Ocean, not only in terms of politics and security, but also in economic terms. In the future, it is expected that the economies of the countries in the Indian Ocean region will account for an increasing portion of the world economy, and the development of economic relations with these countries will undoubtedly bring economic benefits to Japan. However, beyond this perspective, Japan should envision and implement measures to develop a strategic economic partnership with India and with other Indian Ocean countries.

6.5 Educating the Japanese People

In order to make the desired vision of the 'Indo-Pacific' region a reality for Japan and a pillar of its future Asian strategy, it is also essential to foster a sense among the Japanese people that they belong to the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, the prime minister and other political leaders must step up their efforts to talk to the public about the necessity and relevance of this concept for Japan. The government should use the opportunity of the Prime Minister's policy speeches and statements to educate the people on why it is necessary to strengthen relations with countries in the Indian Ocean and why this will be beneficial in the long term.

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日米同盟と東アジアの安全保障*

The Japan-US Alliance and East Asian Security**

Sako Susumu

Introduction

The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe due to the presence of North Korea, which is pursuing nuclear and missile development, and China, which is advocating the promotion of a distinctive great power of diplomacy. Considering the relationship between the two countries, it can be said that the North Korea issue is also closely related to China, and the China issue is the biggest problem in the medium and the long term. Under these circumstances, Japan is taking measures such as developing security legislation. At the same time, its ally, the United States, with the establishment of the Trump administration, has also made a clear shift from its traditional policy of engagement with China and has taken an aggressive stance toward China. The US presence, based on the Japan-US alliance, has contributed to the stability of East Asia in the past. The strengthening of the Japan-US alliance is vital for Japan to effectively deal with the tense security environment in East Asia and maintain stability in East Asia and the region from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and Africa. This paper considers the Japan-US alliance by examining the security environment in East Asia and the current situation between Japan and the United States.

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** Summarized and translated by Ayşe Duygu Dayıoğlu.

The Security Environment in East Asia

In the current security environment in East Asia, tensions are heightened by the presence of North Korea, which has been developing nuclear weapons and missiles with the ultimate goal of maintaining the current regime, and the People's Republic of China, which is challenging and seeking to change the existing international order. The 2018 edition of the government report on defense, "Japan's Defense", published on August 24, 2018, states the following regarding North Korea: "Since 2004, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and has repeatedly launched up to 40 ballistic missiles. These military moves by North Korea represent an unprecedentedly serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community". It is evident that North Korea is a threat to Japan, as it has had missiles within range of Japan for some time. Moreover, North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons as well as biological and chemical weapons. North Korea is a dictatorship with very little transparency. On June 12, 2016, the first US-North Korea summit between President Trump and President Kim took place in Singapore, and a joint statement was released. The joint declaration stated that "President Trump pledged to provide security guarantees to North Korea, and President Kim reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", but did not specify the "Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Denuclearization" (CVID) that the U.S. was seeking, and no concrete results were achieved.

The tone of the debate at the time was mainly along the lines of, "We need to wait and see what happens in the future." Looking at the developments since then, there has been no progress in the "denuclearization of North Korea," as North Korea's attitude was hardened by a direct meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Kim Jong-un. President Trump stated at a press conference that he would suspend joint US-ROK military exercises while continuing dialogue with North Korea. This is a strategic goal that China has been seeking for a long time, and it has led to the removal of US influence from East Asia. At the same time, it is almost common sense for China that North Korea is a buffer state against the US, and China needs to ensure the survival of the North Korean regime. In other words, it can be said

that the North Korean problem is directly related to the Chinese situation.

The question of how to deal with the challenge to the existing international order posed by China, an emerging superpower that has achieved rapid development, has become a problem not only for East Asia, but for the entire world. As fundamentalist extremists in the Islamic world until about 100 years ago, China has a different view of the international order than the Western European-originated international order. China was the center of the East Asian global system. The international order of Western European origin was based on the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which equal independent sovereign states coexisted. On the other hand, the Sinocentric order has a unipolar structure putting China at the center under the moral rule of the Son of Heaven and the surrounding barbarians. The Xi Jinping administration is implementing a diplomatic security policy with the aim of the Great Reconstruction of the Chinese People. At the party's Central Foreign Affairs Workshop in November 2014, Xi Jinping said that the current world is a world of change, a new opportunity. It is recognizing that in a world of new challenges, a world in which the international system and order are considerably coordinated, China has reached a critical stage in realizing China's dream of the Great Reconstruction of the Chinese People. He emphasized the importance of promoting China's own distinctive great diplomacy with its unique Chinese character, style, and spirit. Furthermore, in June 2018, at the same Party Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, he again advocated "great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" based on the recognition that conditions are favorable for China's diplomacy in the future, and said, "We will be actively involved in leading the reform of the global governance system." He also called developing countries "natural allies." He said he would further promote cooperation with them. Suppose China has a mixed view of the modern international and Sinocentric order. In that case, it makes China's foreign policy unique and, of course, a clear challenge to the existing international order that originated in Western Europe. It is necessary to pay close attention to how the Great Reconstruction of the Chinese People will be promoted and realized under the Xi Jinping administration. It also points to a change in China's system. In other words, Xi Jinping's dictatorship may be on the rise: Xi Jinping's New Era of China's Characteristic Socialist Thoughts was enshrined in the party constitution at

the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017. It is believed to be the first ideology to be named after an individual since Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In addition, at the National People's Congress in March 2018, Xi Jinping abolished the term system of the president up to the second term, opening up the possibility for him to hold office for up to three terms. There is growing concern that he may be seeking to return to the Maoist era. Deng Xiaoping's tactic of "hiding one's abilities and waiting for the right moment," which led China to become the great power today, has been abandoned.

One of the most notable policies of the Xi Jinping administration is the "One Belt, One Road" policy, which he proposed in 2013, and which was put forward at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit held in China in 2014. To build the "Silk Road Economic Belt" from western China to Central Asia and Europe, the policy calls for the construction of railroads, roads, and ports through economic aid to countries along the route. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the first of its kind globally, and it will support this initiative. This "One Belt, One Road" policy has been criticized as a "debt trap" or "neo-colonialism" that puts recipient countries under China's influence by imposing huge debts on them. China's maritime expansion has also been seen as a problem. Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin set the national goals of "Strong Military and Wealthy Country in the 21st Century" and "Unification of the Motherland." It is believed that the Hu Jintao administration inherited these goals. In 1992, during the Jiang Zemin era, the People's Republic of China enacted a domestic law called the "Law of the Territorial Waters and Connected Waters of the People's Republic of China," which unilaterally declared Taiwan and islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as its territory. In December 2006, during the Hu Jintao era, Hu Jintao said in front of naval officers, "Our country is a maritime power. The navy has an important position in protecting the sovereignty and security of the nation and safeguarding our maritime interests." In addition, during a visit to China in May 2007 by the U.S. Pacific Command Commander John Keating, he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee the following year that China had proposed that the Pacific Ocean be divided into East and West and managed by the United States and China.

What is particularly alarming about China's maritime expansion is the

reclamation of reefs in the South China Sea and their use as military bases. China has unilaterally claimed the sea area within what it calls the nine-dash line in the South China Sea as its own territory and has been in conflict with neighboring countries over territorial rights. The South China Sea is rich in seabed resources and is strategically important for Chinese submarine operations due to its deep waters. Furthermore, the route from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea through the Malacca Strait is a critically important maritime transportation route for coastal countries and Japan, which depends on the Middle East for oil imports. The East China Sea is an area that serves as a passageway for China's attempts to enter the Pacific Ocean. China conducts military exercises in the waters around Taiwan to exert pressure, sends Chinese patrol vessels and fishing boats into the waters and territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, which are Japan's inherent territory, and Chinese naval vessels pass through the Miyako Strait and enter the Pacific Ocean. Recently, it has been said that China's stance toward Japan has been softening. This may be due to the worsening of US-China relations, and it is necessary to keep in mind that this may be considered a tactical policy change.

What is the Japan-US Alliance?

The term 'alliance' generally refers to the cooperation of groups or individuals with common interests or goals. For example, there are custom unions, currency unions, and city unions. It is a pact between two or more states to cooperate in diplomatic, military, political, or economic relations in international politics. While some nations have adopted a policy of non-alignment, such as Britain's 'honored isolation' and the United States' 'isolationism', the reality is that most nations have some form of alliance. Why do we need allies? One can say that they are necessary because they can complement the weaknesses of one's own country and provide an advocate for one's position. On the other hand, alliances can also make the other party wary, and there is a danger of forming a rival alliance. Therefore, it is natural that we need to weigh the benefits and risks of entering into alliances. There is an argument that by allying, there is a risk of being drawn into the conflicts of the alliance partner. Still, since the partner country also bears the same risk, it becomes logical

to choose isolationism. Japan's historical experience should suffice: In 1902, the British Empire made a major shift from its previous 'honored isolation' policy and entered into an alliance with Japan. This was in preparation for the southward expansion of the Russian Empire in East Asia. This alliance allowed Japan to raise funds for the war effort during the Russo-Japanese War and obtain information from Britain about the movements of the Russian Baltic Fleet. In addition, Japan's credibility in the world was enhanced by its alliance with Great Britain, which was considered the most powerful nation. In 1940, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, eventually resulting in Japan's defeat in the war and the occupation by the United States. It was an alliance that led Japan into isolation. Independence from the U.S. occupation was achieved through the San Francisco Peace Treaty; at the same time, the Japan-US Security Treaty was signed. The Japan-US alliance can be said to have been established at this time. At the time, the term *Japan-US Alliance* was not used, but it is well known that in 1960, the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised and became the new security treaty we know today.

The fact that having an alliance with the US is important not only because of the international environment of the Cold War and the fact that the US occupation made it impossible to have any other ally after independence. It is also important to note that the US and Japan have come to share universal values such as freedom, human dignity, human rights, democracy, the market economy, and the rule of law. The Japan-US alliance provided the conditions for Japan to achieve rapid economic growth by relying on the US for security, adopting a basic postwar policy of light armament, and emphasizing economic growth. When economic relations with the US deteriorated after the Cold War, the argument to 'turn back to Asia' became popular. The argument emerged that Japan should form an alliance with China instead of the US. At that time, the combined trade volume between China and Southeast Asian countries exceeded that with the United States, and China's economic development, in particular, was attracting attention. However, China's political system is a one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party of China, and its values differ greatly from Japan's in other respects. One can say that Japan should continue to maintain its alliance with the US, which maintains the world's greatest military, economic, and influence power, shares its values, and has strong soft power. As for the current situation in the

U.S., it can be said that American society is in a state of confusion, as it is often referred to as divided. The reasons for this division have been pointed out to include income disparity, educational disparity, racial issues, and religious issues. The Republican Party's Trump administration was formed in the United States in 2017. A major reason for Trump's election to the presidency can also be seen as the 'division of America'. Candidate Trump was elected due to his appeal for "America First", his strong criticism of the current state of affairs in America, and his promise to change America. If you recall that former President Barack Obama won the election by saying that he would change the United States, it is quite understandable. Trump is often described as antisemitic, eccentric, and more. In foreign policy, Trump tends to favor a unilateralist and hardline approach with his "America First" policy, which is also being used against allies, such as his aggressive criticism of NATO. Japan and the US are allies, but there are fears about the Trump administration's policies regarding the trade deficit with Japan. In the 1980s and 1990s, trade relations between the US and Japan became so tense that some in the media referred to the situation as the "Eve of Pearl Harbor". The future of the Japan-US alliance must be considered on the premise that such a situation that could damage the alliance between the two countries is possible. The Trump administration is unstable, including the the perception of Russian collusion, and there is the problem of a divided America, so one can expect the US to have a wide range of policies depending on the administration. The Japan-US alliance should not be seen as a given relationship, and efforts should be made to maintain it.

The Current Situation in Japan

It can be said that Japan is currently being asked to reconstruct its national image. There is an urgent need for further clarification of the national image, although there seems to be consensus on living as a maritime trading nation. With the end of the Cold War, the bipolar structure of the US and the Soviet Union collapsed, and the international environment became more fluid, with the term "Anarchical International System" being used at the time. The 21st century began with the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the world became more chaotic. At the same time, China has

achieved rapid economic development, and its economic development has enabled it to build up and modernize its military. Answering how Japan will cope with such a new situation is the key to clarifying the image of the nation. Indeed, it can be said that Japan is gradually changing, but it needs to respond to the rapid changes in the world fully.

For Japan to survive in the international arena while maintaining stability and prosperity, nations need to share a common understanding that it is essential to protect a system in which political and economic liberalism values are accepted worldwide. It is essential to think carefully about Japan's role in maintaining such a world. The fact that there is a debate on constitutional revision, which was unthinkable in the past, indicates that it is time to reconstruct the nation's image. In particular, the national debate is divided between revisionists and conservatives over the issue of what to do about Japan's security, namely Article 9 of the Constitution. This issue naturally directly impacts the nature of the Japan-US alliance. Japan's current situation concerning security is clearly different from that of a normal independent sovereign nation. This is because of the existence of Article 9 of the Constitution, which calls for the non-preservation of force, the renunciation of the right of belligerency, and the possession of the Self-Defense Forces, which is not a conventional military force. Whether Japan can protect the lives and property of its citizens, which is the basic role of a state, and maintain a stable international order in which Japan benefits, is at the center of the revision debate. In 2007, the Defense Agency, which had been an external agency of the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office, was transformed into the Ministry of Defense, which is under the control of the Cabinet. In 2014, the government made a cabinet decision to allow, albeit on a limited basis, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, which had previously been constitutionally unacceptable. Security legislation was enacted in 2015 and came into force the following year. This expanded the scope of activities of the Self-Defense Forces, improved the deterrence and coping power of the Japan-US alliance, and contributed to the defense of Japan and the peace and stability of the East Asian region. In response to China's maritime expansion, it has become necessary to solidify the defense of Distinct Islands, especially the Nansei Islands, therefore, in March 2018, the Ground Self-Defense Force established a new Hydro Land Task Force for island defense.

Change in America

Since the beginning of the Trump administration, there has been constant criticism of Trump, but the question is whether it is enough to criticize him. His unilateralist, threatening, and provocative behavior may be a tactic he uses to gain an advantage in negotiations. Certainly, President Trump raises many questions, but it is clear that he is trying to make significant changes to the traditional United States. Of course, some of his promises are good for Japan, and some are not. One thing that could be considered favorable is a clear shift from a policy of 'engagement' with China. The previous Obama administration, which had initially adopted a policy of engagement, became increasingly concerned about China's activities in the South China Sea in the latter half of the term and began to shift away from a policy of engagement. The engagement policy is based on the idea that economic development will lead to democratization and aims to promote trade and investment in China. It leads China into the international community and promotes regime change over the medium to long term. Looking at China's recent developments, one can see that although it is growing economically, it is not leading to democratization. It is modernizing and building up its military, which is trying to overturn the dominance of the United States. In 2015, during the former Obama administration, Michael Pillsbury published "The Hundred-Year Marathon," pointing out the fallacy of the engagement policy. Since the Nixon administration, Pillsbury has worked as a China expert in government agencies for 30 years. He was a pro-China "panda hugger," but by the turn of the 21st century, he realized that his view of China was wrong. For a long time in the US, he held the view that "China is led by a leader who thinks like us. If we help a fragile China, China will become a democratic and peaceful superpower. But even if China becomes a great power, it does not plan to dominate the region, much less the world", and he was convinced of this. He said, "I, like many people working in the U.S. government, have been hearing for decades that democracy will become in China. I've read about it in countless books and articles. And I believed it." In December 2017, the White House released the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. It states that the United States advocates a free and open Indo-Pacific, with the support of regional partners and allies who uphold international

law, freedom of navigation, and freedom of commerce and thought. The US interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific go back to the earliest days of the republic. In January 2018, the Department of Defense released a Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States. The opening section, “Strategic Environment”, states “China is using military modernization, influence tactics, and predatory economics as leverage to force its neighbors to realign the Indo-Pacific region for its dominance...In the short term, China will continue to pursue its military modernization program to pursue Indo-Pacific hegemony. It will seek to supplant the United States in achieving global excellence in the future.”

Military officials are also speaking out in alarm against China. In June 2018, the United States Indo-Pacific Command was replaced by Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, who made clear his wariness of China, stating, “As stated in the National Security Strategy, the United States advocates a free and open Indo-Pacific, with the support of regional partners and allies who uphold international law, freedom of navigation, and freedom of commerce and thought. It is becoming increasingly clear that China is attempting to create a consistent world with its own authoritarian and above-mentioned model. China is undermining the rules-based international order through its coercive diplomacy, predatory economic policies, and rapid military expansion. We must unabashedly and continuously oppose such actions by China. China is pursuing a long-term strategy to reduce US access and influence in the region, and it has already achieved great success in doing so. China is no longer a rising power but a great power, an equal power competing with the US in the region. In 2018, President Trump called China a ‘rival,’ stated that “Davidson and I fully agree” in the Senate Armed Services Committee. In this way, the U.S. perception of China has shifted, and it has taken a confrontational stance toward China. For example, the U.S. has enacted the Taiwan Travel Act, which permits direct exchange of government officials with Taiwan, which China claims to be a part of, and endeavors to strengthen relations, such as technical assistance in submarine manufacturing, as well as the implementation of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. Furthermore, the U.S. aggressive policy toward China, known as the U.S.-China Trade War, also shows that its aggressive stance towards China is not limited to the security field.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance and East Asia

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has made a clear shift from its previous 'engagement policy' toward China. This can be said that the change in the situation in favor of Japan, as Japan sees China's military power and its expansion into the East China Sea as a threat. For the U.S., too, China's growing military power and maritime expansion into the Pacific Ocean are perceived as threats, and the value of the Japan-U.S. alliance has increased because the perceptions of Japan and the U.S. toward China have become more similar. In addition, the Japan-U.S. alliance can serve as a basis for taking joint steps not only with East Asia but also with Southeast Asian countries, India, Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island nations, to counter China's expansionist policies. In August 2016, Prime Minister Abe announced the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" at the 6th African Development Conference. The key to the stability and prosperity of the international community is the dynamism created by the intersection of the two continents: Asia and Africa, which are growing rapidly and full of potential, and the two oceans: the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which are free and open. Japan can promote diplomacy that integrates these two. This is an extension of the Abe Cabinet's consistent belief that a free and open ocean is the source of peace and prosperity. At the same time, it also states that it will provide support to African countries in terms of development politics and governance, respecting their own governance rather than imposing or intervening. Furthermore, to realize this strategy, Japan will further strengthen strategic cooperation with India, which has historically had strong ties with East Africa, and with the United States and Australia, which are its allies.

In November 2017, President Trump responded in Vietnam that he was honored to share our vision for a free and open Pacific. During his visit to Japan in the same month, he emphasized the importance of stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, which is at the heart of the world's vitality. Significantly, the U.S. agreed to Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" that was proposed. This is because Japan's diplomacy has been criticized for its inability to develop a foreign policy based on broad principles. In 1947, the U.S. established the Pacific Command, responsible for Asia, Oceania, and India. Still, with the change of commanders, it was renamed

the Indo-Pacific Command, and recently the term 'Indo-Pacific' has become widely used. How can Japan continue to contribute to the maintenance and development of an international order that upholds political and economic freedom?

Conclusion

While North Korea is a threat, the more important threat is China in the medium to long term. Japan cannot stand alone against China, which is advancing its One Belt, One Road policy under the slogan of "The Great Revival of the Chinese People" and is developing maritime expansion measures through the Pacific Ocean. There are limitations, such as the Japanese people's awareness of security, Japan's economic strength as the basis for its defense capability, and the legal issue of Article 9 of the Constitution. Of course, it can be said that no nation in the modern world can fulfill its security alone. Under these circumstances, Japan has no choice but to implement its security policy based on the alliance with the United States. Nevertheless, there is currently no such alliance. To continue the alliance, Japan must realize that it is first and foremost responsible for the defense of its own country and adopt appropriate policies. Is there a nation that can help a nation that is unwilling to protect its own country?

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インド太平洋地域の地政学——大国間競争の現状と展望*

Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region: Current Status and Prospects of Competition between Major Powers**

Yoichi Kato

The recent geopolitical and geo-economic changes in the Indo-Pacific region are varied and fast moving. While more time is needed to ascertain the outcomes, it can be said that many of these changes have taken on an unprecedented character and carry the potential to fundamentally overturn the existing order in the region.

The new players making an appearance as part of this power game are not only large countries, but also small and mid-sized countries. In this interim report, the changes will be examined from the perspectives of the four major regional powers: China, United States, India and Japan.

- (1) China: Overreach and revision of the Belt and Road Initiative
- (2) United States: Hardening of its stance toward China
- (3) India: Deepening sense of caution toward China
- (4) Japan: Changes in strategy toward China brought about by the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy (vision).

In addition, the effects of such changes on the maintenance and reconstruction of regional order will be discussed.

* This is an abbreviated translation of the following article: 加藤洋一. (2021年)、インド太平洋地域の地政学——大国間競争の現状と展望」、「インド太平洋地域の海洋安全保障と『法の支配』の実体化にむけて：国際公共財の維持強化に向けた日本外交の新たな取り組み」(令和元年度 インド太平洋研究会) The original can be accessed at: https://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/R01_Indopacific/01-kato.pdf

** Summarized and translated by Sevgi Zeyneloğlu.

1. Major Geopolitical Developments in the Indo-Pacific Region

1.1 China: Overreach and Revision of the Belt and Road Initiative

1.1a Current State in South Asia

Infrastructure projects based on China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are being planned and implemented across a wide geographical range, from Southeast Asia to the South Pacific, Central Asia, Middle East, Africa and Europe. South Asia and the coastal areas of the Indian Ocean are among the regions that draw the most attention.

The most widely known case is that of the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka. The construction that began in 2010 was completed with financing from China. However, the interest rates of up to 6% were high for aid, and the repayment was set to begin early. Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan, and in July 2017, agreed to transfer 70% of the stakes belonging to the propriety company of the port to the Chinese side for 99 years. In December, the port was essentially turned over to China. Some locals voiced their opinion that "it was like becoming a Chinese colony".

Reporting on it extensively in 2018, *The New York Times* popularized the issue. The newspaper reported that as a result of the transfer, "China controls territory just a few hundred miles offshore its rival India, and has established a strategic foothold along a waterway of vital importance, both in terms of trade and military affairs." The report continued "This case is the most striking example of China's ambitious use of loans and aid to gain leverage around the world . . . These debt deals strengthen the harsh criticism towards President Xi Jinping's 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) in which China's global investment and lending programs are trapping vulnerable countries around the world in debt." These feelings of suspicion and caution regarding the BRI are shared by other Asian countries, as well.

In July 2018, Malaysia halted work on the construction of the East Coast Railway, a project that had been ongoing as part of the BRI. In August, Prime Minister Mahathir visited China and held a joint press conference with Premier Li Keqiang in which he drew attention to the following statement:

We agree that free trade is the way to go. However, as a matter of course, free trade must also be fair. It must always be kept in mind that steps of

development differ across countries. To put it simply, fair trade means that poor countries can stand a chance against wealthy countries. Therefore, the circumstances to bear a new colonialism are not desired. Fair trade is a must. In this regard, together with Li Keqiang we support free trade, because we think that it is the way forward for the entire world.

This statement directly identified the defects of 'free trade'. However, the expression 'new colonialism' was used immediately after Malaysia's decision to suspend a BRI project, and was taken as a criticism of the initiative.

In October 2018 it was reported that Pakistan, known for its friendly relations with China, was going to re-examine its BRI related project China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) due to "debt trap" concerns.

The project aims to increase investments for the construction of industry infrastructure such as power plants, harbours, highways and railways. The total investment is said to reach \$62 billion, and China has pledged to provide the bulk of the funds. CPEC is one of the six economic corridors that make up the Silk Road Economic Belt which constitutes the 'belt' portion of BRI. It is also the most advanced in terms of development. Given that "China regards CPEC as the flagship project of the BRI initiative", such stagnation might suggest that the initiative is running into trouble.

In South Asia, China's greatest worry is India. In May 2017, India boycotted the "The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation" in Beijing, the first international event regarding the initiative. "What India opposes is not the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative, but China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)." It is said that "since before, India has held the viewpoint that China's motives moving forward with CPEC are about advancing their national security, and they are claiming it is a project about economics as an excuse to let it pass" and "China increasing its presence and influence in the Indian Ocean is not something India can ignore as they consider it to be 'India's Ocean'".

In February 2018, Gateway House, a think tank based in Mumbai, India pointed out the following problems in a report they published regarding the current state of China's investments in South Asia:

1. China has become the largest foreign investor in the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

2. This penetration by China has reached especially high levels in Myanmar and Pakistan, countries that surround India from the East and the West.
3. China's method is evident. First, they enter the country as a weapon supplier, and then build relationships with the country's elite. After that, they provide modern infrastructure with deferred payments. Once they enter a country, they then influence its domestic affairs. At times, they even manoeuvre for a regime change in favour of China.
4. While China's investments are concentrated on hard infrastructure, they also consider the geo-economic dimension. China is clearly trying to create new rules to control the business and finances in the region.

Furthermore, according to the case studies of major countries in South Asia, the situation in each country is described as follows "In the Maldives, the investments erode democracy. In Pakistan, there are unreasonable mortgages. In Sri Lanka, it's a debt trap. In Myanmar, there is resistance to Chinese dominance." The state of affairs in the small and mid-sized countries of the region and their impact on the power game will be examined in detail in the final report.

1.1b. Strategic Revisions

Since such criticisms and sense of caution spread across the region, China made a move to defend itself by what can be described as strategic revisions. Attending the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Papua New Guinea on November 17, 2018, President Xi Jinping stated the following:

The Belt and Road Initiative is the establishment of partnerships that will open the door for cooperation. Its fundamental principles will be discussed together, established together, and shared together. China, with the world, aims to share opportunities together, to develop in a proper manner without any geopolitical objectives, without targeting or excluding anyone.

The viewpoint that China, by providing aid, trapped countries in debt and

made them do China's bidding in pursuit of geopolitical gains was firmly rejected. It is supported with China's worldview and global strategy that economic globalization is increasing the interdependence of each country and forming a community with "shared interests and destiny". The question is whether the countries of the world or the region are willing to join a community of shared interests, much less of shared destiny, with China. No self-analysis was given by China regarding this point.

In order to avoid criticism from other countries towards the BRI, China has made the eccentric move to change the English name of the initiative. In 2016, it was changed to "Belt and Road Initiative" from "One Belt, One Road" with the reasoning that the previous name could cause the "misunderstanding" that there are only one road and one belt. In fact, the plan is to connect Asia, Europe and Africa via five routes. It was also meant to prevent regional partners from competing with each other. Furthermore, the addition of the word "initiative" was explained as a way to emphasize the openness of strategies and to avoid the criticism that it was "China-centric institution building".

Despite the fact that at least one of the reasons for changing the English name was to explain that it did not represent reality, the Chinese name remains as "One Belt, One Road". This shows that the Chinese government and the Communist Party are only concerned with the image that other countries have of China.

However, as following developments have shown, the effect of this name change on the international community has not necessarily been as the Chinese government aimed for. During the 2018 APEC summit, US Vice-President Pence, who took the stage after Chinese President Xi Jinping, expressed strong criticism towards BRI without naming China.

As we speak, as we're all aware, some are offering infrastructure loans to governments across the Indo-Pacific and the wider world. Yet the terms of those loans are often opaque at best. Projects they support are often unsustainable and of poor quality. And too often, they come with strings attached and lead to staggering debt . . . And so today, let me say to all the nations across this wider region, and the world: Do not accept foreign debt that could compromise your sovereignty . . . We don't drown our partners

in a sea of debt. We don't coerce or compromise your independence . . . We do not offer a constricting belt or a one-way road.

Vice President Pence used the English name “One Belt, One Road” on purpose and criticised by pointing out that the “belt” restrains the countries that accept financial support from China, and that the “road” is a one-way road that benefits only China. These strategic revisions are not limited to BRI. Another prominent example is ‘Made in China 2025’. The comprehensive industrial policy has been introduced in 2015, and its meaning is explained by the State Council as follows:

The manufacturing industry is the foundation of the national economy, the basis of the country, the sacred treasure of national promotion, and the foundation for a strong country. Creating a globally competitive manufacturing industry is the unavoidable path for China to increase its overall strength, guarantee its national security and establish itself as a global powerhouse . . . By 2049, the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the country, through the next three 10-year plans, China must develop into a manufacturing powerhouse that will lead the development of the world's manufacturing industry and lay the groundwork for the realization of the ‘China Dream’, the great revival of the Chinese nation.

However, the response of the US to this policy was strict opposition. U.S. President Trump, at the press conference on November 7, 2018 after the midterm elections, criticised ‘Made in China 2025’ as “insulting” and stated the following: “China got rid of their ‘China ’25’ because I found it very insulting. I said that to them. I said, ‘China ’25’ is very insulting, because ‘China ’25’ means, in 2025, they’re going to take over, economically, the world. I said, ‘That’s not happening.’”

Reuters has reported that China’s state-run Xinhua news agency mentioned “Made in China 25” more than 140 times from the beginning of 2018 to the end of May but stopped after June 5. According to Reuters, “Beijing is increasingly wary of the backlash in the United States caused by the announcement of this ambitious plan”.

There are several other examples of such revisions, but the common ground between all is that they all remain ‘strategic’ in nature, and do not

change China's 'strategies' or 'ambitions'. As the US and other countries in the region have seen through this point, the tensions with China have not fundamentally been eased.

2. United States: Hardening of its Stance toward China

United States' stance towards China has changed extensively in the last few years, both in the security dimension and in the economic dimension.

First, there is the security dimension. In 2015, during the meeting to confirm his nomination, the current chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia was the biggest threat, followed by China, North Korea and the Islamic State (ISIL) in order. However, in 2017 during the confirmation meeting for his re-nomination, he said that while North Korea was the biggest immediate threat, "in the coming years China will probably be the biggest threat to the United States," revealing a new view that saw China as the biggest threat in the medium to long term. The perception of Russia as the single greatest threat has changed dramatically over the past two years.

This trend can be seen in two U.S. strategy documents released in 2018-19. The National Security Strategy (NSS), released at the end of 2017, identifies China as a "revisionist state", along with Russia. In addition to military matters, the report revealed a sense of caution on the economic front as well, citing their strategic intent to "replace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the sphere of influence of state-led economic models, reconstruct the order of the region in favour of their own country". The National Defence Strategy (NDS), a subplan of the NSS released in January 2018 as a summarized edition, defines China as a "strategic rival" and makes the judgement that it is "militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea while using its economy for plundering purposes and threatening its neighbouring countries". In addition to geopolitical means, the new report points out that geo-economic methods and tools are also being used.

At a symposium held in Washington, D.C., in May 2018 for the 40th anniversary of the normalization of US-China relations, a discussion was heard about how the "shock absorber" in US-China relations has been lost. In

the past, when security tensions caused a crisis in bilateral relations, the two countries were able to shelve the problem as their economic relations were complementary. However, it was brought into attention that the framework of the bilateral relationship had changed. As a result of the structural evolution Chinese economy has undergone, the two economies no longer have complementary roles, and in some industries, they are in direct conflict. Hence, the analysis was that security tensions and differences in the positions of governments are becoming more frequent and more apparent.

The view that the current tension between the US and China is not a temporary matter, but one caused by historical and structural issues is becoming widespread in the United States. In response to the major shift in the perceptions, the US government's approach toward China has also changed. To begin with, the assessment is that 'engagement', which has been the basis of the approach towards China since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in the 1970s, has failed. The 2017 NSS notes the following:

For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China's rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others . . . These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades —policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.

As a result, the US is shifting its approach to China from 'engagement' to 'balance' and 'decoupling', taking a hostile stance.

'Balance' means that the US will counter China's aggressive and hostile policies and measures and the consequent increased tensions with commensurate policies and measures. A typical example is the so-called 'trade war' that the Trump administration is pursuing, mainly through economic sanctions.

'Decoupling' means a more radicalized approach. Although it is not an official policy of the US government, it has been advocated by Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President, Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy.

Strengthening the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to prevent Chinese capital from acquiring US companies and the decision to bar China's Huawei Technologies from the next generation 5G high-speed mobile communications network are both examples of decoupling.

While these are fundamentally economy and trade policies, they also extend to the security dimension. The cancellation of China's invitation to the multilateral military exercise RIMPAC: Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2018, hosted by US and scheduled for June 2018, is an example. It was a retaliatory measure against China for its refusal to stop militarizing its artificial islands in the South China Sea.

China is strongly opposed to such decoupling. On March 8, 2019, at a press conference held during the National People's Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi directly denied it, stating that "while there are those who declare that the two countries' economies are decoupling, that is simply wishful and naïve thinking". Furthermore, he stated that the interests of the two countries are "indivisible" and that "decoupling from China is decoupling from opportunities, from the future and in a further sense, from the rest of the world". He also said that "the two countries should not and will not fall into conflict".

A week later, Premier Li Keqiang reiterated Wang's denial, saying that "it is not realistic to decouple the US and Chinese economies". The repeated denial from the Chinese side can be seen as a sign of a sense of crisis to somehow stop such a trend.

This radicalisation of the stance towards China from 'engagement' to 'balance' and then to 'decoupling' is a phenomenon observed since the Trump administration took office. However, not all policy areas can be escalated to the point of decoupling. As China has pointed out, there are limits to the growing economic interdependence. In reality, in some areas there is 'balance' and in others 'decoupling'.

3. India: Deepening Sense of Caution Toward China

On January 24, 2019, India opened a new naval air base in the Bay of Bengal. It is a Kohassa base in the northern Andaman and Nicobar Islands located in

the northwest of the Malacca Straits. In accordance with this, the Indian Navy signed a contract to procure 12 Dornier 228 medium-sized patrol aircrafts in 2017, and decided to establish three new sQUADrons in 2019.

Kohassa Air Base is an expanded and renovated version of a naval air base that was originally established in 2001, with a current runway of 1000 meters. It can only be used by medium-sized twin-engine propeller-driven patrol aircraft and helicopters, but there are plans to extend the range to 3000 meters in the future. In that case, it can be used by the P8I, a state-of-the-art long-range anti-submarine patrol aircraft developed in the United States based on the Boeing 737 passenger plane.

This series of developments suggests that India is seeking to improve its anti-submarine patrol capabilities in the eastern waters of the Bay of Bengal. Although the Indian government's official announcement avoids using names, it is evidently a countermeasure to the increasing presence of not only the surface ships but also submarines belonging to the Chinese Navy in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. It is thought that the Indian Navy commissioning its first domestically produced ballistic missile nuclear submarine, Arihant, in 2016, may be another sign that the navy is seeking to improve its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

This deepening sense of caution toward China is also reflected in their request to Japan for a stronger defence cooperation. There have been calls among the Indian naval officials for Japan to help capture Chinese submarines advancing from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean. The sense of impending crisis on the Indian side concerns the possibility of China establishing control over the East Bay of Bengal across the Strait of Malacca as in the South China Sea.

India's diplomatic strategy during the Cold War was non-alignment in the first half and Indo-Soviet alliance in the second. After the Cold War, it was described as "omnidirectional collaborative diplomacy".

Currently, it is "emphasizing strategic independence" and "developing an all-round diplomacy with major countries rather than alliances with specific countries". In its foundation lies the idea of "strategic autonomy". However, recent developments in the strategic circumstances have led to the necessity of going beyond this "strategic autonomy" and developing a new diplomatic strategy. As China expands its influence in the South China Sea

and the Indian Ocean by increasing its naval presence and building artificial islands and ports, “India has begun to take countermeasures such as joint training with the US Navy and supplying US ships”.

Will it be an extension and reinforcement of the “emphasis on the US” that is said to have emerged in part after the end of the Cold War, or will it lead to greater expectations for Japan, or to a so-called four-country (‘QUAD’) attitude with the addition of Australia to Japan and the US? The future is still unclear.

4. Japan: Changes in Strategy Toward China Brought About by the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Strategy (Vision)

In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” strategy brought forth by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016, Japan expanded the scope of the general framework of its foreign policy strategy from the “Asia-Pacific” to the “Indo-Pacific”.

According to the government’s explanation, the fundamental idea is to “promote stability and prosperity for the entire region” by connecting the “two continents” of fast-growing Asia and high-potential Africa with the free and open “two oceans”, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

The three pillars of the initiative are:

1. Spreading and establishing the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade
2. Pursuing economic prosperity
3. Ensuring peace and stability

The Japanese government explained the aims of FOIP at various opportunities, saying that it is “not targeted at any particular country” and that “the intention is not the envelopment of China”. It is based on diplomatic calculations and considerations, trying not to provoke backlash from China and allowing countries of the region to be in harmony without being concerned about China.

In 2018, an additional step was taken to change what had been initially announced as a “strategy” to “vision”. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* reported the reason as the following:

A senior official of the Ministry of Foreign affairs stated that 'There are countries in the ASEAN that don't like to make a choice between Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific Strategy. We thought it would not be wise to give them the glaring image of a strategy. We are more concerned with the substantial outcome of increasing the number of countries that agree with us, rather than the nominal struggle of word choice.'

FOIP is not hostile toward China or the BRI, but it was surely created with that in mind. Some government officials have stated that it is to off-set China's growing influence.

In order not to be at a disadvantage in competition with BRI, FOIP "deliberately removed" the elements of 'value diplomacy' such as the spread of democracy and respect for human rights. This is a 180-degree turnaround from the first Abe Cabinet's strategy, the "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity", which was based on value diplomacy.

The original gambit of the FOIP was to highlight the problems of BRI, such as debt trapping by explaining the high-quality infrastructure development, which is Japan's forte. Regardless of the official account, it was clear that the real aim was to oppose China.

This has been changing gradually. In June 2017, Prime Minister Abe expressed a positive evolution of the BRI for the first time in a speech, saying that it is "a concept with the potential to link the East, the West and the diverse regions in between", while attaching four conditions to the project: openness, transparency, economic efficiency and the financial soundness of the host country. When Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga was asked to explain at a press conference the following day, he stressed "it is important that efforts under this initiative be promoted as high-quality ones that meet international standards," and said "it is important for Japan and China to contribute together to international issues and regional prosperity, and we intend to cooperate where we can with this perspective."

During his visit to China in October 2018, Prime Minister Abe went a step further and announced that he would embark on joint infrastructure development projects in other countries with China, provided they are in line with such 'international standards'.

The People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of

China, reported that President Xi Jinping said the following at the Japan-China summit meeting with Prime Minister Abe:

“The joint construction of BRI has provided an experimental new platform for China and Japan to strengthen their mutually beneficial cooperation. China welcomes Japan’s more active participation in China’s development process in the new area and the realization of higher-level mutual benefit and win-win cooperation between two countries.”

It was reported that Japan would participate in the joint infrastructure development project in a third country that came to an agreement with China. *The People’s Daily* went on to report that Prime Minister Abe agreed, saying “BRI is an initiative with great potential, and Japan wants to strengthen its cooperation with China in a wide range of areas, including the joint development of markets in third countries”. Incidentally, none of these statements were included in the official record of the meeting released by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Japanese government’s idea is that by participating in the joint project, they will impose international standards on the Chinese side including the four conditions mentioned above, and resolve problems such as debt trapping. It is an approach of ‘leading reforms from within’ that seeks to get close to China in order to change its behaviour.

On the other hand, the US has taken an ‘outside pressure’ approach, offering alternatives to regional countries through FOIP in order to eliminate the BRI which it perceives as a threat. This is an approach that can only be taken by the US, which has abandoned ‘engagement’ with China as a failure, and is changing its approach to a hostile one of ‘balance’ and even ‘decoupling’. There are fundamental differences in perceptions between Japan and the rest of the world.

Japan’s approach retaining an element of ‘engagement’ is, to some extent, in line with China’s current policy towards Japan that aims to improve relations. However, China’s ‘strategic revisions’ as described above have not been raised to the level of strategic revisions such as a return to the “tao guang yang hui” policy described as “keeping a low profile and biding one’s time”. There is no such prospect either.

Furthermore, some countries in the region have criticized Japan’s

‘engagement’ approach as a softening and compromise of its stance toward China. In particular, Japan’s efforts to expose the problems of BRI, which it has been promoting since 2016 through FOIP, have permeated to some extent among the countries of the region, and there is even a trend of reconsidering participation to projects. Given that, intense criticism is being voiced by some of the policy experts in the region, asking why Japan is betraying the project. Although Japanese officials refute it as a ‘misunderstanding’, this case once again highlights the difficulty of devising a policy toward China that gathers uniform support in the region.

The disturbance of relation between countries in the region caused by this policy toward China is also reflected in Europe. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Europe in March 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron said that “the days when Europe was naïve about China are over” and took a tough stance on China’s continued economic expansion benefiting asymmetrical interests. In response, Italy, another EU and G7 member state, signed a memorandum of understanding, pledging to cooperate in the BRI. The port of Trieste facing the Adriatic Sea has become China’s gateway from the Mediterranean to Europe. A total of 2.5 billion Euros in economic support will be provided for its development.

The Impact of the Changes in the Behaviour of Major Powers on Regional Order

China’s geo-economic approach, using its own economic power and the dependence of its partners, is bringing in some good results throughout the world. Political measures and methods that add geo-economics to geopolitics have come to play a major role in creating regional order in the Indo-Pacific region. Not only do they shape the tone of competition among major powers, but they also have a significant impact on the regional engagement of smaller countries.

The new contradictions among the countries of the region that have emerged as a result of China’s geopolitical and geo-economic approach, represented by the BRI, highlight the differences in the regional order that each country is aiming for. Japan is still in a position to support and maintain the unipolar order in which the U.S. takes the lead. This U.S.-dominated order

is being challenged by the rising power of China. On the other hand, China has long been aiming to build a multipolar order, and with the expansion of its own national power and influence, the possibility of realizing this goal is gradually increasing. India, which is defined by the U.S. as a “major defence partner of the United States”, similarly views a multipolar order to be desirable for its interests.

The Trump administration, with its ‘America First’ policy, has shown no signs of giving up on its position as a regional leader. In the 2017 NSS, the following was stated about the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges developed by China:

“States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.”

On the other hand, William Burns, who served as Deputy Secretary of State in the Democratic Obama Administration, wrote the following in his recently published memoir:

“Asia continues to loom as our first priority, with China’s rise the most consequential geopolitical trend of our time. President Trump’s unpredictability and detachment have opened the playing field for China, offering an unexpectedly early path to dominance in Asia . . . The unease among other players across Asia about Chinese hegemony creates a natural opportunity for Washington to knit together relationships with traditional allies like Japan and emerging partners like India.”

While acknowledging that the possibility of China’s domination of Asia is beginning to appear sooner than expected, the U.S. will not concede its leadership position in the Indo-Pacific, typical of the mindset of the U.S. diplomatic elite, both the Republicans and the Democrats. The intensity of the struggle for regional order will inevitably increase in the future.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific region has been shaken by China’s growing influence and uncertainty over the commitments of the U.S.. The small and medium-sized countries in the regions are getting involved in the tug-of-war between FOIP, promoted by Japan and the U.S., and China’s BRI. This is a complex situation

that cannot be explained by a simple bipolar composition. However, in the big picture what confronts each country is the historical and fundamental question of whether the unilateral dominance of the United States, that has continued since the end of Cold War can be sustained, and if it collapses, who will create the “post-primacy alternative” and what form it will take. An analysis of the geopolitical and geo-economic changes taking place in the Indo-Pacific could be one of the most powerful tools to determine the answer.

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日本における中国のソフトパワーとその限界—韓国のソフトパワーとの比較から—*

China's Soft-Power in Japan and its Limits - A Comparison with South Korea's**

Satoko Yasuno, Yasuko Enomoto

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of soft power has come into prominence in the context of international relations as a device of forcefulness. The term refers to the power of a country that gains an upper hand over other countries through its attractiveness and cogency, which is distinguished from hard power obtained from military or financial superiority. American political scientist Joseph Nye suggests that soft power has three fundamental sources: the culture of the country (if it is attractive to other countries); the sense of political values (if it complies with those values both at home and abroad); and its foreign policy (if it is appreciated, and considered legitimate and ethically correct by the others) (Nye, 2011). It should be noted, however, that such conditions are only potential sources and cultural attractiveness, for example, does not necessarily ensure soft power. The extent a source effectively grants power depends on specific circumstances (Nye, 2004). Besides, it is argued that soft power alone is not sufficient for international

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** Summarized and translated by Elif Alkan.

domination and influence, since a strategy of smart power (the combination of soft and hard powers) is required for ultimate success in practice.

Although soft power is subject to its own limitations, the authorities of foreign affairs in many countries have come to acknowledge the benefits of soft power as a part of well-set foreign policy in the long term. As for the East Asian political sphere, as particularly elaborated on in this paper; Japan, China, and South Korea certainly have abundant cultural and political resources to influence their neighboring countries, each having its past connections and currently getting in touch with other nations in every way possible. South Korea has one of the most outstanding and geographically extensive practices to exert soft power; while China has also recognized the policy of enhancing soft power as a national task since the Hu Jintao era, therefore making its public policies by considering the expected diplomatic outcomes.

China's soft power strategy is characterized by five means as follows: (1) the communist and socialist values as a source of soft power, (2) paying attention to enhancing moral values and improving the moral consciousness of society as a whole, (3) putting emphasis on Chinese culture and tradition, (4) motivation to expand into overseas culturally, and (5) the involvement of the ruling party and the government at the center of cultural activities in pursuit of stronger soft power (Kamata, 2010). An example of China's promotional channels in the name of soft power is the establishment of Confucian institutes, where Chinese language and culture are taught around the world. In Southern Asia and the Middle East, in such countries as Indonesia and the Philippines, China has a strongly positive image among people (Gill & Huang, 2006). However, China's efforts for the sake of attractiveness and international influence have not always been welcomed and celebrated abroad; due to the fact that Chinese organizations in foreign countries may also pose a threat as propaganda organs of the Chinese Communist Party, according to most of the host countries, primarily the U.S.. In fact, more often than not, the soft power strategy performed by the Communist Party in China is practically unsuccessful in today's world. The reason behind the backfire of China's soft power strategy might be explained by Nye's argument that soft power must be based on international credibility and thus should not spread any political propaganda by the government. Accordingly, the image of a

communist dictatorship limits China's soft power (Huang, 2013).

Although China has a great deal of potential soft power thanks to its long history and rich cultural background, along with deep-seated hard power provided by its huge population, economy, and military forces; China's global influence will not be as intended unless soft power is acquired effectively. Indeed, the negative impressions are observable even in the nearest Asian societies, such as Japanese society, to be discussed extensively. In a symposium in China, in 2015, Yasuko Enomoto presented the results of a survey conducted in two departments of the Faculty of Letters at Chuo University (namely the Department of Chinese Language & Culture, and the Department of Social Informatics). The survey investigated the image of China among Japanese university students, though the sample group of respondents was limited to the given university only. It was discovered that the students were familiar with such Chinese historical figures as Confucius, Mao Zedong, Li Bai, Lu Xun, and so on, but they knew very little about Chinese celebrities of the modern-day. Enomoto, therefore, introduces his first inference from the study, that the information about China is controlled by Japanese media and is biased due to political, diplomatic, and economical concerns. Another survey reveals that Japanese students tend to rather recognize Korean stars when they are asked about foreign celebrities, which implies that Korea has success in terms of appearance in Japanese media, unlike China. In this respect, China and Korea's soft power are worth examining comparatively.

This paper provides an overview of the Japanese impressions of China, compared to the impressions of South Korea, further analyzed by Tomoko Yasuno and Yasuko Enomoto through an extensive survey. The study seeks for answers to such primary questions as "What do Japanese people know about China and Korea today?" and "How does their knowledge affect Japanese impressions of China and Korea?"; while asserting a number of hypotheses and testing them according to the calculated figures acquired from the results of the survey. At this point, it must be underlined that the feelings of a foreign society toward a given country (the Japanese feelings toward China in this paper) measure the soft power of the country in question. On the other hand, the respondents' knowledge about and interest in China may or may not exert an influence on their impressions, which is to be analyzed through the

survey results. The survey conducted by Yasuno and Enomoto is a web-based one, with respondents of all ages.

The Korean and Chinese Images among Japanese People

When Chinese influence on Japanese society is investigated, it is crucial that Japanese history can not be embraced without taking Chinese connections into consideration. In fact, the culture of Ancient China and Chinese classics have always traveled into Japan and they fascinated the Japanese community. According to historical records, the books of the Three Kingdoms period (189-280) were commonly read during the early Edo period (1603-1868) (上田, 2006), and up until this day, Japanese youth society has been familiar with the history of Three Kingdoms through novels, mangas, films and video games (葉口, 2016). Furthermore, the Chinese scriptures including *Four Books and Five Classics* used to be an essential part of the Japanese education system, at least until the pre-war period. Japanese classics are indeed deeply connected with Chinese classics, and those Chinese classics have had a major influence on Japanese linguistics and literature; hence, Chinese literature and poetry are still taught in Japanese high schools.

While there is a great deal of interest in ancient China, Japanese people's impressions of modern China are currently independent of the historical bounds. Japan's Cabinet Office annually conducts its "Public Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs" which demonstrates the impression of China and Korea throughout the year (see Figure 1). In 2018, a combined 76.4% of respondents answered that they feel "very unfriendly" (38.6%) or "unfriendly" (37.8%) towards China. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the impressions of China from 2001 to 2018, implying that the Chinese image in Japan has deteriorated since around 2003. Within those 18 years, there have been a number of events that have triggered negative feelings towards China. In 2005, for example, anti-Japanese demonstrations created tension; and in 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japan Coast Guard's patrol boat in the Senkaku Islands. A video of the latter incident was leaked on YouTube at the time, leading the conflict over Senkaku Islands to boil up. The impacts of such events are apparently reflected in the results of the public opinion polls. Moreover, Cabinet Office's polls are not the only resources suggesting the poor




Figure 1: Survey - “Do you feel friendly to China?”

impression of China in Japan. Another survey by a non-profit organization demonstrates that the number of respondents with a negative impression of China has never fallen below 80%.

However, the latest polls indicate that the Japan-China relations have significantly improved since the Senkaku Islands conflict, as almost 60% of the respondents answered in 2018 that the relations between the two countries were “good” or “very good”. In 2019 and the following years, the outbreak of COVID-19 might have caused a new shift in opinions about China. Pandemic conditions are, however, not included in this paper. It can be therefore concluded that until recently, relationships between Japan and China calmed down, albeit weakening.

South Korea, on the other hand, as discussed earlier, is one of the countries with a ‘successful’ soft power strategy. In particular, TV broadcasting and other content industries have significantly supported the national policy and generated substantial profits mainly in the Asian region, and gradually expanded to the rest of the world (高橋, 2014). In 1991, commercial broadcasting was reorganized in Korea, and in 1993, Kim Young-sam (the president of the time) fostered value-added cultural industries. The following year, the Department of Cultural Industries was established (沈, 2006). In the background of such movements, there were not only expectations of

the economic benefits that visual content industries would create but also a pursuit of inclusion in the international media competition where South Korea would be able to promote its own culture and enhance its global image. From around 2000, the export of visual content to foreign countries literally began. The demand for *Hallyu* content grew in Southern Asia, China, and Japan while the broadcasters of other Asian countries were suffering from a shortage of content for multi-channel broadcasting (沈, 2011).

The 'Hallyu' craze, which refers to the rising interest in Korean dramas and pop music throughout the world as figuratively depicted as a kind of (cultural) breeze, has also spread in Japan in the early 2000s. A number of dramas and K-pop celebrities have earned a considerable reputation. Apart from the increasing number of fan groups and a huge population of Korean-content consumers, the arrival of Hallyu in Japan has also drummed up interest in the Korean language, culture, and society. Based on a survey in 2006, it was reported that those who had been watching Korean dramas had a more favorable image of Korean people (斉藤 et al., 2010). The overview covered so far suggests that Hallyu effectively functioned as a means of soft power, at least in the early 2000s. If so, do Japanese people hold positive opinions about Korea, providing that Hallyu has achieved success? Further research reveals that it does not necessarily relate. In 2012, the relations between South Korea and Japan deteriorated when the South Korean president of the time, Lee Myung-bak, visited Takeshima, which negatively affected the impressions of Korea. In Figure 2, how friendly the Japanese respondents felt towards Korea in time has been illustrated. The number of respondents who answered "I feel very friendly" (and "I feel friendly") increased during the first Hallyu wave around 2003-2004 and the second around 2010; then sharply decreased in 2012. Since then, relations between Japan and South Korea have continued to deteriorate even after the government changed, particularly because of the *comfort women* dispute and former conscription issues. In the 7th Japan-Korea Joint Public Opinion Survey (May 2019) by non-profit organizations, only 20% of respondents answered that they had a "good"/"very good" impression of Korea, while 49.9% answered oppositely. The tension sustained, as in August 2019, South Korea announced the cancellation of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Such a pattern of conflicts is likely to lead to poor sentiments towards Korea among Japanese society.




Figure 2: Survey - “Do you feel friendly to South Korea?”

So far, we have surprisingly discovered that neither history and cultural heritage of China nor the well-known pop stars and dramas of Korea suffices for their soft power on Japan. This legitimizes Nye’s suggestion that whether something considered as soft power is indeed a power depends on the circumstances. Both countries are in conflict with Japan, including territorial and historical disputes. What’s more, anti-Japanese movements in China and Korea are often reported. Just like the concept of *reciprocal liking* in psychology, i.e. the tendency that if someone is liked by someone, they will like back; the course of international relations are highly affected by reciprocities too. In a situation where public opinions towards each other are mutually deteriorating, soft power will be limited.

Yasuno and Enomoto introduce two hypotheses deduced from the given overview of China’s and South Korea’s relations with Japan. According to the researchers, the interest in and knowledge of ancient Chinese culture does not necessarily correlated with a favorable perception of modern China; while the interest in and and knowledge of Korean pop culture might make way for a favorable perception of Korea (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, because the disputes and anti-Japanese movements are circulated through news, and political knowledge enables one to be more conscious of the disputes; exposure to news, media and political knowledge would have a negative effect on favorable perceptions of the other country (Hypothesis 2).

As noted above, Yasuno and Enomoto have worked on a web-based survey to test their hypotheses and the influential variables that lead to positive or negative public opinions. The study explores what respondents know about China and Korea, and how they think about them accordingly. The final number of valid responses was 1091, the composition of which is reported in Table 1 below:

	～19歳	20～24歳	25～29歳	30～34歳	35～39歳	40～44歳	45～49歳	50～54歳	55～59歳	60～64歳	65～69歳	70歳～	計
男性 人数	2	10	21	25	41	57	87	95	96	80	69	68	651
	0.2%	0.9%	1.9%	2.3%	3.8%	5.2%	8.0%	8.7%	8.8%	7.3%	6.3%	6.2%	59.7%
女性 人数	5	17	33	45	64	63	65	34	45	31	22	16	440
	0.5%	1.6%	3.0%	4.1%	5.9%	5.8%	6.0%	3.1%	4.1%	2.8%	2.0%	1.5%	40.3%
人数	7	27	54	70	105	120	152	129	141	111	91	84	1091
	0.6%	2.5%	4.9%	6.4%	9.6%	11.0%	13.9%	11.8%	12.9%	10.2%	8.3%	7.7%	100.0%

Table 1: The Composition of the Respondents

Just as the survey of Chuo University can not be expected to reflect the general opinion of all Japanese students, as the respondents are limited to the students at Chuo University, the respondents to the survey of Yasuno and Enomoto were not a representative sample. Hence, it is not possible to infer the distribution of opinions among Japanese people as a whole from the results obtained in this study. Rather, it illustrates the relationship between the variables (political knowledge, media exposure, cultural/historical interest, etc.) and the impression.

The basic categories of questions addressed in the survey are as follows:

- 1- Impressions of 16 foreign countries (also including impressions of Japan in the perspective of those countries)
- 2- Experience of traveling abroad, acquaintance with foreigners
- 3- Exposure to foreign and Western culture (frequency of traveling to the West, frequency of reading Western novels, watching Western movies and TV series, exposure to English, frequency of listening to Western music)
- 4- Exposure to Chinese culture (visiting China, learning Chinese, business trips to China, watching Chinese movies and TV series, reading Chinese literature)
- 5- Interest in China and knowledge of Chinese people, Chinese companies,

and Chinese society

- 6- Exposure to Korean culture (visiting Korea, learning Korean, business trips to Korea, watching Korean movies and TV series, reading Korean literature
- 7- Interest in Korea, and knowledge of Korean society and celebrities
- 8- Media exposure (TV, newspapers, internet, use of social media, etc.)
- 9- Sociodemographic characteristics (age, gender, education, income)

Along with China and Korea, the 14 countries are selected among the territories with the highest number of Japanese visitors according to the Japanese Overseas Travel Statistics (JTB Research Institute, 2019), and the countries with the highest number of registered population in Japan. Thus, the position of China and Japan in terms of soft power effectiveness in Japan can be inferred from a global perspective in results. The respondents' impressions of China, Korea, USA, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Russia, Germany, UK, France, Australia, Brazil, India, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore were asked, and the impressions of China and Korea (together with Russia) received extremely negative results (see Figure 3). Of the 1091 respondents, only 7 (0.6%) had a 'good' impression of China, while 44 (4%) had a 'moderate' impression, 268 (24.6%) had a 'neutral' impression, 397 (36.4%) had 'rather negative' impression and 375 (34.4%) had a 'poor' impression. As for Korea, 11 respondents (1.0%) had a 'good' impression, 38 (3.5%) had a 'moderate' impression, 204 (18.7%) had a 'neutral' impression, 276 (25.3%) had a 'rather negative' impression and 562 (51.5%) had a 'poor' impression. In addition, Tables 2 and 3 show the Japanese impressions of China and Korea by the age of the respondents. Chi-square tests demonstrated that the bias by age was important for impressions of the two countries.

The poor image of China might be affected by the demonstrations in Hong Kong, widely reported at the time of the survey (Hong Kong was asked separately for this very reason). Considering that a total of 40% had a positive impression of Hong Kong, with 7.8% having a 'good' impression and 31.0% having a 'moderate' impression, the reflection of the issue in the media as 'Hong Kong seeking democracy and autocratic China trying to suppress it' may have had an influence. On the other hand, the poor image of Korea may reflect the fact that the relationship between Japan and Korea at the time of

China's Soft-Power in Japan and its Limits - A Comparison with South Korea's




Figure 3: Impressions of the Countries among Japanese people (N=1091)

		Good impression	Moderate impression	Neutral impression	Rather negative impression	Poor impression	Total
Under 20s	N	2	5	33	30	18	88
		2.30%	5.70%	37.50%	34.10%	20.50%	100.00%
30s	N	0	6	43	68	58	175
		0.00%	3.40%	24.60%	38.90%	33.10%	100.00%
40s	N	3	10	61	96	102	272
		1.10%	3.70%	22.40%	35.30%	37.50%	100.00%
50s	N	2	5	61	109	93	270
		0.70%	1.90%	22.60%	40.40%	34.40%	100.00%
Over 60s	N	0	18	70	94	104	286
		0.00%	6.30%	24.50%	32.90%	36.40%	100.00%
	N	7	44	268	397	375	1091
		0.60%	4.00%	24.60%	36.40%	34.40%	100.00%

Table 2: Cross Table of the Japanese Respondents' Impressions of China and Their Age

		Good impression	Moderate impression	Neutral impression	Rather negative impression	Poor impression	Total
Under 20s	N	1	7	30	31	19	88
		1.10%	8.00%	34.10%	35.20%	21.60%	100.00%
30s	N	2	10	38	49	76	175
		1.10%	5.70%	21.70%	28.00%	43.40%	100.00%
40s	N	2	10	50	57	153	272
		0.70%	3.70%	18.40%	21.00%	56.30%	100.00%
50s	N	4	3	49	64	150	270
		1.50%	1.10%	18.10%	23.70%	55.60%	100.00%
Over 60s	N	2	8	37	75	164	286
		0.70%	2.80%	12.90%	26.20%	57.30%	100.00%
	N	11	38	204	276	562	1091
		1.00%	3.50%	18.70%	25.30%	51.50%	100.00%

Table 3: Cross Table of the Japanese Respondents' Impressions of Korea and their Age

the survey was at what could be described as its ‘worst’. It is unclear whether this was due to the timing of the survey, the method of the web-based survey, or the structure of the questionnaire, which asked respondents to compare more than one country/region, but results are open to a variety of further interpretations.

On the other hand, the majority of the respondents who have antagonistic approaches towards the two countries answered that the people of China and Korea has also unfavorable feelings for Japan. 72.5% for Korea and 57.9% for China believe that many people of those countries seem to have antipathy towards Japan, complying with the widespread perception that China and Korea are, in a sense, ‘Japan-haters’. Again, the theory of reciprocal liking might be substantiated in the results, indicating that the dislike towards Korea and China might also be because the majority of Japanese respondents assume that they are disliked as well.

Regarding the questions about the exposure to Chinese and Korean culture, whose answers would determine whether knowledge and interest are influential in the impressions, the answers are as follows (the results about Western cultures are excluded in this paper, as only China and Korea are analyzed elaborately): 13.5% of the respondents have traveled to China, while 24.8% have not but would like to, indicating that there is indeed an interest in tourism. As for learning Chinese, 8.8% of the respondents have tried learning it and 16.2% have not but would like to try, which means that about a quarter of the respondents have already learned Chinese to a degree or are interested in learning it. It must be highlighted here that the interest in Chinese is relatively high, even when compared to the interest in English. About Chinese dramas

	Tourist attractions in China		Learning Chinese		Business trips to China		Chinese films and TV series		Reading Chinese literature (including translation)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I have experienced this	147	13.5	96	8.8	61	5.6	133	12.2	88	8.1
I haven't experienced, but would like to	271	24.8	177	16.2	94	8.6	136	12.5	162	14.8
I don't think I would like to experience	673	61.7	818	75.0	936	85.8	822	75.3	841	77.1

Table 4: Exposure to Chinese Culture

and literature, the combined total of “have seen/read” and “would like to see/read” reached 20% each. (see Table 4). Deductions from the data provided are already clear, yet they will be underlined again in the conclusion.

On the other hand, in the results regarding exposure to Korean culture (Table 8), 22.7% of the respondents had traveled to Korea before, 17.4% had “never been in Korea but would like to, 6.2% had learned the Korean language and 13.4% would like to learn. A total of 21.1% have seen a Korean movie or drama, and 8% have never seen but would like to see one, which altogether accounted for about 30% of the total, indicating the penetration of Hallyu content.

	Tourist attractions in Korea		Learning Korean		Business trips to Korea		Korean films and TV series		Reading Korean literature (including translation)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
I have experienced this	248	22.7	68	6.2	43	3.9	230	21.1	27	2.5
I haven't experienced, but would like to	190	17.4	146	13.4	77	7.1	87	8.0	122	11.2
I don't think I would like to experience	653	59.9	877	80.4	971	89.0	774	70.9	942	86.3

Table 5: Exposure to Korean Culture

Figure 4 below provides another set of crucial data, which identify the potential areas of soft power in Japan for China and Korea. The respondents were asked to choose among the options which they were interested in most about Korea and China respectively. Regarding China, food culture (26.6%), tourist attractions (23.6%), history (23.3%), and nature (16.5%) were selected most frequently, while pertaining to Korea, TV dramas (12.0%) were most frequently opted for, followed by food culture (25.3%) and tourist attractions (12.7%).




Figure 4: Interest in China and Korea

No matter how intimate they feel with China and Korea, the respondents were in fact interested in the countries. But were they knowledgeable about them? The names of 19 famous Chinese people, including historical or contemporary figures, were listed, and the participants were asked to select the names of those they had heard of. Not surprisingly, the respondents were most familiar with the generals of the Three Kingdoms. As noted earlier, it has always been well-studied in Japan and even included in video games. The finding that the Japanese know a lot about Chinese historical figures, but less about contemporary figures, is consistent with Enomoto's (2015) report based on a survey of students at Chuo University.

Subsequently, a variety of different questions were asked to evaluate the respondents' knowledge in the various topic, including Chinese companies, Chinese politicians ("Do you know who the current president of China is?"), and Chinese society/traditions ("Do you know which of the following is the Chinese spring festival?"). In each category, the majority of the respondents answered correctly. As we have discussed the influence of political knowledge on the impression, it is crucial to see that 72.1% of respondents correctly answered that the current president of China is Xi Jinping.

To measure the knowledge about South Korea, the familiarity with Korean celebrities was initially examined and the data were categorized by the age of the respondents. According to the results, there are many celebrities who are well known to people of all ages, while 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation Hallyu artists are popular among the different age groups, yet almost every artist (or group) was recognized by more than the half of the respondents, which demonstrates their popularity, and the success of Hallyu penetration once again.

As for the Korean president, 74% of the respondents correctly answered that Moon Jae-in is the current president of Korea. Another question included in the survey is as follows:

"Please choose all of the following statements about Korea that you think are true." (1-5 are randomized).

- 1- There is no time difference between Korea and Japan (32.1%)
- 2- South Korea is still at war with North Korea (42.2%)
- 3- No woman has held the office of president so far (4.9%)
- 4- In South Korea today, it is difficult for young people to find jobs (49.9%)

5- The place where Japan and Korea have a territorial dispute is Takeshima (77.5%)

6- None of the above (7.6%)

The correct answers are 1, 2, 4, and 5.

Another idea to be tested was whether, in the current situation of growing conflicts between China, Japan, and Korea, the sense of belonging to Japan within the respondent may influence feelings towards China and Korea. Yasuno and Enomoto, therefore, included the question "How proud are you of being Japanese?". The results are as shown below:

I am... strongly proud to be Japanese" (27.9%), "fairly proud" (45.0%), "not sure" (20.0%), "not very proud" (4.9%), "not proud at all" (2.3%).

When all answers are handled together and the overall analysis is concluded, it is demonstrated that men and younger age groups are more likely to have a favorable approach. And the higher the respondent's income is, the more negative they are towards China. It is not easy to interpret the influence of sociodemographic characteristics, and therefore further investigation is required. In terms of information and media exposure, the higher the frequency of using the internet and social media on smartphones, the less the sympathy towards the two countries is. It is possible that this is a result of the influence of xenophobic content on the internet. In addition, the more strongly one is proud of being Japanese, the less likely they are to like China, which could be interpreted as a reflection of current Sino-Japanese relations, or an indication of nationalism.

What is interesting is that most of the respondents who are familiar with the ancient Chinese figures have less sympathy for the Chinese. It is difficult to interpret this result, but it may mean that those who are more interested in ancient China consider modern China (under the Communist regime) as something different from 'historical China'. Remember that Hypothesis 1 predicted that 'interest in ancient China does not lead to a sympathy for modern China'. The interpretation indicating that 'interest in ancient China leads to antipathy towards modern China' is highly plausible.

In addition, interest in the Chinese language, Chinese food culture, and Chinese nature had a significant positive effect on impressions of China. There was also a weak effect of interest in Chinese animation. On the other hand, knowledge of politics and culture was not significantly related to the

feelings towards China. It should be noted, however, that given that the overall opinions of the respondents about China were negative, the variable that showed a positive effect here may not necessarily increase their favorable feeling towards China, but may only have the meaning of weakening negative feelings.

A similar evaluation can be drawn about Korea: The younger the age, the weaker the negative sentiment towards Korea, and the higher the annual income, the more negative the impressions. Also, as in the case of China, the more the respondents are proud of being Japanese, the more negative they are towards Korea. Again, media exposure has a negative effect on Korean impressions. This may be due to poor relations between Japan and Korea at the time of the survey, which was frequently reported in the news. Knowledge of the Korean president and Korean society also showed negative effects, suggesting that the more they know, the less they like. On the other hand, interest in the Korean language, Korean food culture, Korean tourist attractions, and nature, weakened the negative feelings towards Korea. Interest in Korean idols was also found to have a weak effect. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1, suggesting that popular content associated with contemporary Korea may have an effect on national attractiveness (but still falls short for providing an overall positive impression and fulfilling the soft power strategy).

Conclusion

In this study, the following hypotheses were tested by means of the web survey: "Interest in and knowledge of ancient Chinese culture are not correlated with favorable attitudes toward modern China (Hypothesis 1-1)," "Interest in and knowledge of Korean pop culture are correlated with favorable attitudes toward Korea (Hypothesis 1-2)," and "Political knowledge provided in the news has a negative effect on favorable attitudes toward China and Korea (Hypothesis 2). The results of the analysis support Hypothesis 1-1 and Hypothesis 1-2. However, knowledge of ancient Chinese culture had a rather negative effect on the impressions of modern China, and the effect of knowledge of Korean pop culture was only significant when the perception of anti-Japanese opinions in Korea was disregarded.

Knowledge of Chinese society and politics were not associated with Japanese feelings toward China, while knowledge of Korean society and politics had a negative effect on feelings toward Korea. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported only for feelings towards Korea. In addition, according to an inference common to both countries, interest in language, food culture, and nature had a positive effect on favorable impressions of the countries, while being proud of being Japanese had a negative effect on favorable impressions of both countries. The perception of China and Korea's public opinion of Japan was also very influential.

The results Yasuno and Enomoto have attained suggest that the effectiveness of soft power (national attraction) is limited in situations where relations with the given country have deteriorated to an extreme degree. Although this study is exploratory, and there is much room for further improvement and reexamination of the survey objections and findings, it provides interesting findings for the studies of soft power diplomacy.

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英国のインド太平洋関与の安定性 —コンセンサス政治と対外政策の観点から—*

The Stability of the UK's Involvement in the Indo-Pacific from the Perspective of Consensus Politics and Foreign Policy**

Ryosuke Tanaka

Introduction

The U.K.'s involvement in the Indo-Pacific has been prominently attracting attention in recent years, which was substantiated by the arrival of a U.K.-U.S. joint carrier strike group to Japan. The U.K. has a background of a growing presence in the Indo-Pacific, despite being geographically distant from the region. This paper aims to provide a brief explanation of the U.K.'s involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

After leaving the E.U., the U.K. intends to implement the “Global Britain” initiative to preserve its international influence. Even though the ‘tilt’ of the UK towards the Indo-Pacific could be observed before the Brexit, it is undeniable that the trend has become more noticeable after leaving the E.U.. Secondly, the tension between the U.S. and China and the shift in Europe’s stance regarding China have also influenced the U.K.’s strategy. European countries previously maintained decent economic relations with China, but now there are reassessments as China becomes more and more

* This is an abbreviated translation of the following article: 田中 亮佑（2021年）。「英国のインド太平洋関与の安定性 —コンセンサス政治と対外政策の観点から」、日本国際フォーラム (JFIR) 公式サイトコメンタリー（2021年9月24日）。The original text can be accessed at the following link: <https://www.jfir.or.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/210927tr.pdf>

** Summarized and translated by Taha Arda Gün.

assertive. Furthermore, while the Biden administration takes a tough stance on China and aims to restore relations between the U.S. and Europe that had deteriorated under the Trump administration, the atmosphere becomes more advantageous for European countries, including the U.K., to develop their Indo-Pacific policies.

On the other hand, the Indo-Pacific region barely involves 'East of Suez', where the UK withdrew during the Cold War. Therefore, the UK's involvement in the Indo-Pacific is not secured by a relatively large population, territory, or exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the region, as is the case with France. Unlike France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the E.U., the U.K. has not formulated strategic and policy documents specific to the Indo-Pacific yet, amid concerns about the lack of assets to accomplish persistent progression. That is to say, while the U.K.'s involvement in the Indo-Pacific has been welcomed, its stability remains debatable.

So far, most evaluations on this matter have been mainly centered on strategic perspectives, such as dispatching military vehicles and restraining China. On the other hand, the method of achieving stability in the Indo-Pacific region is not confined to strategic approaches. Also, it involves domestic politics, which can similarly impact foreign policy. This paper analyzes the stability of the U.K.'s Indo-Pacific policy from the perspective of the U.K.'s consensus politics. First, I explain consensus politics in the U.K. and its application to foreign policy. Then, I discuss the collapse of domestic consensus, due to Brexit, in the 2010s and the political measures against China. Third, based on the current claims of the Conservative and Labor parties, I suggest that a consensus may be developing toward the Indo-Pacific, at least at the leadership level of both parties. Fourth, I provide a brief overview of the Indo-Pacific policies of France, Germany, and the EU and discuss the relevance of these policies to the U.K.. Lastly, I provide implications and prospects.

The U.K. and 'East of Suez' from the Perspective of Consensus Politics

Consensus politics in the U.K. generally refer to the commonality and continuity of the policies implemented by succeeding administrations. Consensus politics in postwar Britain can be divided into "post-war

consensus" and "neoliberal consensus". The former originated from the war cabinet that managed labor maintenance during World War II. Both parties integrated commonality and mutual understanding into their policies during the post-war period, especially in economics and social welfare. Nonetheless, post-war consensus collapsed due to both parties' inability to take practical actions to prevent the stagnation of the British economy. The latter phase is called the 'neoliberal consensus'. Assuming the presidency in 1979, Thatcher aimed to build a strong nation centered on neoliberalism; however, it was the Blair administration of the Labor Party that included neo-liberal elements in its policies as "The Third Way". Therefore, the neoliberal consensus was established after the premiership of Thatcher.

There is also a view that this framework of consensus politics can also be applied to foreign policy. For example, some portion of the Conservative Party opposed the withdrawal from 'East of Suez'. Yet, eventually, both political parties reached an agreement on the 'post-war consensus', and the withdrawal from the area was settled in 1968. Can we find a consensus on the U.K.'s movement toward East of Suez in the neoliberal consensus period then? Initially, the Thatcher government emphasized the necessity to protect the interests of the U.K. in a wide range of areas, even outside NATO. In fact, at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, a fleet of Armilla patrols was deployed in the Persian Gulf countries. The Thatcher administration also sought to abandon a reduction in the deployment of British troops outside Europe due to the Falklands War. Furthermore, following the Cold War, the U.K. participated in the Gulf War. The policies and discourses of the time show the U.K. intended to have a further presence in the Gulf region and possible involvement in the Asia-Pacific, following the return of Hong Kong to China.

During Labor Party management under Blair, a policy document called "Strategic Defense Review" was published. This plan aimed to enhance the capacity of the British army to deploy far away, and accompanied with the repetitive statements about the importance of the Persian Gulf region, Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), and cooperation with Southeast Asia. After the Blair administration accomplished the overthrow of the Hussein regime in the 2003 Iraq War, the Labor Party administration under Brown began to pursue an expansion into the Persian Gulf region seeking a military supply to Afghanistan. As far as the policy of expanding outside Europe is

considered, which was a part of the Thatcher administration, it can be asserted that there was stability during the neoliberal consensus period.

Brexit and China-U.K. Relations: The Collapse of Consensus

Cameron became the leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, and he believed that because of the policy changes under the Blair administration, the conservative party, which remained in the right-wing, must return to centrism so that they could resume power. Therefore, Cameron made a public commitment to 'liberal conservatism', which centered on maintaining government spending. However, after they regained political control in 2010, the Cameron administration imposed exhaustive budgetary austerities to manage the financial crisis of 2008. Miliband from the Labor Party, though he was defeated in the general election, was elected as the leader under massive support from the labor union. Even though Miliband demanded equality-oriented policies and was opposed to financial austerities, he lost the 2015 general election, as the support from the party members was inadequate. Corbyn, Miliband's successor, became prominent as a party leader owing to the change in the party election process. He demanded anti-austerity and social welfare policies more forcefully than Miliband and challenged the Conservative Party.

The collapse of consensus was spurred by European integration. British Eurosceptics increasingly condemned the E.U.'s response to the 2008 financial crisis, which led Cameron to declare that he would hold a referendum on Brexit after the 2015 elections due to the growing number of Eurosceptics within the Conservative Party and among its supporters. In 2014, William Hague resigned as foreign secretary from the Cabinet, and Hammond and other Eurosceptics began to serve as foreign secretaries. Eventually, the Conservative Party won the majority in the 2015 general election, which initiated the 2016 referendum.

As the supporters of Miliband and Corbyn were populist Eurosceptics of the Blue Laborers, the Labor Party could not possibly emphasize strengthening relations with the E.U.. Before the national referendum, Corbyn insisted that he supported staying in the E.U. while, in fact, he wanted the U.K. to leave. He barely explained why the U.K. should not leave the E.U. to the Labor

Party supporters during the referendum process. Therefore, the consensus between the Conservative and Labor parties on economic policies and the relationships with the E.U. had collapsed.

The collapse of consensus was also reflected in U.K.-China relations crucial in Indo-Pacific involvement. The austerity measures of the Cameron administration were inextricably linked to the increased acceptance of foreign direct investment (FDI), and they involved a large amount of FDI from China. While human rights issues in China had become a matter of debate in the Cabinet by 'liberal conservatism' supporters, the disappearance of these liberal conservatives from the Cabinet in the 2014 cabinet reshuffle and the 2015 general election allowed a 'Golden Age' of relations between the U.K. and China. In contrast to this environment, the Labor Party was cautionary towards China and intensely criticized Chinese FDI and business acceptance by the party leader and the Shadow Cabinet. As the Labor Party tends to despise the dependence on the FDI, and emphasizes fiscal policies, the Conservative Party's dependence on China led to the collapse of consensus. That is to say, the neoliberal consensus saw its demise around 2016, mainly because of Brexit and U.K.-China relations.

From “East of Suez” & “Asia Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific”: Rebuilding Consensus?

Being aware of the “bonds of the imperial era,” the Cameron administration began building relations with the Persian Gulf region and Southeast Asian countries from 2010, by concentrating on potential areas in which the U.K. could play a role. Initially, the U.K. had begun to expand its political and economic relations with the Gulf countries, and signed bilateral cooperation agreements one after another mainly to broaden the development of its naval aviation. On the other hand, in Southeast Asia, where relations were weakened, military action was limited for a short period to initiate the establishment of diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, around 2018, the U.K. declared its intention to increase its permanent presence in the region. It has been pointed out that the deployment of British forces in the Gulf region may serve as a model. Relating to this announcement, large-scale military defense expenditure and asset reductions specified in the 2010 “National Strategic

Defense and Security Review” were also improved with the 2015 edition. In fact, the latter is additionally directed as a reference to the Asia-Pacific.

As mentioned above, there were already negotiations on the return to East of Suez even before the 2016 U.K. European Union membership referendum. However, they indeed became more prominent as a response to the referendum’s result. For instance, in 2016, Johnson, who was the prime minister at the time, stated that the 1968 decision to withdraw from East of Suez was a ‘mistake’ and that he plans to expand the U.K.’s involvement in the Gulf countries. In 2017, Jones (First Sea Lord) stated that the U.K. should play a role in the maritime security of Europe, the U.S. (NATO), and the Gulf region / Asia-Pacific. This statement implies the increased importance of the Gulf Coast and Asia-Pacific in the U.K. and reveals the necessity of forming an Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific strategy by policy institutes or think tanks.

Furthermore, in March of 2021, the U.K. published a comprehensive security policy review entitled “Integrated Review”. Even though the U.K. government traditionally mentions the term ‘Asia-Pacific’ when referring to Asia, it appears that the word “Indo-Pacific” was deliberately used in the “Integrated Review”. While the announcement of “Integrated Review” and setting forth ‘The Indo-Pacific Tilt’, in the document commenced the U.K.’s current policy of involvement in the region, it is also highlighted that publishing a policy document specific to the area, such as those of Germany, France, and the E.U., remains necessary. In any event, the U.K. certainly presented a strategy of involvement in the Indo-Pacific region and is now in the process of examining how to envisage and implement it in the future.

It seems that the shift in the U.K. and China relations have had an impact on the transformation of ‘East of Suez’ and ‘Asia Pacific’ into ‘Indo-Pacific’. In 2016, when the Brexit referendum was held, there was also another diplomatic conflict in the South China Sea. Therefore, during 2017, many cabinet ministers remarked on sending naval vessels and potential aircraft carriers to the South China Sea, while finance minister Hammond and others have presented their concerns about possible adverse effects of such operation on economic relations with China. Besides, Prime Minister May, who mentioned the dispatching of ships in the first place, later distanced herself from the discussion, in consideration of relations with China. Nevertheless, Hammond left the Conservative Party in 2019; thus, the relationship between the U.K.

and China certainly continued to deteriorate in 2020, due to the Hong Kong issue and China's position in the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Labor Party has been advocating this cautionary position against China for a long time. Currently, under the leadership of Starmer, the Labor Party has returned to middle-of-the-road policy while still maintaining Corbyn's type of caution towards China. Their support of domestic politics involves restrictions on FDI and the supply chain. At the same time, their foreign policies include building relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific region that are conscious of China. Furthermore, due to Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Conservative Party seems to have steered away from austerity in economic policies. In other words, even though currently the U.K. is in a situation of turmoil and has an unstable foreign policy, the third consensus is nearby. Such agreement may remain at the leadership level of both parties, yet it is vital to note that it may provide some stability to Indo-Pacific engagement.

On the other hand, domestic politics and public opinion have not agreed on the deployment of British troops in the Indo-Pacific; hence the U.K. government will be expected to deliver a precise and more detailed justification of such necessity. While the general agreement is that the Indo-Pacific is crucial to the U.K. and related policies must be pursued, there is still hardly any consensus on providing a security guarantee, especially by the military. However, there is a particular union between the Conservative and Labor Parties that the U.K.'s primary mission is to contribute to European security through NATO. The government, political parties, public opinion, and research institutes have seemingly not concluded their thoughts on a military involvement policy in the Indo-Pacific, whereas the Johnson administration certainly aims to develop a military initiative.

Europe's Indo-Pacific Policy: Relations with the U.K.

After the discussion on the U.K.'s involvement in Indo-Pacific from the perspective of the U.K.'s domestic politics, now I aim to discuss the U.K.'s relationship with the Indo-Pacific policies of European countries and the E.U.. France obviously is the first European nation to develop progressive policies towards the Indo-Pacific since it has the largest territory, EEZ,

population, and military force amongst any European country. Europe's first Asia-Pacific documents called "France and Security in the Asia" were respectively published in 2014, 2016, and 2018 (which was renamed as "Indo-Pacific"). In 2019, a document entitled "Indo-Pacific's National Defense Strategy" was published by France's Ministry of Military Affairs. France even carried out separate navigation operations and joint military exercises with Japan, the United States, and Australia. In 2021, France's Indo-Pacific Strategy, constructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was published to revise the previous strategy. These facts above demonstrate that France stands out among the other European countries owing to the number of policy documents on the Indo-Pacific, and will undoubtedly promote several practical strategies.

China primarily triggers the expansion of France's Indo-Pacific policy. As evident in the 2008 Defense White Paper, France initially intended to focus only on the Western Indian Ocean, also called the "arc of instability". Nevertheless, France was also aware of the necessity to strengthen its involvement in Asia, considering that the initiatives such as "The Rise of China and India by 2025" would change the international strategic environment. In other words, the concept of connecting the Indian Ocean region with the Pacific region is not a recent phenomenon. After the release of this document, France examined China's growing influence not only on the South China Sea but also on the Pacific islands; consequently, the Indo-Pacific policy was developed and is currently recognized as the Indo-Pacific Power.

As for the other European countries, Germany and the Netherlands prepared documents on the Indo-Pacific in September and November 2020. Even though the policies formulated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands have several unknowns about its military movement, they included actions such as dispatching naval vessels to a joint U.K.-U.S. carrier strike group and joint exercises between Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.. Germany's "Indo-Pacific Guidelines" were approved by the Cabinet. They cover policies on a wide range of areas, involving strengthening multilateral security, promoting trade, addressing human rights issues, and promoting the rule of law. Germany's policies are aimed to diversify its diplomatic relations, so there have been considerations on economic interactions with China. Nevertheless, they still concentrate on security, such as dispatching

naval vessels to the area.

Currently, the three major European powers (the U.K., France, and Germany), and the Netherlands, are in the stage of advancing their policies. Still, the policy of E.U. involvement in the Indo-Pacific will attract more attention in the future. In April of 2021, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on “the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”. In September, the European Commission and the European External Action Service published “Joint Communication on the Indo-Pacific Strategy”. Under these policies, we can expect the E.U. to announce and advance its Indo-Pacific strategy soon. However, cooperation between Germany and France is considered necessary even today, and both countries have made public statements confirming it. France is inclined to have a flexible and independent partnership with the QUAD and other countries. At the same time, Germany wishes to have a comprehensive strategy at the E.U. level and cooperation with regional organizations such as ASEAN. There are also other differences of opinion between France and Germany on traditional security issues of Europe. For example, France is flexible in employing military power in the region, whereas Germany has strong domestic constraints on such involvement. Therefore, we can say that these differences in the Indo-Pacific policies are likely to trigger future discussions.

How does the U.K. relate to the Indo-Pacific strategies of these European countries and the E.U.? The U.K., France, Germany, and the E.U. share similar fundamental values; thus, we can suppose further cooperation on global issues from a normative perspective. In fact, the E.U. document mentioned above includes the U.K. as a potential partner in the Indo-Pacific, whereas France, which has deployed assets in the Indo-Pacific, has been regarded as a potential partner for security cooperation. Since 2010, the U.K. and France have strengthened their relationship by establishing a joint integrated expeditionary force and continually conducting training. Collaboration has been discussed in other security fields, even though they plan to operate these activities in the vicinity of Europe. In addition, both the U.K. and France have established separate connections with the QUAD and various Indo-Pacific countries.

However, the new security cooperation framework AUKUS announced by the U.S., the U.K., and Australia in September 2021 triggered a conflict

with European countries. AUKUS is a framework to promote security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. It involves collaboration on economic security (including supply chains) and technological fields, such as cyber security and artificial intelligence. Besides, it is expected to include provision technology and cooperation on nuclear submarines. Due to this pact, the Australian government abandoned their submarine construction plan contracted with a French company. Besides, the planning process of AUKUS was kept secret from NATO's ally European countries in the first place, leading to a conflict between the U.S., the U.K., Australia, France, and the E.U.. Although relations are currently restored in September of the same year, the conflict undoubtedly opened a new chapter to the traditional cooperation and confrontation structure between the U.S., U.K., Australia, and Europe. The dispute undeniably will hinder the cooperation between these countries and affect the U.K.'s involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

On the other hand, both the U.K. and France have committed to cooperating with the QUAD, which involves a group of countries such as the US and Australia. Progress on AUKUS would allow the U.K. to build further cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, and it would be absurd for France or the E.U. to not align with the U.S., the U.K., and Australia in their activities in the Indo-Pacific region. As a part of the improvement of relations between AUKUS, the E.U. and its member states, it is expected that the relations between the U.S. and France will improve and deepen further.

Conclusion: Towards the Stabilization of Involvement

To sum it up, the U.K. is possibly aware of the emergence of the third consensus politics in the wake of Brexit and the weakening of its relations with China. For now, a consensus can only be observed in the Conservative Party, Labor Party Cabinet, and Shadow Cabinet, but if the previous consensus could lead to an agreement on the foreign policy, the third consensus politics can bring stability to the Indo-Pacific involvement. Nevertheless, there are still many uncertainties in terms of security, and it can be said that military deployment by government initiatives is still in progress. From the perspective of foreign policy, AUKUS may become one of the external factors consolidating the U.K.'s involvement in the Indo-Pacific if only it continues to develop in the

future. However, it is still too early to claim certain assumptions.

Until now, the U.K. utilized its relations with the Middle East and the Gulf Region as a bridge to its Indo-Pacific involvement. Even though the relations with the European countries have temporarily deteriorated, cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is evidently indispensable in the military field and for promoting a wide range of policies, such as strengthening the supply chain and forming new strategies in the Indo-Pacific. Due to Brexit, it might be difficult for the U.K. to act as a bridge between the U.S. and Europe, yet cooperation of the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and the E.U. in the Indo-Pacific is still necessary. The U.K. is expected to improve its relations with France and the E.U..

In any event, the involvement of European countries (including the U.K.) in the Indo-Pacific on security areas was initiated not long ago and is not continually stable. As far as the U.K.'s politics are concerned, the situation remains unstable, although there is a possibility of an emerging consensus. In the 2021 by-elections, affected by political instability after Brexit, and economic instability due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Conservative Party won the Labor Party stronghold. In contrast, the Liberal Democratic Party won the Conservative Party stronghold. Furthermore, in the Scottish Parliament elections of the same year, the pro-independence Scottish National Party won a majority. The U.K. will unlikely allow a Scottish independence referendum, but the situation will be a definite source of instability in due course.

The instability in the U.K.'s domestic politics is expected to continue. The U.K. government must maintain at least a minimum consensus within the country and not let such uncertainty affect its foreign and Indo-Pacific policies. In addition, not only the U.K. but Europe as a whole is expected to establish a structure of involvement by strengthening bilateral relations with Indo-Pacific countries and growing connections with relevant regional frameworks such as the QUAD and AUKUS. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific countries must also state the need for the involvement of European countries, consider the necessity of cooperation, and attempt to integrate European countries into the regional framework.

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「インド太平洋」地域外交に向けた日本の外交政策への提言*

Recommendations on Japan's Foreign Policy towards 'Indo-Pacific' Regional Diplomacy**

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Recommendation 1:

Following the international affairs trends in the recent years, "Indo-Pacific" has become important as a unified regional concept. Japan's foreign policy should go beyond the narrow perspective of bilateral relations and develop a dynamic "Indo-Pacific diplomacy" strategy by adopting a broader perspective that integrates politics, economics, and security.

In addition to regional concepts such as 'Northeast Asia', 'Southeast Asia', 'Asian-Pacific' and 'East Asia'; 'Indo-Pacific' is being formed as a broader regional concept connecting the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. The reason for this is as follows: growing interest in maritime security, India's advancement and changes in its foreign relations (stronger economic, political and security ties with other Asian countries), expansion of the Asian economic sphere towards Myanmar, Bangladesh and India, and finally the distress on the security of maritime transportation routes caused by China's advance into the ocean.

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** Summarized and translated by Selin Kütükçü.

Australia has already adopted the 'Indo-Pacific' concept in the official documents of the government, and benefitted from this concept in strengthening relations with India and cooperating with Indian Ocean nations. Until this event, the fact that Australia is not considered an Asian country, even though it is located in Asia, has been creating discomfort for Asian countries throughout the years. For Australia, the 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept will not only set the country free from its Asian roots, but will also support Australia's dynamic foreign policy as a regional concept that stems from its natural location. Australia is in the process of becoming the center of Indo-Pacific region from its former 'down under' (the other side of the world from China's perspective) position.

In India, whether or not to adopt the 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept is still being debated. However, if we look at the country's advancement in economy and security which is the government's focus on foreign policy (QUAD¹ or strengthening the relations with ASEAN countries), it suggests that the country is developing its foreign relation policy with this Indo-Pacific regional concept in mind.

China is hesitant to use the term 'Indo-Pacific'. A probable reason for that might be the US Republican security specialists, who are advocates of the vigilance against China, often associating their opinions with 'Indo-Pacific' regional concept. China's Xi Jinping administration's 'Maritime Silk Road' vision was aimed at combating the Chinese version of the 'Indo-Pacific' or the US 'rebalancing policy' with the idea to expand its impact area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and even to the Middle East.

In Indonesia, many important steps were taken towards adopting the Indo-Pacific concept by the former administration. The current government of Jokowi has already launched its main policy with a national goal of transforming Indonesia into a Maritime Axis, to advance its development as a maritime state. Indonesia is currently developing its foreign relations with keeping its geographically strategic position located between the Pacific and Indian Ocean in mind.

Obama administration's 'rebalancing policy' is also based on the awareness

1 QUADrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) group is a response to a growing China whose economic and military might is causing instability to an already established international order.

that the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean are becoming one. The 'Indo-Pacific' region concept has been supported by Republican security specialists against China's expansion risk into the Pacific Ocean.

Japan will be required to make some policy changes on the Indo-Pacific region. It is especially important to determine geopolitical and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific and take Japan's own national interests into consideration. A comprehensive, encompassing, multi-lateral approach should be adopted across all the departments of the government. For example, in the past, important measures were implemented to increase Japan's coastal security power. Even though improvements of warships were made and aircrafts were sold to various countries in the Indo-Pacific region such as Vietnam, Philippines and India, no cross-regional framework has been established. Instead of a division method by region or country, the first step should be implementing a comprehensive and cross-regional policy of "the intersection of two seas" proposed by former prime minister Abe, encompassing the whole Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 2:

Japan's strategic objective in the Indo-Pacific region is to maintain and strengthen the liberal, open, rules-based international order that has supported the peace and prosperity in the region for many years. In terms of security, policies should be established based on the principle of openness and stable use of the wide trade-areas and maritime commons that run through all the way from Pacific Ocean to the Singapore Strait and Indian Ocean to Middle East and East Africa. Japan must take confidence-building measures by establishing consensus among the aforementioned countries and encourage the coastal nations to enhance their precaution monitoring abilities. In this regard, Japan should further strengthen the cooperation with countries of the Bay of Bengal which are located in strategic locations in the Indo-Pacific and the South China Sea.

The strategic goal for Japan is to maintain the existing free and open, rules-based international order in the vast region connecting the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In order to achieve this goal, strengthening of cooperation with the relevant countries in the region is a must. In particular, it is important

to cooperate with countries in the Indian Ocean such as Australia, Indonesia and India which are democracies that share the same liberal values and ideas with Japan and the United States. Japan, along with its ally United States, should encourage the cooperation with aforementioned countries that value a free and open, rule-based international order.

The Indian Ocean is an ‘international trade route’ with more than 75% of goods transported to East Asia passing through. Even though there is no urgent threat on the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca might get affected by the conflict greatly, considering its strategic location. It is the maritime choke point of the Indian Ocean Trade Route and connects to the South China Sea. If a particular nation seeks to control the waters, the openness of the Global Commons will be lost and the maritime choke points will become unstable.

In order for the Indian Ocean Highway to be stable, countries with interests in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (directly adjacent countries: India, Indonesia, ASEAN countries, Australia, China and also other countries with bigger interests including the U.S. and Japan) need to recognize the maritime region as global commons and develop a rule and consensus to ensure its stability and free use.

In addition, competition between major countries is likely to intensify in the Bay of Bengal, which is located at the western exit of the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, it is even more crucial to establish relations with countries around there such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Recommendation 3:

From the economic perspective, the decisions taken within the scope of TPP which aimed to harmonize and integrate the domestic economic systems of the countries concerned, and expansion to other countries should be implemented in this period as well and a conclusion should be reached. Japan should hurry to formulate a “post-TPP strategy” in order to maintain and improve a free, open and rules-based international order. After that, measures should be taken to encourage Indonesia and other ASEAN countries to adopt the measures that were discussed within the scope of former TPP (about relations with aforementioned countries, institutional reform, improving the human resources, etc.). Whether the countries will implement the former TPP decisions will probably have a decisive impact on the future of the Indo-Pacific regional order.

Asian countries have achieved a great economic success by opening their markets, actively introducing foreign capital and exporting products to overseas markets under liberal international order such as GATT/WTO.² While doing so, Asian countries that were sceptical about the free trade system once, have accepted liberal economic norms, including the principle of free trade. China is no exception to this phenomenon. It has gradually embraced liberal economic principles while maintaining the political system run by a single Chinese Communist Party.

The international liberal economic order, until the last few years, had the flexibility to consider the differences of countries and to value the uniqueness of each country with respect to the domestic regulatory system, while raising a code of liberalism. Therefore, Asian countries could participate in this international liberal economic order while preserving their traditional domestic systems.

However, later on, the decisions made on the TPP showed that the main aim was to form a "strong regional system" in which domestic regulatory systems of each country should be integrated rather than the "flexible regional system" in which national circumstances are considered as well. Therefore, Japan should actively encourage the decisions taken in the context of TPP back then to be implemented as soon as possible. It should also set out a "Post-TPP Strategy" to encourage the ASEAN countries to follow the decisions that was supposed to come into force with TPP and make efforts to create a free trade zone in the Indo-Pacific region. While doing so, Japan should be careful about the difficulties faced by the countries of the Indo-Pacific in the process of adapting to this new perspective that had come with TPP. It is not a good idea for Japan to have an image of being completely aligned with the United States, from other countries' perspectives, since the US policies sometimes might be too radical. While protecting its image, Japan should politely explain that the measures on market opening and economic system reforms in Asian countries that were a part of TPP will contribute to the economic modernization of the relevant countries and will ensure long-term sustainable development.

2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations.

Therefore, Japan needs to play a difficult but meaningful role in bridging the gap between the high demands of the United States and the reality of the Asian economy. Acting as an intermediary will ensure Japan to win the reputation as an independent and influential country in the Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 4:

In terms of the international relations in the Indo-Pacific region, it is important for Japan's diplomacy to deal not only with major powers, but also with other swing-states in the region such as India, Indonesia, Australia and ASEAN countries. The diplomacy must ensure that these swing states cooperate in forming a liberal, open, and rule-based order.

The important focus of the U.S. "Rebalancing Policy" as well as China's "Peripheral Diplomacy" and "Maritime Silk Road Initiative" is to consolidate ties with these swing states and to get their support. Trends in countries that have traditionally been considered as the "periphery" of the Asia-Pacific region are becoming the main focus that influences trends in international affairs.

As a leading power in the Indian Pacific, Japan should keep a close watch on the fluid power relations between the U.S. and China. However, Japan also must not forget to pay attention to the countries other than these two. The future of the Indo-Pacific is likely to be dominated by not only the U.S. and China, but also other countries as well.

One thing to note about Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomacy is that the ideal international relations concept in countries such as India and Indonesia (and most of the countries in the Pacific region) is closer to traditional nationalism in China, rather than liberal ideas similar to those in the U.S. and Australia. For example, these swing states' perception of the norms of the international economy, how international relations should be, the domestic political system and sovereignty, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, are highly in line with the Chinese way of thinking. However, there is a deep-rooted belief among Asian swing states that they should overcome the traditional idea of national sovereignty and align with the liberal rules

and norms of the international community. In fact, ASEAN countries are still working together to build the 'ASEAN Community' based on liberal principles.

Japan should actively support ASEAN's efforts regardless of the problems that might come up in forming the ASEAN Community. Such a community is expected to contribute to the establishment of a liberal, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

Recommendation 5:

As a response to China's "detour" strategy, more importance should be put on the Indo-Pacific diplomacy from now on. It appears like China has been working on adopting its "detour" strategy without conforming to nor challenging the liberal order. Japan should respond to China's attempts at performing its detour strategy by promoting a comprehensive approach that sympathizes with liberal international order

The first step must be concentrating on the urgent diplomatic issue centered around China-led AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). Institutions which have played a fundamental role in forming a postwar liberal international order; The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, should work on strengthening their response in a flexible and detailed manner, while also seeking to align with AIIB's international standards.

The terms 'power transition' and 'power shift' often come up when talking about international affairs in the Indo-Pacific. The reason is the rise of emerging powers such as China and India, and the relative decline of the United States' dominance. The main issue of the 'transition of power' in international relations is whether China will use its power for the benefit of the existing liberal international order or challenge the existing order to create a new international order. In other words, it is a question of 'conformity or challenge'.

It was hoped that the measures taken to incorporate China into the regional economic network and regional system would encourage China to align with the liberal international order and transform it into a responsible member of the international community.

However, does the debate on whether China will conform or challenge reflect China's real stance? It is important to note that the liberal international order formed after the war was flexible and has allowed each country to maintain its own domestic mechanisms. As a result, Asian countries including China became a part of this order to stimulate economic growth. However, the current regional approach does not allow such flexibility and calls for a strong sympathy for liberal norms and standardization in each country's domestic mechanisms. On the other hand, China is trying to build its own regional system by 'detouring' rather than completely challenging or conforming to the liberal order code. In other words, China refuses to conform to rules and norms if they're not desirable for itself, while enjoying the benefits of liberal order. Instead, China develops its own mechanism (in a loose liberal manner) and seeks sympathy.

Considering China's support for the economic development in Asia with the "New Asia Security Concept" at the CICA (Conference on Mutual Cooperation and Development in Asia) in May 2014, "Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)", it can be said that China does not openly challenge the existing international order established with IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Instead, they try to 'detour' them and create new organizations based on its own norms. For China, it is essential that the international free trade system will be maintained since it has been implementing the policies that benefits from the introduction of foreign capital and the export-led economic growth. Therefore, it can be said that China is a beneficiary of an existing liberal order but still is not seeking to change its stance on the defiance of the GATT/WTO and IMF systems that are the center of the liberal international order.

The '21st Century Marine Silk Road' initiative led by China may challenge Japan's Indo-Pacific' strategy. Henceforward, while observing the progress of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", Japan must make sure that the development of this initiative concerned with the maritime order will conform to the free and open rules-based order supported by Japan and the United States.

Recommendation 6:

In order to maintain and consolidate the involvement of the U.S. interest in the Asian region, Japan should dispel Asian countries' concerns on the U.S. involvement and persistent stance on the region through building up the Japan-U.S. alliance further.

Asian countries generally appreciate the Obama administration's 'rebalancing policy' however, some countries have doubts about the United States' involvement in Asia and demand its withdrawal even though the United States itself claims to be a "staying power" in the Asian region. The sceptical views of Asian countries on the US involvement have influenced their approach to China's policies and Asian economic and security issues. Japan should play a major role as a cornerstone for the United States' involvement because U.S. active diplomatic involvement is essential for the 'Indo-Pacific' to be perceived as a feasible regional concept.

The question is whether the United States can formulate a sustainable, consistent and integrated Asian policy that is in tune with regional countries, to earn their trust. In order for the development of a practical strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States and Japan should work together in developing policies.

Recommendation 7:

We should strengthen the regional system that encompasses the Indo-Pacific region by efficiently making use of EAS (East Asia Summit). First, the countries concerned should collectively put out an "EAS Leaders' Statement".

ASEAN countries should be encouraged to incorporate their principles on the "Code of Conduct" for the South China Sea into this Statement. The EAS Leaders' Statement on the Domination of the Territory and Maritime Issues should ensure political commitment that compiles with the peaceful resolution principles through international rules.

The EAS Leaders' Statement should include (1) solid arguments on EAS' position as the higher authority to discuss political and security issues, (2) set

out basic principles concerning the international relations in the Indo-Pacific region and reach a consensus on the rules and norms that countries should follow. Japan should also consider incorporating various measures in the Statement for it to serve as an alternative to the negotiations on COC (Code of Conduct) between ASEAN and China which is unlikely to be finalized in the near future.

For this reason, it is important to get the ASEAN support on the basic principles regulating international relations and Japan must consult with ASEAN countries that play a central role in the summit frequently. Some basic principles that should be included in the statement are as follows:

The countries should;

- Emphasize the importance of maintaining the order of the oceans, including the freedom of navigation stated in the international law.
- Stand up against using intimidation, compulsion and force to restrict another country's territorial and maritime rights.
- Urge the other relevant countries to clarify the basis for their claims of maritime rights according to the international law in case a dispute over sovereignty and maritime interests arises.
- Support the diplomatic and legal measures, including international arbitration, to resolve maritime disputes.

Recommendation 8:

Policies to build an economic architecture for the Indo-Pacific region should be formulated. In particular, Japan should support ASEAN's economic integration and stability, and build up economic relations with countries around the Indian Ocean.

Currently, ASEAN is in the works of a regional cooperation, therefore Japan's support will contribute to the stability of ASEAN in the future. Various Japanese companies in those countries are means to influence the Indian economy. In addition to India, Japanese diplomacy should also strengthen economic relations with countries in the Indian Ocean such as Bangladesh,

Sri Lanka, Australia, etc. through implementing measures to form “strategic economic partnerships”.

To form economic partnerships with these countries, Japan should strategically utilize ODA.³ In recent years, the ODA budget in Japan has shrunk, dropping to the fifth largest in the world by OECD⁴ standards. Japanese diplomacy should strategically utilize the repayable yen loan to strengthen economic partnerships with Indian Ocean countries. By investing in the infrastructure development in these countries, Japan would be able to promote connectivity.

Recommendation 9:

The India-Japan partnership should be strengthened in the economic sphere and Japan's importance should be implied through the process. Especially, Japanese government should make substantial commitment in helping to connect India with South Asia, South East Asia through “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” (IPEC) vision which is approved by the U.S. as well.

As long as the current international environment continues, Indian prime minister Modi's administration will maintain and strengthen its involvement in the Indo-Pacific and China. However, there is no guarantee that the international environment will remain unchanged. The whereabouts of US policy toward China and Sino-US relations will have a great impact on China's policy toward India and Sino-India. Since India is an influential swing state in the region, Modi administration could be likely to invest more in the Japan-Australia- U.S. vision of the Indo-Pacific, or they could also economically and politically lean on China more. For Japan, it is clear that the latter scenario is not desirable because of the formal Japan- United States alliance. In that sense, it is essential to first try to make Modi's administration become aware of Japan's importance in the economy realm that is on par with China. The closer economic relations with India are expected to contribute to Japan's

³ Official Development Assistance

⁴ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

diplomacy and security in the long run, even if they are not profitable in the short run. Given that the Modi administration has agreed with the United States to improve connectivity through the “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” (IPEC),⁵ Japan’s cooperation and substantive commitment to this initiative are also required not just for the reasons stated above but also for the benefit of Japanese companies that is based in the ASEAN region.

Recommendation 10:

Indonesia’s Jokowi administration’s Maritime Axis Doctrine resonates in many ways with Japan’s Indo-Pacific regional strategy, which aims to maintain and strengthen a free and open maritime order. Japan should actively commit to both public and private efforts to support Indonesia’s maritime axis vision through various sectors.

Indonesia is the key country in Japan’s Indo-Pacific policy. Therefore, it benefits Japan for Indonesia to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific with Jokowi administration’s goal to make Indonesia a global maritime axis. Japan can support Indonesia’s goal by cooperating on maritime defence, or by strengthening countermeasures against pirates and maritime crimes. Support for human resource development in respect to maritime crimes is also important. In addition to providing short-term training at Japan Coast Guard Academy in Kure, Japan’s investment and assistance are expected by Indonesia for the development of marine resources and the strengthening of marine infrastructure as stated in Indonesia’s Global Maritime Axis Doctrine.

5 The “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor” seeks to connect India with South Asia, South East Asia and East Asia through Myanmar.

Recommendation 11:

For ASEAN, Japan should promote a policy that regards the Indo-Pacific region as one economic zone. For example, involvement in the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multidisciplinary Technology and Economic Cooperation) should enhance economic connectivity between Southeast Asia and South Asia. In particular, a policy should be set out to reduce China's influence on "CLMT" countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) as much as possible by supporting their economic development to break their dependence on Chinese economy. Also, Japan and the United States should build strong ties with Thailand. The main aim of Japan's approach to ASEAN should be to maintain the basic elements for the formation of ASEAN Community.

Japan should first focus on the topic of economic architecture in its Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Policies should aim to promote increased connectivity within the Indo-Pacific Economic Zone or the Indian Ocean Rim Association. Getting ASEAN countries' support is vital for Japan's Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Therefore, it would not be wise to launch Indo-Pacific regional policy as an opposition to China since ASEAN countries are cautious about restrictive policies that put issues concerning China on the spot.

ASEAN countries put great importance to the economic ties of the Indo-Pacific (especially South Africa and Southeast Asia) and are trying to reduce their economic dependence on China. What Japan should do is to build strong economic connections between Indo-Pacific countries (especially Southeast Asia and South Asia) and reduce their economic dependence on China.

The next issue will be how to control China's growing influence on CLMT countries. In particular, the role of Thailand is important considering its strategic location. Japan and the United States should strengthen their ties with Thailand to increase their political and economic influence on the Southeast and South Asian regions. Thailand is an U.S. ally and has a deep economic relationship with Japan. However, the military coup in Thailand has complicated its relationship with the United States so it'd be fair to say Thailand is deeply dissatisfied with the United States. Therefore, Japan should form a comprehensive dialog and take measures to strengthen ties with Thailand by consulting with the United States.

In summary, Japan's strategic objective is to support the Southeast Asian countries' goal to build a regional community centered on ASEAN and make sure the rules and order of the ASEAN regional community are free, open and in line with Japan's expectations.

Recommendation 12:

Japan's major partner, Australia should promote stronger Australia-Japan relations from the economy and security perspective and encourage Swing State countries to adopt free, open, international rules and norms through trilateral cooperation (Japan-Australia-Indonesia, Japan-India-Australia, Japan-Australia- Myanmar).

Australia is Japan's major partner in maintaining and strengthening a free and open rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific region. Close cooperation is elevated between Japan and Australia not only in terms of economy but also in terms of security as well. However, as China's influence on the Australian economy intensifies, some oppositions on Australia's close partnership with Japan and the United States comes to the surface with the concern that this partnership could complicate relations with China. Therefore, Japan should not fully rely upon Australia's support for Japanese policies. In the future, Japan should continue this cooperation and carry out policy discussions while keeping in mind that Australia's domestic politics may become complicated in terms of its cooperation with Japan.

Recommendation 13:

Track 2 dialogues should be actively carried out with the United States and other related countries in order to foster a common understanding of the desirable regional order vision on the Indo-Pacific.

The 'Indo-Pacific' concept became more and more important for Japan's diplomatic and security policies under the Second Abe Administration. In the future, Japan's diplomatic and security experts should actively engage

in Track 2⁶ dialogue with experts from countries such as the United States, India, Australia, and Indonesia to foster a common understanding of the desirable regional order in Indo-Pacific. Therefore, the Japanese government should increase its financial support for non-official diplomatic exchange and dialog activities.

Recommendation 14:

Necessary foreign policy and security policy tools should be developed so that Japan can play a sufficient role in building and maintaining the security order in the Indo-Pacific region.

It would not be enough to simply regard the Indo-Pacific policy as a new rhetorical or language expression. If Japan itself does not take the necessary action to build up and maintain the desirable security order in the Indo-Pacific, under the banner of proactive pacifism, based on internationalism, it will not be possible to demonstrate leadership on the region. To achieve this, the government must urgently prepare necessary policy tools, including developing military capacity centering on the Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Recommendation 15:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan should consider establishing a department that is in charge of the "Indo-Pacific Policy".

Up until now, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' regional policy initiative, the Regional Policy Division of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, has played an important role in going over the measures to encourage a cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, by acknowledging the significance of the entire Southeast Asia region, particularly the ASEAN countries. Considering the importance of the ASEAN for Japanese diplomacy, it is not a good idea to change the name of the Regional Policy Division. Instead, a new

6 "Track 2" refers to non-official diplomatic activities that facilitate confidence building and confidence resolution among states.

Indo-Pacific Policy Office should be established within the Regional Policy Division or the South-West Asian Affairs Department. Its function should be comprehensively analyzing and examining the politic, economic, security and military trends throughout the entire Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 16:

Japanese people should be educated on the importance of strengthening the relations with Swing States and overall “Indo-Pacific” regional concept which is a relatively new concept to Japan’s Asia strategy.

A country’s diplomacy must be broadly supported by the public opinion. In order to draw the ideal image of the Indo-Pacific for Japan and to make it a pillar of Japan’s future Asia strategy, it is essential to foster the understanding and sense among Japanese people that Japan belongs to the Indo-Pacific Region. To that end, the Prime Minister and other political leaders must step up their efforts to explain the public about the necessity and legitimacy of this new regional concept for Japan. The government should persuade the public on why Japan needs this new pattern of regional order through using prime ministers’ policy speech and even active media awareness campaigns.

Notes

This paper is a summary of the policy recommendations in each chapter of “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s Foreign Relations and Security Research Project”.

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